UNDERSTANDING

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY:

CHURCHILL'S THREE MAJESTIC CIRCLES

AND CASE STUDY ON BRITISH INVOLVEMENT IN

IRAQ WAR

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Abstract

To survive in this world of different states and interests, foreign policy is an absolute vital element on the stability and success of a state. British foreign policy (BFP) possesses interesting approaches on managing international affairs, contributed by their history and ideology.

To examine the workings of BFP, this paper has briefly reviewed British history of the past 300 years, BFP concept such as Winston Churchill's "Three Majestic Circles", and theories on analysing foreign policy including the "Three Models" from *Essence of Decision* by Allison Graham and theory on national interest by Donald E. Nuechterlein. Also, a case study has been conducted regarding British involvement in Iraq War with a dedicated database composed of 86 items from the following six factors, British Political Elites, British Public Opinion, US Government, European Union, United Nations, and Iraq and Arab World.

What prompted the British to join the widely regarded unjust invasion of Iraq in 2003, which costs the British government lives and billions? This paper suggests that the essence of BFP is to pursue a higher than usual status for a middle power, through elements like the "Special Relationship" with United States, which came from the "Three Circles" concept. Furthermore, this paper argues that this extended diplomatic relationship between the two governments is unusual but effective. If properly conducted, smaller states could also utilise the leverage this approach provides and expend its sphere of influence. Taiwan, or the R.O.C. government, as a relatively small state with unusual diplomatic status, could and should learn from the cases and "outside-the-box" approaches of BFP.

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INTRODUCTION

Background

The year 1945 marked the end of World War II, but it also signalled the start of a

new era in international affairs. The United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR)

have succeeded the United Kingdom (UK) as the dominating force of the world. The

economy and armed forces of UK have been heavily compromised during the war and

were no match to the superpowers. One indication of such decline could be found in

UK's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In 1870, at the height of the British Empire, the

UK when combined with its satellite states has the highest GDP in the world, about

15.5% higher than the US and contained a quarter of the world's total.[1] But, in 1950,

the GDP of the US is about 23.5% higher than the UK.[2] This significant discrepancy

prompts Sir Winston Churchill, who lead the UK through World War II, to devise a

new foreign policy approach, that is the "Three Majestic Circles", which he

introduced in the 69th annual Conservative Party Conference in 1948. The three

circles are inter-linked and consist of the following:[3]

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[1] Goedele De Keersmaeker, *Polarity, Balance of Power and International Relations Theory: Post-Cold War and the 19th Century Compared* (Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2017).
[2] Jutta Bolt et al., *Maddison Project Database: New Income Comparisons and the Shape of Long-Run Economic Development* (2018).
[3] Winston Churchill, "Conservative Mass Meeting: A Speech at Llandudno, 9 October 1948," in *Europe Unite: Speeches 1947 & 1948* (London: Cassell, 1950).

1. The Commonwealth and (British) Empire.

2. The English-speaking countries, which includes the United States.

3. A united Europe.

Figure 1. Winston Churchill's "Three Circles" Foreign Policy Concept

Churchill argues that the UK is the only state that "has a great part in every one of them", if the British could link them together "there is no force or combination which could overthrow them or even challenge them", and this would once again propel the British to its glory.[4] As the result, starting from his second term as Prime Minister in 1951, UK's foreign policy have been, consciously or unconsciously, underpinned by this ideology.[5]

Today (2019), 71 years after Churchill first introduced his master plan, the context which it was meant to be applied in, mainly the international environment and the role of the UK, have changed, again, in a considerable margin. The position UK strive to procure by connecting the three circles has cost them greatly, in the form of military expenditure and human life in Iraq War, and the worsening economic and

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[4] Ibid.
[5] Christopher Hill, "British Foreign Policy Priorities: Tough Choices," *The World Today* 66, no. 4 (2010).

political status in Brexit. But, remarkably, the basic principles of the "three circles" are still in service. However, is it because the "three circles" are ingenious or stubbornness at work? Could this age-old principle still cuts it, or is it time for it to retire?

Motive

It is remarkable, to an extent surprising, to know the fact that a country as advanced as the UK has clung on to the same foreign policy principles for the last seven decades. Although some British, mainly the younger generation, can grasp the fact that they are not what they were at the start of the 20th century anymore, but there are still strong voices, predominantly the elders, expressing that UK shall not be confined to what they are today, not just a middle power or a mere member of the European Union (EU). The result of the 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum (also known as Brexit) expressed this point very clearly. From the percentage of "leave" and "remine" voters, we can see the number of supporters on each side are very close, 51.9% for leave and 48.1% for remain[6], almost a 50/50 division.

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[6] BBC, "Eu Referendum Results," accessed 22 Sep. 2019.
https://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results.

To fully understand this partition, and other elements of the British foreign policy, this paper will be exploring British history and period foreign policy of the last 300 years in later chapters to observe how modern British foreign policy came to be.

Another point of motivation is that researches usually focus on how to make a state stronger, more powerful, and more influential. This paper argues, however, it is also very crucial to investigate how a former superpower could transition back into a normal state with success and smoothness when they are surpassed by new dominating states.

Significance

Like your favourite television series, there bound to be an end for superpowers as well. The Spanish, the British, and the Soviets, all were once great empires or powers that has now reduced its role or disintegrated. And the next giant to fall, if it would let itself, is the United States. The rising power of China and India are very unlikely to retard or be contained, thus, one day the United States might have to accept its decline. This research would provide a case study of the UK, home to the once great British Empire, and try to analyse the advantages and disadvantages of the British approaches towards foreign affairs, in the context of an empire turned middle power.

Purpose

By analysing cases from British foreign affairs in the past decades, this paper

will strive to clarify the underlying British ideology on this matter. How the ideology

came to be, and how it shapes the path of British foreign affairs. Furthermore, in

correlation with the situation faced by the US mentioned above, what other states can

learn and find inspiration to transform and to fit their status. Beyond the application

for transformation, the position and attitude that post-empire UK adopted in dealing

with the international system can also be valuable for relatively less powerful states,

like Taiwan, to learn from.

Contribution

Enabling readers to have a quick yet comprehensive view on the history,

formulation, and some self-contradicting elements in the British foreign policy. Also,

to aid the Europeans, the Americans, and the British themselves to further clarify their

relationships, the attitude of the British, and the consequences of a failed transition of

state status. With a better acknowledgement of the situation, they, other states, and

readers will be more capable and objective when faced with state status transition and

British foreign affairs in general.

Research Question

This paper will perform an in-depth case study on the Iraq War, to observe how

and why things came to be. Also, what did the UK gain or loss from this puzzling

insistence on upholding their long lasting, if not outdated, mindset.

Limit

Since the topic for case study, British involvement in Iraq War, is a decade old,

current trends and approaches of British foreign policy could have evolved, especially

when faced with the decline of the US, the rise of China, and the further development

in Brexit. However, this research suggests the core interests of British foreign policy

indicated in this thesis is still relevant.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will investigate the past and the evolution of British foreign policy. History, quotation, and existing foreign policy theories will be utilised to examine and explain the past of British foreign policy. There will be three sections, first, "History and Period Foreign Policy" will go through the events lead to the adoption for a particular foreign policy in a specific time frame. Second, "Debates" will analyse the objective of period foreign policy with historical events and choices made by the UK government. Third, "Foreign Policy Theories" will look for established theories that might just explain the workings of British foreign policy.

History and Period Foreign Policy

To fully understand a person, we must get a grasp on his/her past, on what made one who one is today. It is also true for understanding a country. The spirit of their predecessors and history will forever remind citizens of today the greatness achieved by their country, stirring the hearts and minds of people to be sentimental about the past, about their beloved country. Apart from emotional elements, the history can also spark comparisons on past and present. UK's foreign policy is a case and point. To understand why, we need to go on a trip down memory lane.

To better understand British history, this paper has divided it into six sections, which are the following:

1. The Rise: Napoleonic Wars

2. The Height: British Empire

3. The Fall: Two World Wars

4. The Transition: Cold War

5. The Statement: Falklands War

6. The Commitment: Iraq War

The Rise: Napoleonic Wars

1803 to 1815, saw the rise of the British as a dominate force in Europe. First, the Battle of Trafalgar on 21 October 1805 procured the total control of the oceans for the UK, after the Royal Navy defeated the Franco-Spanish fleet,[7] which ensured the security of the British Isles from Napoleon hands.[8] Second, the final blow for Napoleon on 18 June 1815, the Battle of Waterloo. Where British forces and its allies successfully defeated what was left of the Napoleon forces, which forced him to abandon his throne as emperor of France four days later. These two battles may mark the end of Napoleon, but they are the sparks that started the substantial rise of the

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[7] BBC, "British History Timeline - Empire and Sea Power," accessed 15 Apr. 2019. http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/timeline/empireseapower_timeline_noflash.shtml.
[8] Nicholas A. Barr et al., "Encyclopædia Britannica - United Kingdom," accessed 15 Apr. 2019. https://www.britannica.com/place/United-Kingdom/.

British Empire. They are also proofs, proofs that the UK is the dominate force out on the seas, and later, in the Western hemisphere.

But, have you wondered, why did the British go to such great length to stop the expansion of Napoleonic France? Why not just cooperate with this force that swept across Europe? The reason is simple, if the British did cooperate with the French, then the UK would later become a mere subsidiary of the French Empire, since there were no reasons suggesting Napoleon would leave the British Isles alone. By forming a coalition with other resistant forces, the British could prevent a French hegemony in continental Europe. This trend of divide and rule by stopping the formulation of a hegemony would characterise British foreign policy.

The Height: British Empire

Riding on the success of industrial revolution, and the lack of opponents that can effectively contain the UK economically or militarily, the British Empire advanced to its apex in the mid-19th century, when the Empire controlled a quarter of the world's GDP and population.[9] Part of this prosperity is contributed by the "Splendid Isolation" foreign policy, which spared the UK from the conflicts and power struggle in continental Europe, to better concentrate on empire affairs.[10]

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[9] Keersmaeker.

[10] Veldeman Marie-Christine, "Britain and Europe: From 'Splendid Isolation' to 'Semi-Detachment'," *Équivalences* 39, no. 1-2 (2012).

As the 1st Lord of Admiralty, George Goschen puts it:

> "There may be the isolation of those who are weak and who therefore are
>
> not courted because they can contribute nothing, and there is, on the other
>
> hand, the isolation of those who do not wish to be entangled in any
>
> complications and will hold themselves free in every respect … Our
>
> isolation is not an isolation of weakness; it is deliberately chosen, the
>
> freedom to act as we choose in any circumstances that may arise."[11]

It was during this period of Pax Britannica that the empire where the sun never sets is built.

The isolation means the UK can better focus on Empire affairs without disturbance from continental Europe. But it also left the UK with no "friends" to count on when problems arise. This effect was particularly profound during the Second Boer War when other European states supported insurgent activities around British South Africa. Along with the bloc forming on continental Europe in the late 19th and early 20th century, proved that the UK can no longer insist its course of isolation. Thus, this period saw an increase in interest towards foreign affairs activities with European states. Although the 1904 Entente Cordiale, an Anglo-French agreement, and the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention are just agreements, not formal

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[11] Ibid.

alliances, it still can be marked as a beginning for an improved Anglo-European

relationship and, unfortunately, the decline of British supremacy over other European

states.

The Fall: Two World Wars

From 1914 to 1919 and 1939 to 1945, Europe saw two of the world's harshest

wars. Although the UK won both, it was not without paying a hefty price tag. The

victories were not possible if the US had not supported the UK and its allies with

American industrial capacity, American troops, and American money. It was reported

that just after the Second World War, the British government borrowed, when adjusted

for inflation, about £93.3 billion from the US in loan.[12] This move was out of

necessity to keep the country afloat, since these two major wars in a relatively close

succession had not allowed the UK to fully recover, which left British industries

disproportioned and financial abilities crippled.[13] The UK was on the edge of

bankruptcy, struggling to keep its people fed, let alone financing the cost of operating

its empire. Thus, the once great empire slowly fell apart, and went into the cold war as

a mere medium power ally of the US.

This paper suggests that the ideology of divide and rule was used in both wars

with the intention being to ensure Europe is in pieces and stay in pieces. Not in ruins,

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[12] BBC, "Uk Settles Wwii Debts to Allies," accessed 15 Apr. 2019.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/6215847.stm.
[13] Barr et al.,

although it is a side effect, but in a political status that no hegemony is present. This is

fairly obvious since the British stands with the resistant forces both times.

The Transition: Cold War

When the dust of the Second World War has settled, it was clear that the UK,

now with most of its things in disorder, will no longer be the place where power is

concentrated. The US and the USSR on the other hand, were another story. This

change of position in the world means the British had to find a new roll that will not

be any less dignifying, yet suit the situation they are now in. Naturally, there were

several proposals, but as mentioned in previous chapter, the three circles of

Churchill's were the one that stuck around. It urges that the UK should be a bridge

which joins the three circles together, and by doing so, Churchill claimed that the

British will "…hold the key to opening a safe and happy future to humanity.[14]" But,

this thought is somehow a bit ironic. Firstly, why would any part of the three circles

willing to be linked by the British? What could possibly allow the UK to be a bridge

between these countries?[15] Secondly, the idea of a united Europe after the war is a

very realistic approach to prevent another deadly conflict among European countries.

However, the existence of this so-called united Europe was because of British interest

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[14] Churchill,   in *Europe Unite: Speeches 1947 & 1948.*
[15] Simon Tate, "The High Wire Act: A Comparison of British Transatlantic Foreign Policies in the Second World War and the War in Iraq, 2001-2003," *Area* 41, no. 2 (2009).

on stopping the advance of the USSR into Western Europe[16]. And the British, in

Churchill's own word "We help, we dedicate, we play a part, but we are not

merged…[17]" This mindset would later be the biggest obstacle for the UK to join the

predecessor of European Union (EU), the European Economic Community (EEC),

and preventing the British to be fully committed after they did. Thirdly, Churchill

wanted to build a "special relationship" with the US. But, what incentives are there to

make the US to oblige? Does "special relationship" means "special privileges"? Till

today, the "united Europe" circle and "special relationship" with the US are just like

any other interstate relationship, built on national interest.

The Statement: Falklands War

2nd of April 1982, the Falkland Islands were ceased by Argentine forces. This

aggression prompted immediate actions by the British government. Three days later, a

naval task force embarks to the South Atlantics. But, the American's attitude towards

this war was not in favour of the British. The US government fear that a worsened

diplomatic relationship with Argentina would give the Soviets an opportunity to

establish close ties with Argentina and other South American countries, thus "urged its

British ally to take a dovish approach and tried to broker a deal between the aggressor

and the aggrieved.[18]" Furthermore, the US decided that none of its forces would

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[16] John Young, "Churchill's 'No' to Europe," *The Historical Journal* 28, no. 4 (1985).
[17] Tate.
[18] Lawrence Freedman, "The Special Relationship, Then and Now," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 3 (2006).

participate in this battle. United Kingdom is now alone in this battle thousands of

miles away from home, but the outcome is not so depressing, not at all. After 74 days

of fighting, on 14th of June 1982, the Argentinian surrendered.

The victory is good for national solidarity and a warning to others who wish to

follow the Argentinians that the British still got what it takes to defend its honour. But

the position that US took during the conflict is a substantial setback for the idea of a

"special relationship". And once again emphasised the point that policies are linked

with interests, and mostly interests.

The Commitment: Iraq War

After the collapse of World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September 2001,

then Prime Minister Tony Blair pledged his support for the US, stating "Here in the

United Kingdom, we stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this

hour of tragedy, and we, like them, will not rest until this evil is driven from our

world."[19] This is the start of a series of war that the UK might not necessarily have to

participate, but jumped in anyway. In the case of Iraq War, their enemy was the

Hussein regime of Iraq, which was in violation of Human Rights, in possession of

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and an alleged sponsor of the terrorist group

that planned and carried out the 911 attack. At least these are the reasons that they

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[19] Ibid.

said. The legitimacy of this war is very much questionable, the reasoning and

intelligence that this war based on would later be found out as false. Some even say

the Bush administration went to war because they can.[20] The question here is, why

did the British government endorse US position on the Iraqi matter when they can

steer clear of this tangled mess?

The Suez Crisis back in 1956 gave British the awareness that itself cannot be one

of the pivotal powers of the world without the support of the US.[21] This "ah-ha"

moment further rooted the idea of "Special Relationship" and prompted the British

government to never get out of step with US foreign policy again. And Iraq War is no

difference. According to then US Secretary of Defence, British forces are not strictly

needed, but their presence would give more legitimacy for what Washington was

planning to do.[22]

On the international stage, diplomatic relationships are mostly built on a

utilitarian cause, seeking a positive affect to one's national interest to be exact, and

sometimes, principals of a more idealistic approach would be side-lined. For example,

the US established diplomatic relationship with the People's Republic of China

(P.R.C.) in 1979 and subsequently terminated its formal diplomatic relationship with

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[20] Al Jazeera, "The Connection between Iraq and 9/11," Al Jazeera, accessed 24 Apr. 2019.
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/the911decade/2011/09/201197155513938336.html.
[21] Freedman.
[22] Alex Danchev, "Tony Blair's Vietnam - the Iraq War and the 'Special Relationship' in Historical
Perspective," *Review of International Studies* 33, no. 2 (2007).

the Republic of China (R.O.C.) for the interest that the mounting argument between

PRC and USSR would be beneficial to the US effort on containing the Soviets. Even

though this means betraying the democratic R.O.C. and in favour of the communist

P.R.C. This sort of relationship policy is neither moral nor in honour of solidarity, but,

it is viciously effective. However, from numerous speeches of former British Prime

Minister Tony Blair, we can notice, at least on the surface of it, that he seems to have

a more noble ideology. In a British ambassador gathering in 2003, he said "We are the

ally of the US not because they are powerful, but because we share their values."[23]

The former PM is also obsessed with doing good things. He once stated that "the US

are a force for good"; and by the continuous possession of this special relationship,

the UK can also be a force for good. Thus, the UK has to be a reliable ally to the US,

for the "privilege" and "good name" in return.

Debates

We, as a person, face choices every day, and governments are the same.

However, they are not choosing between what kind of lunch they fancy, but on serious

matters that can change the face of a country.

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[23] Ibid.

This section would use experts' comments from published studies and online materials to analyse the choices British government made and possible alternatives regarding British foreign policy in three period:

1. the 19th century: empire matter – for land or economy?

2. the 20th century: a united Europe – global or local?

3. the 21st century: Brexit – what is the point?

19th century is the finest hour of British Empire, here we see the success in terms of territorial gain and economic development. When we think about this period, we will inherently link to the world map depicting the Empire with all of its territories marked in colour. It is obvious that no one else can stop the British at this point, except themselves. Naturally, there are some different thoughts on how far should the empire reach. On the one hand, there are the interventionists who advocate the expansion of the empire on the bases of Social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer. On the other hand, stand the Liberals, who believe the expansion should be based on free trade, in line with the thesis of John Hobson, which has close resemblances to the "vent for surplus" thought of Adam Smith[24]. These two thoughts mainly argued about the initiative and principle of the empire but did not question the existence of empire itself.

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[24] John Cunningham Wood, "J. A. Hobson and British Imperialism," *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 42, no. 4 (1983).

The 20th century, however, is not as cheerful as the 19th for the British. From

1945 onwards, as mentioned before, the UK face its demise as a dominant power. Due

to the emergence of two new world superpowers, and the start of the Cold War. Their

new position as a middle power prompted the British to search for allies. However,

the search in the European arena was particularly lacking in commitment. In 1946,

Churchill raised a notion in a speech that "There is a remedy which ... would in a few

years make all Europe ... free and ... happy.[25]" He calls for the reestablishment of the

European family. To achieve this he said, "We must build a kind of United States of

Europe.[26]" But this speech alone does not paint the whole picture. As mentioned

before, Churchill also indicate that the British will "…help, …dedicate, …play a part,

but …not merged…[27]" on the united Europe affairs. Although this self-contradicting

attitude towards this united Europe concept was not publicly expressed, many do

share this stance, with argument on both the political side and cultural side.

Furthermore, government actions on European affairs, more often than not, follow

this line of thought. However, there were Britons who believe their country should

actively participate in the then newly formed European Communities (EC), its

predecessors, and surrounding plans. David Maxwell Fyfe and Harold Macmillan are

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[25] European Commission, "Winston Churchill: Calling for a United States of Europe," accessed 19 May 2019. https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/winston_churchill_en.pdf.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Tate.

two players in the British politics that support this notion. But both of them failed to

stimulate any meaningful progress on deeper British involvement in continental

Europe. The resistance on continental Europe did soften in the coming decades

following the 1950s. Even the "Iron Lady", Margret Thatcher, said in her speech to

the Collage of Europe in 1988 that "Our[Britain's] destiny is in Europe, as part of the

Community.[28]" However, the idea she supported was not a federalist Europe, no

British Prime Ministers has been, but the emphasis on the Single Market, due to the

retard of British economic growth and the economic benefits of joining the EC.[29]

The 21st century sort of extended the Europe issue with the referendum on the

withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, or Brexit as it is

commonly called, which has haunted the British government since June 2016. It is

obviously a two-horse race, the remain and the leave. In a more political term,

whether the British want to stay as a part of an increasingly federalist European or

not. Before the referendum, almost 200 economists sent a public letter to *The Times*

stating that "Focusing entirely on the economics, we consider that it would be a major

mistake for the UK to leave the European Union" and "Leaving would entail

significant long-term costs.[30]" However, Niall Ferguson, a historian, said in an

[28] Owen Bowcott, "Margaret Thatcher Backed Single Market in Draft Bruges Speech," The Guardian, accessed 21 May 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jul/21/margaret-thatcher-backed-single-market-in-draft-bruges-speech.
[29] Nauro Campos and Fabrizio Coricelli, "Why Did Britain Join the Eu? A New Insight from Economic History," *Mostly Economics Blog* 3 (2015).
[30] Paul Levine, Simon Wren Lewis, and Tony Yates, "Brexit Letter," The London School of Economics

interview that focusing this heavily on the economy is a mistake, because "…that

wasn't what people cared about.[31]" It is important to note that he was on the remain

side before the referendum because, one, he is the friend of then Prime Minister David

Cameron and Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne, his support came out of

loyalty to friends, and two, he found "…the argument of the Brexiteers deeply

unconvincing.[32]" He also said in the interview that he was asked with a question

multiple times in pubs around the country, it goes "…about the 1.3 million Muslins

the Germans has just let in … if the Germans give them German passports, can they

come here?[33]" This is the point that he said he cannot argue about, and the only honest

answer is yes. He concludes that immigration was the issue, and people feared that the

UK has lost control of its border. This indicated that people are willing to accept the

disadvantages in economics for the regain of border control.

Foreign Policy Theories

In this section, this paper will try to discover and understand the theories and

notions behind British foreign policy through existing theories on the workings of

foreign policy.

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and Political Science, accessed 18 May 2019.
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/textonly/_new2014/BREXIT/BREXIT_LETTER_23May2016.pdf.
[31] Alcove C, "Niall Ferguson: Why I Opposed and Now Support Brexit," last modified 17 Jun 2018,
accessed 18 May 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fk3dGHo8knk.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.

Different Types and Intensity of National Interests

There are several aspects that will influence the course of foreign policies, but the most significant, yet the hardest to explain, is "national interest." It is fantastically ambiguous, as in a democratic country, it may contain inputs from every corner of the society under different sets of context, priority, and vision for the future. But, despite its complexity, scholars did compile an outline of several types of national interests and the intensity of those interests on which governments adjust its foreign policy according to the category and urgency of these interests. They are as the following[34]:

- Types of National Interests:

    1. Defence interests

    2. Economic interests

    3. World order interests

    4. Ideological interests

- Intensity of Interest:

    1. Survival issues

    2. Vital issues

    3. Major issues

    4. Periphery issues.

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[34] Donald E. Nuechterlein, "National Interests and Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Decision Making," *British Journal of International Studies* 2, no. 3 (1976).

Different types of national interests are said to have "compromises and trade-offs among them" and they are also "competing for attention and resources.[35]" Thus, the intensity of interest will be a scale on which governments can evaluate what kind of measures are needed, the degree of such measures, and when to deliver these measures to maintain its interest.

UK, not surprisingly, "…simultaneously pursues multiple foreign policies, some of which overlap and some of which may be contradictory.[36]" and thus the formulation of British foreign policy should not be characterised by certain issue areas, but by multiple interests jointed together. However, this theory on the category and intensity of interest can still aid the identification of British interest in later chapters regarding case studies.

Models on Analysing Foreign Policy

With incentives categorised, we must shift our focus to the process that turns notions into actions, the formulation. Some scholar regard Allison Graham's three models of foreign policy analysis in the *Essence of Decision* as the most prominent approach of this case by case analysis.

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[35] Ibid.
[36] Paul Williams, "Who's Making Uk Foreign Policy?," *International Affairs* 80, no. 5 (2004).

Three models are as the following:

1. The rational actor

2. Organizational process

3. Governmental politics.

First, in the rational actor model, he suggests that actors affecting foreign policies handle events with unity and rationality. And that "Rationality refers to consistent, value-maximising choice within specific constraints.[37]" The constraints are, goals and objectives, alternatives, consequences, and choice. In a simpler term, the actors will juggle these four constraints around, with care and a clear line of interests, to achieve value-maximising. For researchers, this mean they will have targets to aim at in the fantastically ambiguous realm of foreign policy. And utilising the findings to draw a picture on how things could come to be.


Figure 2. How Foreign Policies are handled in Rational Actor Model

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[37] Allison Graham, *Essence of Decision : Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971).

Second, the organisational process model focusses on how government decisions came to be. It puts heavy emphasis on the importance of government organisations. And the formulation of governmental behaviour is more of an output, rather than a deliberate choice.[38] What this means is that each government organisation has its own stands and "…a fixed set of standard operating procedures (SOP) and programs", which affect its response on a given subject. For instance, on the one hand, when faced with a pending war, the Foreign Office might oppose the idea of initiating the conflict, but to resolve the hostility through diplomatic channels, which is what its SOPs are all about. However, on the other hand, the Ministry of Defence will likely to lean towards handling the incident with force, since their doctrine and subsequent SOPs are not designed to prevent wars, but to win them. These "preferences" of individual organisation will then be summed up and evaluated by the leader before the final decision was made. One notable point is that this model suggests organisation made people, not people made organisation, a person will represent the interest of the organisation, instead of his (or her) personal interest. "Where you stand depends on where you sit" is the most common phrase to describe the situation.

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[38] Ibid.

Figure 3. The Formulation Path of an Organisation Driven Foreign Policy

Third, the governmental politics model has a deep contrast with the rational actor model. Where the rational actor model sees actors in unity, governmental politics model thinks otherwise. It focuses on the exact opposite, the diverse approach of each actor who bares specific interests which collective targets are not present.


Figure 4. Foreign Policy Making Process Suggested by Governmental Politics Model

Alongside the methodologies that help us understand foreign policy, ideological actors are also a crucial point that will give us a reasonable explanation on how governments perceive its interests. The ideologies include external factors upheld by realism and internal factors of liberalism.

Above mentioned theories on national interest, foreign policy models, and ideological actors are steps in the right direction, thus, this paper will incorporate some of the elements from these theories and models to assess British foreign policy.

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METHODOLOGY

An Overview

To analyse the formulation of modern British Foreign Policy, this paper will focus on the British involvement in Iraq War. Reason being that if we insert British involvement in Iraq War into the national interest theory by Mr. Donald E. Nuechterlein, we can discover that although this event stretches across the category of Ideological and World Order, the intensity of this dual stimulation is low, with no immediate threat towards the vast majority of British public, British government, and British national defence. Thus, it will be interesting to examine why the British made the decision they did.

Since foreign policy decisions will be based on numerous factors, this paper will utilise parts of foreign policy models by Allison Graham and its own hypothesis to select target factors, as demonstrated by the following graph.

Which divides all factors into two large categories, internal factors and external factors. Internal factors will focus on pressure and voices from within the country, siting two news outlets, The Guardian and The Telegraph, as sources of public opinion that includes viewpoints from different sides of the political spectrum. Also contained in the internal factors are two groups of political elites. One focuses on a

personal level with then Leader of the Opposition Iain Duncan Smith, then Prime

Minister Tony Blair, and then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. The other focuses on an

organisational level with the party whips and the House of Commons. As for external

factors, the U.S. government, the United Nations, the European Union, and Arab

World are selected, which are thought to be some of the most influential bodies that

affected British decision on the matter.

Figure 5. Factors in the Policy Making Process of British Involvement in the 2003 Iraq War

To authenticate the hypothesis made by the graph above, this paper will collect data regarding the U.S. Government, The United Nations, The European Union, Iraq, British public opinion, and British politics. Sources and breadth for these factors will be defined by Table 1. For an in-depth table showing the construction of the Database established for data analysis on British intention in Iraq War, see Appendix A.

Table 1. Major Components of Database

FACTOR	SOURCE(S)	TIME PERIOD
UK Politician	UK Parliament Commons Hansard*	5 Apr. 2002 to 20 Mar. 2003
UK Public Opinion	The Guardian* & The Telegraph*	5 Apr. 2002 to 20 Mar. 2003
U.S. Government	US National Achieve*	Prior of 20 Mar. 2003
European Union	European Parliament* & The Report of the Iraq Inquiry*	5 Apr. 2002 to 20 Mar. 2003
United Nations Security Council	UNSC Resolution 1441* & The Report of the Iraq Inquiry*	-
Iraq and Arab World	Aljazeera (Arabic)*	5 Apr. 2002 to 20 Mar. 2003

*For the directory of each sources, see Appendix A.

The Reasoning

In a democratic political system, such as the UK, public perception and opinion is one of the most important aspect of policy making. Politician who made unpopular policies has a slimmer chance of getting re-elected, potentially ending his/her carrier. Thus, the correlation between public opinion and a politician's political manoeuvre can provide a glimpse of the commitments and priorities of a politician. To represent public opinion, this paper has chosen The Guardian and The Telegraph for their viewership and viewpoints from different sides of the political spectrum. The range of dates set on news reports are chosen for their significance as a marker of Iraq War. 5th of April 2002 is the day Tony Blair met George Bush at the Bush ranch in Texas, where conversation regarding Iraq has taken place.[39] Although we do not know the detail and direct effect of their conversation, but the Report of the Iraq Inquiry points out that the mood in government agencies changed after this meeting and "different departments began to resonate."[40] The 20th of March 2003 marked the start of Iraq War, which at this point, the British is firmly within this conflict and the question of whether to join or not is out of the window.

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[39] House of Commons, *Commons Hansard*, by UK Parliament, Vol. 383 (2002).
[40] Nick Hopkins, "When Blair Met Bush: How the Uk Went to War in Iraq," The Guardian, accessed 30 Jul. 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/09/iraq-war-after-blair-and-bush-met-the-tempo-changed.

For the raw, untouched verbal comments and statements made by political figures, the Commons Hansard has been chosen. This unfiltered channel eliminates media as the middleman of information, thus eliminates biases. The range of dates was set for the same reason as the news outlets.

Given the nature of this event, several external foreign factors will be incorporated. First, the U.S. government. United States being the leader of the pro-war camp and the holder of a special relationship with the British on a state and personal level between then President Bush and Prime Minister Blair, definitely has a considerable amount of influence over the decision whether the UK should go into a war with Iraq or not. For information coming from the West side of the Atlantic, the National Achieve of United States will be searched for press releases, Q&A session transcripts, and comments for a better understanding of the influence.

Second, the United Nations Security Council. Being one of the largest, most powerful, and most versatile inter-governmental organisations, it is a place for mediating international disputes and discussing international affairs. Pressing on major manoeuvre without consents would mean a wave of serious condemnation, thus incorporating UN into this analysis could help us better understand how the Tony Blair used UN resolution as a standpoint and how UN can be powerless when one of the world's most powerful nation decides to do whatever it wants.

Third, the European Union. Being one of closest inter-governmental organisation to the UK in terms of physical location and economic integration, its influence is also significant. Securing support here would mean a huge boost to the legitimacy of British action.

Fourth, Iraq and the Arab world. For states to go to war with one another, there must be reasons, whether legitimate or illegitimate, direct or indirect. Thus, it is important to understand stories and actions from both sides for a more comprehensive view on the situation.

To fill in the missing or unbiased information, the Report of the Iraq Inquiry is selected, for its analysis conducted after the Iraq War has ended and its key figures has stepped down, when a greater view of the situation can be obtained.

DATA ANALYSIS

Iraq War of 2003 was one of the most talked about and well documented British foreign engagement in recent decades. The government, parliament, media, public, and international community were all on high alert, eager to see further development and to push their own agenda. Thus, it is an excellent event to observe the chemistry between above mentioned bodies on the formulation of British foreign policy.

For most commentators on this subject, British involvement in Iraq War was a mistake. Commenting on the legality, financial burden, personnel loss, and other concerns that are associated with this war. The author of this paper initially shared the same stance that British involvement in Iraq War was unnecessary and redundant. However, after combining all the elements within this research, this paper suggests British involvement in Iraq War was not pointless after all. This paper argues that this event shall not be analysed solely as a standalone event, but rather as a continuation of the implementation of British foreign policy formula, and that under this context, the intension of the British government become apparent and justifiable in relation with British national interest.

To achieve a thorough analysis, this chapter will examine different types of factors and event-crucial actors in the next section to formulate a final verdict.

Internal Factors

UK Political Elites

This section will be devoted to analysing core British political actors, both

individual and organisational, namely then Prime Minister Tony Blair, then Foreign

Secretary Jack Straw, then Leader of the Opposition Iain Duncan Smith, party whips,

and the House of Commons.

The most prominent figure in this section is none other than Mr. Tony Blair, who

is one of, if not the, key person who initiated British involvement on the matter of Iraq

War. Between the sampling date, 5 Apr. 2002 and 20 Mar. 2003, three speeches and

subsequent debates were made in Westminster. These "conversations" focuses on why

Saddam Hussein shall be stopped and why the use of force as a failsafe to Iraqi

incompliance on the matter of WMD is the best action and a just cause. 24 Sep. 2002,

first of the three speeches were made.[41] Here, Mr. Blair described Saddam Hussein as

a figure who grasps tightly on the Iraqi WMD program for his own benefit and in

ignorance of the welfare that Iraqi people deserves. In addition, Mr. Blair put

emphasis on the breach of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions by

the Hussein administration and their uncooperative attitude towards UNSC weapon

inspectors. Furthermore, Mr. Blair shared a dossier with the House, prepared by the

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[41] B-CH-390a

British Joint Intelligence Committee, siting it as the proof of Iraqi aggression.

However, it is interesting to note that the dossier was later found drawing from

unreliable sources. 25 Feb. 2003, Mr. Blair made his second speech regarding the

Iraqi situation.[42] He once again reflects heavily on the dishonesty of Mr. Hussein with

past histories and the case of UN resolution 1441. Making it plain that the only

peaceful way forward is for Mr. Hussein to cooperate wholeheartedly. 18 Mar. 2003,

Mr. Blair conducted his third and last speech to the House.[43]This is the one speech

where Mr. Blair focused on the contribution of military threat more than before. Siting

examples from October 1994 and October 1997, both military threat towards Hussein

administration resulted in the resumption of previously curtailed weapons inspection.

However, there is one point that these three speeches failed to mention, the public

opinion. You would think that given the magnitude of this event, public perception

and opinion would be a major concern, but the facts are quite the contrary.

Mr. Jack Straw, as Foreign Secretary from 2001 to 2006, is another key figure

that deserves attention. Throughout sampling period, he was more engaging with the

House, making ten speeches and debates with a more in-depth dive into the situation.

He pointed out that when compared with other WMD proliferating states, Iraq has

frequent records of actually using these devices[44], far from a mean of last resort.

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[42] B-CH-400b
[43] B-CH-401c
[44] B-CH-390b

When asked by MP whether Iraq has connections with terrorist groups, Mr. Straw stated that he will not be surprised if there are connections, but could not supply solid evidence to prove. Another point is that Mr. Straw constantly projects the image of the US government being a reasonable, honest, and helpful figure in the process of Iraqi disarmament.[45] He would jump in front of any accusation towards the US to defend the legitimacy of US actions[46], and at the same time heavily criticise the attitude France and Germany adopted on the matter.

Another figure worth examining is then Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Iain Duncan Smith. In the face of heavy public protest against waging war, Mr. Smith, surprisingly, did not seize the opportunity to attack Mr. Blair and the Labour party. Instead, he gave out a sense of support on confronting the Iraqi WMD problem with a firm diplomatic attitude and even military actions. In general, his statements are less ambiguous and possess heavy focus on military actions as a failsafe to Mr. Hussein's incompliance.

In terms of the government organisations, the Commons and the Government both saw a wave of disapproval towards Government motion to acquire the "go ahead" on military action in Iraq from the House. Twenty percent of the Commons MPs voted against the motion on 18 Mar. 2003, with almost 40 percent of Labour

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[45] B-CH-392b
[46] B-CH-390b

MPs either voted against or abstain. Although the Government motion was passed

with ease and the force of rejection was insignificant, it still possesses a meaning

which indicated the disconnect of Blair administration with their fellow MPs on this

particular matter.

UK Public Opinion

This event saw a great volume of expression from the British public. Both The

Guardian and The Telegraph reported substantial public rejection towards possible

military action proposed by the Government on 15 Feb. 2003 in the form of a

protest.[47] Dubbing it as "UK's biggest peace rally.[48]" Polls conducted for The

Guardian shows a grim outlook for Mr. Blair's administration and motion. A poll

published on 14 Nov. 2002 indicates 46% of the sample public sees Mr. Blair as

President Bush's lapdog.[49] Another poll published on 21 Jan. 2003 shows "…outright

opposition to the war has risen to 47%...[50]" With a follow up poll on 18 Feb. 2003

presenting a minus 20 points on Mr. Blair's personal rating and outright opposition to

war risen to 52%.[51] Despite this strong opposition to war and to Mr. Blair from the

public, the Government still pressed on with the matter of invading Iraq. It seems

approval rate and opportunity for re-election are not always the strongest incentive.

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[47] B-TG-006
[48] B-GR-009
[49] B-GR-004
[50] B-GR-006
[51] B-GR-010

External Factors

U.S. Government

The US government is probably the only actor here that has strong influence over the British government, stronger than the EU, the UN, or the British public. However, it is interesting to note that in none of the White House releases on the matter during the sampling period have any mention regarding the British government or any British personnel. The vast majority of the White House releases put heavy emphasis on the danger and cruelty of the Iraqi regime, the aspect of a coalition force only got a minor mention. This might derive from the fact that British troops were not needed to win the fight. But, they compensate for the lacking part of this war, legitimacy.[52] However, it is not like the British was there just to uphold the "friendship", when applied with the mindset of Churchill's three circles, this action becomes a trade between the two governments for getting their way around the international affairs.

European Union

Although there was no Europe-wide agreement to support or reject military action as a method to disarm Iraq. But, both EU giants, France and Germany, made clear expression on their position to reject military action based on the circumstances.

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[52] Danchev.

With France threatening to utilise its veto power in the UNSC. However, the point

here is not on the attitude of France, Germany, or other EU member states, it is the

British response to the French and German stance. Given that France and Germany

are both close partners of the UK physically, politically, and economically, it is

interesting that the British government choose the US over these two states. But, yet

again, British foreign policy doctrine had always favoured the US over its European

partners.

United Nation Security Council

The UNSC have two points worth mentioning, UNSC resolution and the

Permanent Five members. The UNSC resolution, namely no. 1441, gave a very

affirmative attitude towards the disarmament of Iraq, compare to debates, public

opinion, and the general politics, it was rather stable and uneventful. Although some

of the more open-ended clauses in resolution no. 1441 did spark debates on the

interpretation of its meanings. The interaction of the Permanent Five member is where

this spark turns into fire. The US and the UK is clearly on the same side pushing for a

"second resolution" that would fully legitimise military actions against Iraq, while

France, Russia, and China took the opposite stance with other UNSC member states

showing no support for the "second resolution" draft.[53] This "side-choosing" activity

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[53] B-IR-ESM

certainly gave a clear example on which side the British will lean when faced with a

choice.

Iraq And Arab World

Within Iraqi border, news report from Aljazeera suggests the then Iraqi

leadership has no intention of changing its stands against US "aggression" and that

Iraqi people are in support of this decision. Quote "more than 15,000 armed Iraqi

volunteers vowed in a military parade to defend their leader and homeland to death.[54]"

Furthermore, then Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz stated that accusations

regarding Iraqi possession and development of weapons of mass destruction are based

on alleged claims, and Baghdad can prove itself innocent.[55] Also, the return of

weapons inspectors will not produce feasible results.

When speaking of other Arab countries, there were several levels of compliance

proposed by Arab state leaders in the Arab Summit of 2003. Most notably is the one

by United Arab Emirates, a long time US partner in the region, which proposed giving

Saddam Hussein full immunity in exchange for him stepping down as the President of

Iraq.[56] But, due to its interventional nature and similarity to the US demands, this

initiative was not met with warm welcomes.[57] In the end, the summit concluded with

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[54] I-AJ-002
[55] I-AJ-003
[56] I-AJ-009
[57] I-AJ-010

a statement condemning any changes imposed upon the Arab region and rejects any manoeuvre to affect Iraq and its decisions.[58] On the surface of it, Arab nations were not in support of any US military action in the region. However, they also urge Iraqi administration to comply with UN demands to prevent conflict, but respect how Iraq will handle this matter. After going through the data, this paper argues that Arab nations were sandwiched in a difficult position between righteousness and regional stability. On the one hand, they dislike the US aggression against Iraq and the possible instability in the region brought by US actions.[59] But, on the other hand, they want the region to be stable and tension-free, hence the calling from numerous Arab leaders and officials for Iraq to comply with international demands. In terms of connection with British actions, there are no significant link other than Iraq's repetitive breach and argument regarding UN resolutions.

Section Recap

In terms of external factors, the British government showed a clear bias towards the US when faced with a choice. If the only reason that the Government decided to go to war was because Mr. Hussein's history of incompliance, they could just sit quietly and let the US does its thing. As a journal article by Alex Danchev pointed out that the then US Secretary of Defence stated "there are workarounds" if the British

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[58] I-AJ-010
[59] I-AJ-006

decides not to go to war.[60] But, if the British steps in and display their support, both

physically and psychologically, it would be a huge boost to the "special relationship"

that the British was, and still is, chasing after. Think of it as a silence deal between the

two governments, one gave legitimacy to other's manoeuvre of interest, the other

gave favour when setting out its foreign policies, political agenda, and etc. The other

three factors in this category are, comparatively, in sharp contrast to the US. They are

still important to British actions, make no mistake, but, no way near the attention,

intimacy, and commitment the US got in this event.

This paper argues that although it is crucial for the British to gain EU and UN support

on this matter in the view of international community, the British was also prepared to

go alone if the action of supporting the US's position demand such steps to be taken.

In the other category that contains internal factors, responses to public outcry

against the war are less than tangible. The "UK's biggest peace rally" and the negative

approval ratings have nothing on the people who made the final call. The UK is a

democracy, yes; people vote for their MPs, correct; but the democracy is dominated

by elites and their actions are not always in line with what the public wants, creating a

disconnect. In contrast with the gap with popular opinion, political figures and

organisations are much more united. The Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and

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[60] Danchev.

even the Leader of the Opposition all agreed to support the US with minimum friction

in between. Foreign Office also did not seems bothered by the ever fast approaching

war. With Party Whips keeping most MPs aligned with party stance, one could say

this government motion to endorse US action was unstoppable.

Overall Analysis

Interest

As we have established before, national interest is an inseparable part of foreign

policy, this paper has identified a few key objectives and national interests of the UK

and how the British utilize foreign policy to achieve such goals.

First, this paper suggests the UK is trying to acquire a higher than usual position

for a middle power with manoeuvres applied through foreign policy. With the

"English speaking country" circle in Churchill's three circles, they strive to differ

using the "special relationship" with the US. Through which the British "…hope of

shaping the exercise of U.S. power.[61]" Although this concept does not always work,

as mentioned before in the Falklands War, but, by keeping an above average

relationship with, as of writing, the world's strongest superpower does brought

benefits in areas such as international politics, economics, and military, contributed by

the sheer weight of the US in these areas. The recent non-binding resolution of the

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[61] Freedman.

UN on the dispute between the UK and Mauritius over a few rocks and islands in the

Indian Ocean shows the US standing on the British side in an almost unanimous

voting result favouring the Mauritius.[62] One reason for US support can be the US

Military base on these small bodies of lands that is owned by the British, but it is

precisely the point. By becoming an integral part of US's interest, the British could

influence American stance and power in a way that is beneficial to its own interest.

Although not exactly reliable, with occasional draw backs such as joining wars that

the Americans are fighting, it is a unique opportunity for the British to elevate

themselves from the position of a middle power.

Second, avoiding raising a particular enemy on the international stage. Starting

from the latter half of the 20th century, the British has stopped engaging in wars alone.

The Multinational Force in Lebanon, Gulf War, Kosovo War, War in Afghanistan, Iraq

War, and Operation Desert Fox, these are all conflicts that the UK participated in the

past three decades where at least two participants are on the British side and never

does the British initiated these wars. This can give the enemy a sense that they are not

being attacked by British forces alone, but with several other participants, and usually

the US will be the most prominent in the bunch. Thus, if there comes an opportunity

for revenge for the enemies, the British Isles will not likely to be the only one or

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[62] James Griffiths and Jenni Marsh, "Uk Suffers Major Un Defeat over Chagos Islands Decolonization," CNN, accessed 24 Sep. 2019. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/22/asia/uk-chagos-islands-un-intl/index.html?no-st=1569315184.

where the force is concentrated, greatly reducing the cost of potential risks.

Third, economic prosperity. Starting from the Empire era, the UK has known for its trading. From America to China, they establish trade posts wherever possible, this brought wealth and gave the domestic industries a channel to vent their surplus. Trade propelled the UK from a small island in the Atlantic to an Empire where the sun never sets. Needless to say, the British government take trading very seriously, sometimes even more serious than ideology. From 1945 to 1949, China experienced a civil war between the Nationalist (KMT) and the Communist (CCP). This conflict was a potential threat for British interests of trade in China and the containment of Communists. However, the British seemed more concerned about its trade in China then its political stance. In a Parliamentary debate on 5th May, 1949 both the Conservative and Labour "…agreed that good relations with the CCP were necessary if Britain was to retain its China trade…[63]" But even before this, in 1947, an analysis by the British Embassy in Nanking stated that "British business, missions and residents can thus expect to be bled white, exploited, reviled and/or squeezed out under a Communist regime just as much as under any other Chinese system of government, without the protection of extraterritoriality and the "gun boat policy".[64]"

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[63] David Wolf, "'To Secure a Convenience': Britain Recognizes China - 1950," *Journal of Contemporary History* 18, no. 2 (1983).
[64] Foreign Office, *Political Situation in China. Situation Reports from Nanking. Communist Government in North China. Possible British Subject Evacuation. Economic Situation in China.*, by Foreign Office (1948).

And after the establishment of People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1950, the British quickly expressed the willingness to cooperate with its government on trade. Although it was not met with a reply, but it was a start, and an indicator of British interest.

Formulation

Through the case study on Iraq War and findings in Literature Review, we can see the workings of the British government on how they handle foreign affairs. When analysing the formulation with Grahams three models, this paper noticed an absence of organisational process in the case of Iraq War. There may be ministers representing one government department, but none of them standout as having their own takes on the matter. They all seemed supportive on the proposals of the Prime Minister. This paper argues the rational actor model is suited to explain on how foreign affairs are handled by the British government. They strive to maximise the rewards of their actions partially under the guideline of Churchill's three circles. Partially, because the context that the three circles were built on has moved on and that there is significant imbalance on the weight of each circle, the heaviest being the "English speaking country" that includes the US and the lightest being the Commonwealth which the UK has now lost meaningful control.

Due to the nature of democracy, the Parliament is another major point where possible hurdle could be found. But, surprisingly, in the case of Iraq War, the House of

Commons voted for the involvement in Iraq despite intensive public outcry. Granted, there are a substantial number of MPs that voted against, and the pressure of Party Whips ensured that most MPs were in line with party policies. However, the most surprising of them all is that the opposition, the Conservative Party, was also in support of this motion raised by Tony Blair, who is from the Labour Party. This unusual spectacle of a cross party agreement indicates that principles of British foreign policy are respected between parties. Furthermore, these principles can sometimes outweigh public opinion on whatever matter it is linked to.

The Verdict

This paper argues that the decision making in British foreign policy is done by a small group of elites that uphold principles such as Churchill's three circles and are not sensitive to public input or external factors that they deemed not crucial. This line of stance may seem outdated and contradict the essence of democracy, but it indeed built a somewhat stable position that is not procurable by normal middle power. However, if the British intend to achieve their goals in foreign affairs this way, they must be ready for the continuation of the "draw backs" comes with this approach. Other methods, for example, be more committed to EU, can brought a more stable and consistent outcome, but the reward might be smaller in comparison. In a way it is like deciding to play lottery or not, if decided to go in, you might lose your investment

or win a jackpot; if decided not to go in, you will retain your investment, but you will lose the chance to win big. All in all, the British took an interesting approach to foreign policy compare to most European middle power states. It may possess more risks and uncertainties, but it is the chance that the UK takes to brake the convention of middle power states. The cost of this breakthrough might be expensive, but having a mostly reliable superpower ally in this interest driven world, it may just worth the price tag.

CONCLUSION

Theoretical Contribution

This paper reaffirms the "Three Models" developed by Allison Graham. Its structure gave substantial contribution to the initiation of this research. The "Three Models" are a quick to characterise and explain the formulation of foreign policies. The "Rational Actor Model" and "Organisational Process Model" are excellent at differentiating the primary actor of a government on the matter of foreign policy making and handling foreign affairs. "Government Politics Model" can guide the analysation on the division between government agencies and political figures, it contributed the finding of a united stance between British government organisations and major political parties. The paper suggests that the theory on national interest by Donald E. Nuechterlein does not fully encapsulate the variables in the realm of foreign policies. However, it did aid the clarification that the examination of foreign policies shall not set national interest as the sole motivation behind any action, due to the fact that interests without context is meaningless.

British Foreign Policy

This paper suggests that the British foreign policy is mostly dictated by external factors and that the mindset for policy making is more in line with the realism approach. This paper also suggests that the emphasis between Churchill's three circles has become disproportioned with Europe and Commonwealth being less crucial than the "Special Relationship" with the US.

This paper affirms the act of the British on acquiring a higher than usual status for a middle power and suggests that other middle power states could consider a similar approach when conducting international affairs. By positioning itself as a part of a superpower's sphere of influence the

Figure 6. The Disproportion in the Application of Churchill's Three Circles

British inherently secured some control over the superpower's policy making process, it might not be much, but it is a resource that the British can utilise to their advantage. This style of engagement with foreign policy may be considered too hazardous for states which envision stability in foreign affairs. However, this distinction indeed set the UK apart from normal European middle power states.

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To understand the strategy and guiding principle behind modern British foreign policy, which this paper set out to achieve, the "New Three Circles on Understanding British Foreign Policy" has been developed to better conceptualise the backbone of policy decisions. The new three circles are the national interest that calls for a higher than usual status for middle power, the Rational Actor Model by Allison Graham from *Essence of Decision*, and the essence of Winston Churchill's three circles. On the front of national interest, the notion to pursue a higher than usual status is mainly driven by external factors. Contributed by the fact that performance throughout the interaction with other powers, especially those who are stronger than the UK itself, could decide the position of the British in this ever-competing realm of international society. Regarding the Rational Actor Model, the UK political elites will stand united to the pursuit of national interest, as the actions of the two major UK political parties has shown in the case of Iraq War. Lastly, the essence of Winston Churchill's three circles as a spiritual guidance on the attempt to achieve the higher than usual status that British national interest demands. Especially the action which positions the UK in the sphere of influence of superpowers to gain influence over the policies of that power.

Figure 7. The Three Circles on Understanding British Foreign Policy

This paper reaffirms that the British approach might possess more substantial costs when encountered with mishaps or mismanagement and is unsuitable for states in favour of a stable foreign policy models. But, just like a poker game, higher the stake, higher the reward could be.

APPENDIX A

Table of the Database Established for Data Analysis on British Intention in Iraq War

for UK Political Elites				*33 items*
Master URL	https://hansard.parliament.uk/			
Ref. No.	**Title**	**Date Published**	**Source**	**Item URL**
B-CH-383	Commons Hansard Vol. 383	16 Apr. 2002	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/2oSVM3y
B-CH-384	Commons Hansard Vol. 384	29 Apr. 2002	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/32XCVTm
B-CH-390a	Commons Hansard Vol. 390 Sec. 1	24 Sep. 2002	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/2nltRsA
B-CH-390b	Commons Hansard Vol. 390 Sec. 2	24 Sep. 2002	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/2MaHWkV
B-CH-391	Commons Hansard Vol. 391	29 Oct. 2002	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/2AFqSxU
B-CH-392a	Commons Hansard Vol. 392 Sec. 1	05 Nov. 2002	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/355Ii56
B-CH-392b	Commons Hansard Vol. 392 Sec. 2	07 Nov. 2002	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/30GPqBj
B-CH-396a	Commons Hansard Vol. 396 Sec. 1	09 Dec. 2002	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/2AFHVjz
B-CH-396b	Commons Hansard Vol. 396 Sec. 2	10 Dec. 2002	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/2Oh4lzx
B-CH-396c	Commons Hansard Vol. 396 Sec. 3	18 Dec. 2002	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/31JpzKk
B-CH-397a	Commons Hansard Vol. 397 Sec. 1	07 Jan. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/31MN1Gy
B-CH-397b	Commons Hansard Vol. 397 Sec. 2	08 Jan. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/2MaIEP7
B-CH-398a	Commons Hansard Vol. 398 Sec. 1	20 Jan. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/31LFl7C
B-CH-398b	Commons Hansard Vol. 398 Sec. 2	21 Jan. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/31Izq3e

B-CH-398c	Commons Hansard Vol. 398 Sec. 3	21 Jan. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/2LJrrNw
B-CH-398d	Commons Hansard Vol. 398 Sec. 4	27 Jan. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/33131VF
B-CH-398e	Commons Hansard Vol. 398 Sec. 5	27 Jan. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/2ofaJg3
B-CH-398f	Commons Hansard Vol. 398 Sec. 6	27 Jan. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/332z5IG
B-CH-398g	Commons Hansard Vol. 398 Sec. 7	27 Jan. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/2OkMTdw
B-CH-398h	Commons Hansard Vol. 398 Sec. 8	30 Jan. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/2VhJ6PF
B-CH-400a	Commons Hansard Vol. 400 Sec. 1	25 Feb. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/30IUViU
B-CH-400b	Commons Hansard Vol. 400 Sec. 2	25 Feb. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/2VaNQGK
B-CH-400c	Commons Hansard Vol. 400 Sec. 3	25 Feb. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/2MasdT2
B-CH-400d	Commons Hansard Vol. 400 Sec. 4	26 Feb. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/2Mgw2WR
B-CH-400e	Commons Hansard Vol. 400 Sec. 5	26 Feb. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/2Mdu0qf
B-CH-403a	Commons Hansard Vol. 403 Sec. 1	10 Mar. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/2oVEFxJ
B-CH-403b	Commons Hansard Vol. 403 Sec. 2	10 Mar. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/2LHKRT0
B-CH-401a	Commons Hansard Vol. 401 Sec. 1	17 Mar. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/2AIPm9O
B-CH-401b	Commons Hansard Vol. 401 Sec. 2	17 Mar. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/33362VE
B-CH-401c	Commons Hansard Vol. 401 Sec. 3	18 Mar. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/30GQN2V
B-CH-401d	Commons Hansard Vol. 401 Sec. 4	18 Mar. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/2MfBrNw
B-CH-401e	Commons Hansard Vol. 401 Sec. 5	19 Mar. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/2V8NMr8
B-CH-401f	Commons Hansard Vol. 401 Sec. 6	20 Mar. 2003	House of Commons	https://bit.ly/2VaOofM

for UK Public Opinion				*19 items*
Master URL	https://www.theguardian.com/international https://www.telegraph.co.uk/			
Ref. No.	**Title**	**Date Published**	**Source**	**Item URL**
B-GR-001	Blair says UK must pay US "blood price"	06 Sep. 2002	The Guardian	https://bit.ly/30Gwi6F
B-GR-002	Blair agrees recall of parliament	12 Sep. 2002	The Guardian	https://bit.ly/2IlXGAs
B-GR-003	Sharp rise in favour of war on Iraq	16 Oct. 2002	The Guardian	https://bit.ly/2MasYLS
B-GR-004	50% see Blair as Bush's lapdog	14 Nov. 2002	The Guardian	https://bit.ly/2nce7I6
B-GR-005	Iraq: the case for decisive action	19 Jan. 2003	The Guardian	https://bit.ly/2AEPFSL
B-GR-006	Support for war falls to new low	21 Jan. 2003	The Guardian	https://bit.ly/30GR6uB
B-GR-007	UK war dossier a sham, say experts	07 Feb. 2003	The Guardian	https://bit.ly/2LJnFE6
B-GR-008	Downing St admits blunder on Iraq dossier	08 Feb. 2003	The Guardian	https://bit.ly/2yL6Zrm
B-GR-009	UK's "biggest peace rally"	15 Feb. 2003	The Guardian	https://bit.ly/1tqn2DH
B-GR-010	Blair's popularity plummets	18 Feb. 2003	The Guardian	https://bit.ly/2pKgAdU
B-GR-011	Blair battles on after record rebellion	07 Feb. 2003	The Guardian	https://bit.ly/2pMd6Yn
B-TG-001	Sharon urges America to bring down Saddam	17 Aug. 2002	The Telegraph	https://bit.ly/2McxAAZ
B-TG-002	Duncan Smith supports Iraq action	02 Sep. 2002	The Telegraph	https://bit.ly/2Mgx8lr
B-TG-003	Iraq attack can be justified as collective self-defence	19 Sep. 2002	The Telegraph	https://bit.ly/2ASxvgN
B-TG-004	Saddam empties Iraq's jails	21 Oct. 2002	The Telegraph	http://bit.ly/2LHMxMi

Ref. No.	Title	Date Published	Source	Item URL
B-TG-005	Blair sent in tanks after "chilling" threat	16 Feb. 2003	The Telegraph	http://bit.ly/2MiHC3M
B-TG-006	One million march against war	16 Feb. 2003	The Telegraph	http://bit.ly/33c2EYH
B-TG-007	Blair rocked by biggest revolt over war on Iraq	27 Feb. 2003	The Telegraph	http://bit.ly/2oMpfft
B-TG-008	France and Russia will vote no	11 Mar. 2003	The Telegraph	http://bit.ly/2LK1kGj

for US Government				*11 items*
Master URL	https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/			
Ref. No.	**Title**	**Date Published**	**Source**	**Item URL**
A-WH-001	President Stresses Need for Strong Iraq Resolution	01 Oct. 2002	US National Archive	http://bit.ly/2OiFPy7
A-WH-002	Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq	02 Oct. 2002	US National Archive	http://bit.ly/32YVQ0j
A-WH-003	President Signs Iraq Resolution	16 Oct. 2002	US National Archive	http://bit.ly/2In7oCN
A-WH-004	President Discusses Iraq in Press Conference	07 Nov. 2002	US National Archive	http://bit.ly/2ImAJ0a
A-WH-005	President Bush, President Putin Discuss NATO, Iraq	22 Nov. 2002	US National Archive	http://bit.ly/30Keasn
A-WH-006	President Discusses Iraq and North Korea with Reporters	31 Dec. 2002	US National Archive	http://bit.ly/2VbdmM9
A-WH-007	President's Remarks on Iraq 1/2/03	02 Jan. 2003	US National Archive	http://bit.ly/2ImnpIR
A-WH-008	Excerpts from the Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer	21 Jan. 2003	US National Archive	http://bit.ly/2VdmPT9
A-WH-009	Excerpts on Iraq From Grand Rapids Speech	29 Jan. 2003	US National Archive	http://bit.ly/336pWyL

A-WH-010	Global Message on Iraq	12 Mar. 2003	US National Archive	http://bit.ly/2OlyZb8
A-WH-011	President Discusses Iraq in Radio Address	15 Mar. 2003	US National Archive	http://bit.ly/2AJaJri

for European Union				*2 items*
Master URL	https://www.europarl.europa.eu/portal/en https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-report-of-the-iraq-inquiry			
Ref. No.	**Title**	**Date Published**	**Source**	**Item URL**
E-EC-001	Outcome of the European Council (21-22 March 2003)	26 Mar. 2003	European Parliament	http://bit.ly/2Vak1Ge
B-IR-ESM	The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Executive Summary	6 Jul. 2016	United Kingdom Government	http://bit.ly/2M5YuKE

for United Nations Security Council				*2 items*
Master URL	https://www.un.org/en/? https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-report-of-the-iraq-inquiry			
Ref. No.	**Title**	**Date Published**	**Source**	**Item URL**
N-SC-1441	Resolution 1441	8 Nov. 2002	United Nations	http://bit.ly/354H89U
B-IR-ESM	The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Executive Summary	6 Jul. 2016	United Kingdom Government	http://bit.ly/2M5YuKE

for Iraq and Arab World				*19 items*
Master URL	https://www.aljazeera.net/			
Ref. No.	**Title**	**Date Published**	**Source**	**Item URL**
I-AJ-001	Iraqi opposition	17 Jul. 2002	Aljazeera	http://bit.ly/30GSxJv
I-AJ-002	Saddam's speech pushes Iraqis to more challenge	08 Aug. 2002	Aljazeera	http://bit.ly/352waBI
I-AJ-003	Saudi prince visits Baghdad amid growing opposition to war	02 Sep. 2002	Aljazeera	http://bit.ly/2Il5xy0

I-AJ-004	Saddam gets 100 percent in the presidential referendum	16 Oct. 2002	Aljazeera	http://bit.ly/354Hldc
I-AJ-005	Iraq's neighbours have no influence on Baghdad or Washington	25 Jan. 2003	Aljazeera	http://bit.ly/2pFYDgl
I-AJ-006	Bush's State of the Union address is a declaration of war	29 Jan. 2003	Aljazeera	http://bit.ly/2neP3QM
I-AJ-007	Worldwide popular movements reject the war on Iraq	15 Feb. 2003	Aljazeera	http://bit.ly/2MbK0cf
I-AJ-008	Bush plays down the importance of destroying Iraqi Al-Samoud missiles	27 Feb. 2003	Aljazeera	http://bit.ly/2AIPExc
I-AJ-009	Emirati initiative calls on Saddam Hussein to step down	01 Mar. 2003	Aljazeera	http://bit.ly/30E6JmE
I-AJ-010	Arab summit confirms absolute rejection to strike Iraq	01 Mar. 2003	Aljazeera	http://bit.ly/2ACTPe7
I-AJ-011	Iraq .. From siege to war	01 Mar. 2003	Aljazeera	http://bit.ly/358PMnF
I-AJ-012	The Iraqi economy and the possible repercussions of the war	01 Mar. 2003	Aljazeera	http://bit.ly/332MOiU
I-AJ-013	UAE: Arabs will remember Zayed's initiative after the invasion of Iraq	04 Mar. 2003	Aljazeera	http://bit.ly/331rNFe
I-AJ-014	Russia looms veto against the decision to strike Iraq	04 Mar. 2003	Aljazeera	http://bit.ly/30ICzyz

I-AJ-015	Russia threatens to veto the resolution on the war on Iraq	10 Mar. 2003	Aljazeera	http://bit.ly/2VbGKln
I-AJ-016	Al-Azhar calls for jihad in the event of an attack on Iraq	10 Mar. 2003	Aljazeera	http://bit.ly/354HFIW
I-AJ-017	Chirac: France will not support war on Iraq	11 Mar. 2003	Aljazeera	http://bit.ly/32YWV8n
I-AJ-018	Bush gives Saddam 48 hours to leave Iraq	17 Mar. 2003	Aljazeera	http://bit.ly/2AHnSRL
I-AJ-019	The Iraqi leadership rejects the US warning and Saddam promises victory	18 Mar. 2003	Aljazeera	http://bit.ly/2pKqKew
				TOTAL: 86 items
END OF TABLE				

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