

**The Impact of Social Media Misinformation on Voter Perception  
and Political Dynamics in Taiwan:Learning from Other  
Countries' Counter Disinformation Strategies**

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**Abstract**

This research aims to examine the proliferation of fake news during Taiwan's election periods and its impact on Taiwanese voters. We compared censorship mechanisms in other countries to identify potential improvements for Taiwan. First, we used questionnaires to analyze the extent and factors influencing voters' exposure to fake news, identified primary channels through which voters obtain misinformation, and examined whether voters' motivations for using social media affect their ability to discern fake news. We further investigated the cognitive and emotional impacts of fake news on voters, including misperceptions of candidates' images and policies, as well as potential feelings of anxiety, anger, or distrust. Finally, this study compared Taiwan's response strategies and attitudes toward fake news, such as verifying sources, relying on fact-checking platforms, or engaging in social media discussions and contrast them with international countermeasures and mechanisms. This comparison aims to reveal differences in information literacy across varying political cultures and media environments. Through this research, we aim to investigate how fake news impacts elections and public perception, providing insights for enhancing media literacy and introducing international media oversight mechanisms.

(Key word: Fake news, Voting of election, Censorship mechanisms, First-time-voter )

# 社群媒體上的不實資訊對台灣選民認知以及政治動態的影響：借鏡他國的防假訊息策略

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文藻外語大學, 2026

## 摘要

本研究旨在探討假新聞在臺灣選舉期間的氾濫，以及假新聞對於台灣選民的影響，我們將對比其他國家的審查機制，以此來參照台灣該如何改進。首先，我們將透過問卷分析選民遭受假新聞的影響程度及因素，以及這些選民主要是通過那些渠道來獲取錯誤資訊，並且比對選民使用社群媒體的動機是否會影響選民本身對於假新聞的判斷能力。我們也將進一步調查假新聞對選民的認知與情緒所造成的影響，包括對候選人形象與理念的誤解，以及可能引發的焦慮、憤怒或不信任感。最後，本研究比較臺灣在面對假新聞時所採取的應對策略及態度，如查證來源、依賴事實查核平台或透過社群媒體討論等，並將其與國外的因應措施及機制進行對照，以揭示不同政治文化與媒體環境背景下的資訊素養差異。透過此研究，我們希望能深入調查假新聞如何影響選舉以及民眾的認知，並提供強化媒體識讀能力與引進國外媒體審查機制的參考。

關鍵字：假新聞、選舉投票、審查機制、首投族

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## INTRODUCTION

### Research background

According to a survey in 2018 conducted by the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem) hosted by the University of Gothenburg in Sweden, called Foreign Government Dissemination of False Information, Taiwan is the most attacked by foreign government disinformation in the world (V-Dem, 2018). Therefore, combating fake news is not only an urgent task for other countries, but also a major issue that the Taiwanese government needs to pay attention to. Political lobbying, campaigning activities, and political polls before running for election are also common political-related news reported by the media.

For example, in the mid-2020 and 2024 presidential elections, false information related to candidates was widely circulated on social platforms such as Facebook and LINE, and this information was sometimes mistaken for real news, further deepening the political tendencies of voters with specific positions. For the political party supporter of low political polls, the position may be change. For supporters of political parties with low poll results, the stance may change. The most representative example is the widespread spread of fake news about a candidate being "pro-China" during the 2020 presidential election, which was later verified as untrue, but has already affected political positions in some communities. In addition, in 2016, the United States did not have a large number of censorship mechanisms to verify, so Trump could easily use the media to spread fake news.

According to a report by the Taiwan Fact-Checking Center, the number of fake news has increased significantly during elections, especially information related to candidates, which are often packaged as factual and further confuse the public. From a theoretical perspective, confirmation bias explains that people tend to believe

information that is consistent with their existing beliefs while ignoring or questioning the opposite, which makes fake news easy to spread quickly and strengthen its political attitudes once it conforms to the position of a specific group. Most of the young people in Taiwan rely on community media as the main source of political information. However, different motivations for use (such as entertainment, seeking social links, and getting news) will affect the way and depth they are exposed to information. The source of information and the motivation to receive it may determine whether a person is easily affected by false information. For this reason, this study combines the three aspects of "the impact of fake news on the public", "motives for the use of social media" and "fake news censorship mechanism" to try to analyze the interaction between the three, and explore whether this further affects their understanding of candidates or policies and voting behavior.

## **Motivation**

In recent years, social media has play an increasingly important role in Taiwan's political environment. As the speed of information dissemination accelerates, fake news and misinformation also spread rapidly, causing potential political cognitive impacts on voters . There is especially a lot of fake news during the election, which may intensify social antagonism. After participating in the election last year and experiencing the process of voting,voting counting, and result announcement, we are more interested in politics and news media. Since we are the first-time voters and were born in Generation E, the channels for acquiring information are quite diverse and easily accessible. As a result ,we receive a lot of news from the Internet before our thoughts are mature, which can easily influence our cognitive shaping. First-time

voters are relatively unfamiliar with the elections, easily influenced by the trends, and it is difficult to distinguish the authenticity of the news.

In this regard, we also want to thoroughly study the characteristics and sources of information of the first-time voters people and analyze the recognition of fake news by different ethnic groups. Is it easier for the first-time voters to believe political fake news? Due to the significantly increase in fake news during the election period, we also want to study its impact on elections, as well as compare the differences in response to fake news between foreign countries and Taiwan. We hope to learn more about the attitude of Taiwanese voters in the face of fake news and the measures that the government should take. We hope our research can reduce the impact of fake news on Taiwan's politics.

In contrast, after the 2016 presidential election, the United States implemented a set of countermeasures against fake news, such as introducing third-party censorship agencies and cooperating with organizations like Snopes and Politifact. However, Taiwan's response to fake news has been ineffective. According to Jisen Ho's research on "Supervision and Governance Discussion of Fake News"<sup>1</sup>, Taiwan adopts the public policy approach to this issue and adopts network governance. The government does not involve the judgment of the truthfulness of news information but urges operators to establish news truth verification mechanism. Additionally, many private verification agencies in Taiwan that are dealing with the authenticity of fake news and preventing the continued dissemination . We believe that Taiwan can learn from the foreign censorship mechanism and make the system work reasonably through

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<sup>1</sup> He, Chi-Sen. "A Study on the Regulation and Governance of Fake News." *Communication Research and Practice* 8, no. 2 (2018): 1–41. Accessed November 18, 2025.  
doi:10.6123/JCRP.2018.07\_8(2).0001.

appropriate adjustments. We also investigate voters's opinions on foreign censorship mechanisms and their opposition to introducing foreign media censorship mechanisms into Taiwan. In order to find a balance between media censorship mechanisms and freedom of speech, we visit private Fact-Checking centers and local legislators to evaluate their ideas and suggestions, thereby enhancing the contribution of our research to Taiwan.

### **Research purpose**

This study aims to discuss the relationship between news media and politics and how fake news influences people's judgments and thoughts during presidential elections. We delve into several points.

The following are the purposes we discuss, how the fake news affects voters' thinking, including psychological, social, and political effect, the influence of fake news and in an era where voters are frequently exposed to fake news, do they trust Taiwan's existing free and democratic system? We look at voters' perceptions and understandings of fake news, how they receive election information, their motivations for using social media, and whether they can tell what is fake news.

This study analyzes voters' diverse reactions and perspectives when faced with fake news through research. In addition, this paper investigate the attitude and the reaction, and the different response approaches.

Furthermore, to understand the differences between foreign and Taiwan's media censorship mechanisms, we conduct literature reviews and look for expert interviews to determine whether Taiwan's fake news censorship mechanisms need further development. We also gather public opinions on these mechanisms.

By exploring media in different environments and cultural backgrounds, we can gain a deeper understanding of the influence and effects of fake news.

### **Research questions**

1. What is the level of voters' perceptions toward fake news they encountered during Taiwan's presidential election, and what factors influence the differences in these perception levels?
2. In what ways did such fake news influence voters' understanding of candidates and election issues , as well as their emotional responses?
3. In the context of the increasing prevalence of fake news, what strategies do Taiwanese citizens adopt to respond to misinformation, and how do these responses compare with those implemented in other countries?

## LITERATURE REVIEW

### **What is Cognition? How to contribute the cognition?**

Cognition, in a broad sense, is when people face to the information, the psychological process of acquisition, understanding, processing and application ;and contribue to cognition is not the single static thing, is a process of continuous circulation and dynamic change. The perception of voters may be through news, social media or selective attention to the information they are interested in, and then interpret the information according to their own thoughts and emotional states, and finally form the conclusion that this person is worthy of support or the party cannot be trusted; The election news shape the specific world outlook though choose the subject matter, arrange the narrative order and use the specific wording. For example, the same thing can be reported as "candidate A shows leadership" or described as "candidate A's domineering dictatorship". This is the perception of manipulating voters.

According to Bo Qi Xu's essay<sup>2</sup>, comments, likes, reposts and tags among members could influence others' opinions and attitudes. This process represented how cognition is contributed to during the social interact. In this study finds that when users feel "we are a part of community" on platforms like Dcard or other social media. In fact, this consciousness is the result of collective identity. It contributes to cognition through repeated interaction, emotional resonance and shared values. It can be seen from it, social media not only serves as a platform for exchange the information but also play an important role in shaping individual and collective

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<sup>2</sup> Boqi Xu. "Exploring the Impact of Virtual Community Awareness, Cognitive Interaction, and Cognitive Key Majority on Community Participation: A Case Study of Facebook Groups." Master's thesis, Tamkang University, 2017. Retrieved from Huayi Online Library on November 5, 2025. doi:10.6846/TKU.2017.00663

cognition. Interact behavior of social media affect the members' opinion and attitudes , gradually forming a sense of community belonging and collective cognition through repeated communication and emotional connection.

### **Voters and The cognition of election news**

According to Guang Yang Ji's research<sup>3</sup>, good information does not necessarily lead to good decision-making, it also depends on whether decision-makers have the ability to correctly understand and utilize this information. When voters receive political information that is biased, distorted, or incorrect (e.g., fake news or manipulative reporting), it can result in cognitive biases and irrational voting choices, as mentioned in the study's quadrant 3 scenario (misinformation + poor cognitive condition → worst decision-making). In addition to, every voter has their own political stance, experience or preference. “These forms of a priori knowledge” affect them how they perceive new information, whether they accept it , and how they interpret it? For example, even if some information is accurate, it may still be questioned or rejected if it contradicts an individual’s existing beliefs. This aligns with the interaction process of “priori knowledge” and “new information” emphasized in the study. Therefore, the information reading ability of voters and cognitive openness are the main factors of election rationalization in a democratic society.

According to Si Ping Lin’s journal<sup>4</sup>,which mentioned the study of traditional newspapers in the US and UK. During the large-scale and indicative election, the

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<sup>3</sup> Guangyang Ji. "Construction and Discussion of the Relationship Model of "Information" and "Cognition" in the Decision-making Process. Journal of General Studies, Northern Taiwan University of Science and Technology, No. 6 (2010): pp. 195-216. Retrieved from Huayi Online Library on November 5, 2025. doi:10.7032/JGETSINT.201006.0195

<sup>4</sup> Szu-Ping Lin. “Political News and the Construction of Newspaper Readers’ Political Stance: A Qualitative Approach — Taking Taiwan’s Three Major Local Newspapers as an Example.” Journal of Fuxinggang (Fuxinggang Academic Journal), no. 104 (2014): 151–174. Retrieved November 5, 2025, from Airiti Library

political stance of the newspaper has a significant impact on the reader. Especially when supporting a specific political candidate, it has an obvious persuasive effect on the voting choice of the reader. During the election, voters choose the news content that is in line with their position according to their own political position. It reflects "selective exposure"<sup>5</sup> and "selective perception"<sup>6</sup>, voters accept the news information according to existing perceptions. When the news position conflicts with its own power, voters may seek to restore cognitive balance by consulting alternative sources.

The perception of election news does not only come from a single influence. It may be influenced by the combined role of family, society and the media. In the face of such multi-faceted information input, voters are no longer passive recipients, they must have a certain media literacy and critical thinking skills to integrate all information and make effective comparisons and analyses. Only in this way can voters make more rational and autonomous judgments in face of complex political issues and election information, and form a stable and mature civic consciousness.

Under the influence of such an information environment and psychological mechanism, election news can gradually influence and even change the original cognitive structures of voters, and reshape the overall understanding and attitude of voters towards candidates, political parties and even the whole election itself by guiding "how to look at things" and "how to feel things". Referring to the research of

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<sup>5</sup>Selective exposure refers to the tendency of people to actively engage with information that is consistent with their existing attitudes, beliefs, or values, and avoid or ignore information that conflicts with their own position. This is a cognitive bias phenomenon aimed at maintaining psychological consistency and avoiding the discomfort caused by cognitive dissonance.

<sup>6</sup> Selective perception refers to the fact that when people receive information, they selectively pay attention, interpret, and remember information that is consistent with their own position, while ignoring or distorting information that is inconsistent with it.

Wen Hui Luo , Hui Xin Wang and Zhi Qin Hou<sup>7</sup>, it can be observed that there are obvious differences in the attitudes and positions of various news media towards different candidates. The content of the report shows different degrees of political tendencies in the selection of subject matter, reporting angle and narrative style. Therefore, voters are exposed to some media news are likely to be unconsciously influenced by this bias , thus shaping the perception and evaluation of candidates.

### **First-time voters influenced by social media**

Research by CAI,MIN-JIE and YANG,WEI-REN<sup>8</sup> discoverd that users selectively engage<sup>9</sup>with social media to fulfill their motivations and objectives. Selective exposure does not directly impact political participation, but those with high levels of selective exposure are more likely to participate in political activities compared to those with low levels.

Those experiencing a stronger echo chamber effect also exhibit higher political participation. They build like-minded communities on social media, discuss public issues, and exchange politically aligned opinions. This process reinforces their own perception, leading them to misconceive others share their views. Also increase their motivation for political participation, and their political convictions become more determined.

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<sup>7</sup> Ven-Hwei Lo,HueiXin Wang , and ZhiChin Hou. "Political Bias in Newspaper Coverage of Taiwan's 2004 Presidential Election." *Journal of Electoral Studies*, vol. 14, no. 2 (2007): 95–120. Retrieved November 5, 2025, from Airiti Library.

<sup>8</sup> CAI,MIN-JIE and YANG,WEI-REN "A Study on the Impact of Social Media on the Political Participation of First-Time Voters: A Case Study of the 2020 Presidential Election". *Journal of General Education and Multiculturalism*, No. 10 (2022): pp. 103-142. Retrieved from Huayi Online Library on May 12, 2025.

<sup>9</sup> The theory of selective contact is based on the "cognitive dissonance theory" proposed by Festinger (1957)(*Cognitive Dissonance Theory*), which points out that when individual cognitions contradict each other, psychological discord will arise harmony and conflict, in such a situation, the individual should change cognition or behavior

The so-called echo chamber effect<sup>10</sup> refers to a psychological phenomenon where a group of people share common views, exchange information, and thereby reinforce existing perspectives. Within specific communication spaces, users tend to selectively engage<sup>11</sup> with information aligning with their political stance, discussing or connecting with others which similar to their political spaces to reinforce their self-perception.

The echo chamber effects may affect the contents which users choose to pose on social media and influence users to find community identity of the similar stance. Nowadays, social media has become an important tunnel to gain information about politics by young people. Also, social media is one of the main factors<sup>12</sup> that influence the young person' political attitude and political participation behavior. The teenagers are growing in the E-generation. Although they are good enough at using social media, but they impacted by social media easily, hence social media will emerge as A New Model of Electoral Campaign Strategies<sup>13</sup> in the world. Social media has become an indispensable tool in electoral campaigns<sup>14</sup>.

This shows that first-time voters primarily absorb informations through social media. When we browse social media, we will open self-protection mechanisms to avoid cognitive dissonance and reduce cognitive imbalance. To prevent this, audiences seek information that is similar to their existing views, aligning cognition with behavior, thus creating the phenomenon of selective exposure.

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<sup>10</sup> Dori-Down, Versee , and Gilbert, 2013.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid

<sup>12</sup> Su, Heng, and Fu, Yu. (2011)

<sup>13</sup> Zhang Yu Shi, (2017)

<sup>14</sup> Li Hongtian, (2013)

This self protection mechanism, first noted by Klapper<sup>15</sup>, It mentions that audiences will discover information on social media that is aligned with their preferences or not, then they will make trade offs about the information they gained, this action is called selective exposure. Selective exposure is linked to psychological processes of self-protection. We tend to focus on platforms that share our political stance, even with traditional media. We typically only watch programs aligned with our preferred party. However, social media always uses algorithms to push content related to what they frequently look to users. This practice enhance the echo chamber effect, reinforcing the collective consciousness of groups sharing the same political ideology. This leads to increasingly narrow sources of information reception, making it difficult to perceive the whole picture. Below this we explore first-time voters' motivations for using social media, the extent of their influence, and how their online activity impacts political participation.

### **The main motivation for first-time voters to use social media**

This paper references several scholars' classifications of motivations for using social media. Wang Songyin<sup>16</sup> categorized them as Instrumental Motivation: Users can access or download needed information anytime, unrestricted by time or location. Entertainment Motivation: Using the internet satisfies entertainment needs or serves as a pastime. Social motivation: The internet expands interpersonal networks, users can not only maintain old friendships but also form new ones. CAI,MIN-JIE and YANG,WEI-REN categorized social media motivations into information gathering,

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<sup>15</sup> Klapper. "The Effects of Mass Communication." APA PsycNet, 1960. <https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1962-00995-000>.

<sup>16</sup> Wang, Songyin. "Patterns, Motivations, and Impacts of Internet Usage." *Journal of Information Society Studies*, Vol. 12 (2007): p.57-85. Retrieved May 12, 2025, from the Huayi Online Library. doi:10.29843/JCCIS.200701.0003

social interaction, and entertainment. Wang Taili<sup>17</sup> categorized public social media motivations during elections into information needs, entertainment needs, social needs, and self-expression needs.

This paper summarizes motivations as information gathering, social interaction, entertainment, and political use. Information gathering refers to daily data searches for the latest updates, not specifically political content. Social interaction refers to maintaining interpersonal connections, expanding networks, and fostering user-to-user engagement, excluding political purposes. Entertainment pastime including activities like gaming, watching entertainment content, listening to music, etc., for amusement and time-killing, also excluding political purposes. Political purposes refer to staying informed about political news, publishing political opinions, monitoring government announcements, paying attention to domestic and international political developments, watching political commentary programs, and gathering election campaign information.

To analyze the primary social media platforms used by first-time voters and their main motivations, we categorize them and conduct questionnaire interviews to examine differences in internet usage between first-time and non first-time voters. We also investigate whether their social media usage habits influence political participation levels.

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<sup>17</sup> Wang, Tai-Li. Facebook Election "*The Impact of Social Media on Political Participation in Taiwan's 2012 Presidential Election.*" *Soochow Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2013): pp. 1-52. Retrieved May 12, 2025, from the Huayi Online Library.

## **Factors affect the voting of first-time voters**

First-time voters, as the name suggests refer to young voters participating in an election for the first time. According the research on the impact of social media with the political engagement of first-time voters, using the 2020 presidential election as an example, group of young first-time voters, lacking prior voting experience and a sense of active participation, so they often feel unfamiliar with the voting process, relevant regulations, and the overall functioning of the political system, so when they make electoral decisions, they are easily influenced by social atmospheres at that time, media discourse, and mainstream opinions. Simultaneously, with the widespread of digital technology, social media has become the primary channel for first-time voters to access political information.

However, the rapid dissemination of information on social media also makes them encountering misinformation or fake news easily, leading to biased perceptions and judgments without scrutiny. Moreover, first-time voters are highly dependent on peer groups during their formative years, making family influence and peer discussions become crucial factors in shaping their political attitudes. Through peer interactions, political opinions can rapidly spread and evolve, ultimately swaying first-time voters' voting intentions. This is a far reaching of social media and peer circles to the political behavior of younger generations, while also show the significance of the information environment and social networks in shaping election outcomes within contemporary democratic societies.

## **What is Fake News?**

Fake News means fabrication, quotation of false sources ,making up or alteration of storylines,etc. to create sail under false colors. Actually the phenomenon of fake news didn't come out in recent years. In 2016, Fake News attracted attention on the

America president election. During the election, Cambridge Analytica helped Trump win the election by creating Fake News, and then fake news became a hot word. Ho Jisen <sup>18</sup> pointed out that there is no clear definition and boundary between fake news, only the difference in degree, but scholar Chadwick defines fake news as 「Presenting fictional content in a non-fictional way, the purpose is to mislead public, taking fictional content as fact.」 <sup>19</sup> According to periodical <傳播研究與實踐> . Volume 8, fake news should refer to the traditional news media or socialization the network media model to spread wrong information, the purpose is to mislead the public, bring political or commercial benefits. <sup>20</sup>Fake news usually mixes with real information, or distorted the part of facts, making the public hard to distinguish between truth and falsehood in the news. The concept of fake news is unclear, there is often politics or manipulative news of commercially intention. In addition to only giving the biased truth and persuading public's special motivation, fake news is not limited to the dissemination of network platform operators.Paragraph. The table below is included so that there is an item in the sample List of Tables.

## Types of Fake News

The types of fake news can be classified by different angles, UNESCO wrote in a published book that fake news could be separated into two different types in 2018.

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<sup>18</sup> He Jisen. <*Discussion on the supervision and management of fake news. Communication Research and Practice*> Volume 8 Issue 2 (2018): Pages 1-41. Doi:10.6123/JCRP.2018.07\_8(2).0001

<sup>19</sup> Wei Yunfang. “*On the impact of fake news on public perception: Take the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections in the United States as an example. Master's thesis, Institute of International Politics, National Zhongxing University, 2023. [Https://hdl.handle.net/11296/twr594](https://hdl.handle.net/11296/twr594).*

<sup>20</sup> “*Communication Research and Practice*”. Journalism Research No. 110 (2012): Pages 279-279. doi:10.30386/MCR.201201\_(110).0008

The sharing motivation and intention are the key reason. Elle Hunt<sup>21</sup>,Mark Verstrate,Derek Bambauer, and Jane.R Bambauer think the types of fake news include hoaxes ,trolling ,satire,humor,Publicity .etc five basic form. Scholar Huang Junru by using the degree of falsehood in fake news and the level of motivation to be delimit by fake news' condition, based on the difference between the gravity and scale of the motivation divided into front and back five parts. Building upon the previous delimit, fake news is furthermore divided into 25 types.

### **Communication process and Speed of Fake News**

With the popularity of social media, the influence of social media has been exaggerated. Social media has become a primary channel of communication for political campaigns .Fake news' speed of dissemination is six times faster than true news. The rumors' transmission route of social media is also deeper than the ordinary sharing. The higher the level of political polarization, the quicker the speed of dissemination. This is because fake news tends to contain inflammatory's article and emotional contents. According to Shu et al. synthesized previous research, classical communication process of fake news on social media includes stages such as creation 、posting 、early diffusion 、viral spread 、mainstream adoption and audience response. Taking Covid-19 as an example, at that time, it was mainly shared by a small number of influential people on Twitter, and then reposted by the public. First, the algorithm recommends personalized content to help you find like-minded groups, and the sharing of information within the group causes fake news feedback

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<sup>21</sup> Yang Weiren. < *The harm and response of fake news. Outlook and Exploration Monthly*, Volume 17, Issue 12 (2019): Pages 95-116. Retrieved from Huayi Online Library on May 12, 2025.


loops, thus falling into a loop. In order to better understand the communication patterns of online news, Castillo depicted the life cycle of online news through research in the article *<Characterizing the Life Cycle of Online News Stories Using Social Media Reactions>*<sup>22</sup> which further classifies news according to its communication characteristics, such as rapid popularity, short-lived and continuous attention. Fake news has emotional content and exaggerated headlines, the sharing rate is extremely high in a short period of time and causes discussion, so it is quickly becomes popular. Understanding the communication process and how the news media spreads not only helps analyze the audience behavior of true news, but also helps us identify fake news and formulate corresponding countermeasures in advance.

In the Figure 1 Infer the forwarding path from the forwarding diagram of Twitter, the researchers demonstrate how to infer the spread path of fake news on Twitter in three scenarios. First (a) the most recognizable situation, based on the retweet history between users, we can directly observe how the message is passed from the original poster to the subsequent sharer in order according to the chronological order in which the post appears, and (b) shows that when there is no clear retweet marker, we can only rely on whether there is a tracking relationship to infer the source of the message. For example, if one of the two users who are also sharing content follows the other and the other does not, it can be inferred that the message is more likely to be passed from the follower to the follower, then (c) means that when there is insufficient tracking information or there is no social connection between users, it returns to the most basic judgment method and speculates on the most likely direction of spread based on the order of posts by different users. Overall, scenarios A, B, and C show

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<sup>22</sup> N.d. *Characterizing the Life Cycle of Online News Stories Using Social Media Reactions*.

how researchers can infer the trajectory of information flow through timelines and social connections in the state of incomplete information, thereby reconstructing the spread pattern of fake news on social media.




**Figure 1** Infer the forwarding path from the forwarding diagram of Twitter  
(Adapted from Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral, “The Spread of True and False News Online,” *Science* 359, no. 6380 (2018): Supplementary Figure S5, <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aap9559>.)

### Censorship mechanism for fake news

The censorship mechanism refers to measures for identifying, marking, restricting, or removing misinformation, aimed at reducing the spread and social impact of fake news.

Our research primarily references foreign online media censorship mechanisms and adapts them into complementary measures suitable for implementation in Taiwan. According to research by the Center for Democracy and Multilateralism (V-Dem) at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, Taiwan will again be the country most severely targeted by foreign attacks in the world in 2024, and it's already continuous eleven years at the top of this ranking. The Figure 2 below is the attached image depicts the severity of global attacks from foreign misinformation, categorized by color. The indicator scores in the chart range from 0 to 4, with lighter shades indicating a higher degree of foreign disinformation attacks.

Foreign Government Dissemination of False Information



**Figure 2** Foreign Government Dissemination of False Information (Source from 紀路台灣) <https://tbotaiwan.com/v-dem-foreign-government-dissemination-of-false-information-2024-taiwan/>


We also referenced the Press Freedom Index<sup>23</sup>. This ranking reflects the extent to which journalists, media organizations, and netizens in these countries enjoy the freedom, while also indicating the degree to which their governments protect and promote this freedom.

According to Reporters Without Borders' ranking of 2025 World Press Freedom Index, Taiwan rose from No.27 in 2024 to No.24 in 2025. This indicates that Taiwan's media enjoys considerable freedom with few limit. On the contrary, this environment tends to generate excessive amounts of unverifiable fake news, which can easily mislead the public during election periods. Figure 3 Press Freedom Index shows the 2025 World Press Freedom Index, where colors closer to blue indicate greater

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<sup>23</sup> The annual ranking evaluated by Reporters Without Borders after assessing the previous year's press freedom records in certain countries, regions, or organizations,

freedom, while colors closer to red indicate less freedom.



**Figure 3** Press Freedom Index (Source from website Wikipedia)

<https://zh.wikipedia.org/zh-tw/%E6%96%B0%E9%97%BB%E8%87%AA%E7%94%B1%E6%8C%87%E6%95%B0>

<https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aopl/202505020289.aspx>

According to Xu Kaiyu's research<sup>24</sup>, the content primarily talk the regulatory models for fake news in the United States and Germany. The paper mentions that Taiwan also introduced a draft Digital Intermediary Services Act<sup>25</sup> in 2022, aiming to regulate fake news online within Taiwan through legislation. However, the draft bill sparked controversy due to its mechanisms. Many citizens feared that platform operators might delete any articles flagged as questionable to protect themselves if the law took effect. Furthermore, the draft lacked clear definitions for illegal content. Public concern that government standards for identifying fake news could different,

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<sup>24</sup> Hsu, Kai-Yu. "Exploring Challenges in Taiwan's Online Regulation of Fake News through the Lens of U.S. and German Regulatory Models." Master's Thesis, National Taiwan Normal University, 2024. Retrieved June 2, 2025, from the Huayi Online Library. doi:10.6345/NTNU202400271

<sup>25</sup> The National Communications Commission (NCC) of the Republic of China intends to enact the *Digital Intermediary Services Act*. On August 18, 2022, it convened the third public briefing session for the Digital Intermediary Services Act. Information storage service providers

and potentially leading some institutions to conceal related news and reducing transparency in news consumption.

Taiwanese citizens value freedom of speech and press freedom more than the benefits this draft bill offers, leading to strong public fight against. The implementation of the draft Digital Intermediary Services Act has been stopped consequently.

In contrast, Germany stands as a pioneer in establishing new laws to combat fake news and effectively curb its reproduction. Initially, Germany hoped social media platforms would autonomy remove fake news by social media operators, but this approach proved ineffective. Then, Germany enacted the Network Enforcement Law (NetzDG) in 2017. France under President Macron's leadership, passed Law Against the Manipulation of information, This law strengthened oversight of social media platforms in France regarding the spread of misinformation and authorized relevant units to sanction television channels attempting to influence elections during campaign periods<sup>26</sup>. In 2020, former U.S. President Trump also enacted the Clean Network Initiative, aiming to ban Chinese internet equipment suppliers and communication media<sup>27</sup>.

In recent years, the freedom of social media has increased, any platforms allowing users to express their opinions and comments. News on Threads is often referred to as frontline information because it is no need to the media editing and the traditional news production process, enabling instant dissemination. While this reflects the new form of modern media, allowing third party citizens beyond traditional media to autonomously publish opinions and share current events, but it is

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<sup>26</sup> Luo Shihong, 2018

<sup>27</sup> Tang Shizhe, 2020

not entirely positive. This trend may lead to an increase in fake news, Unverified news spreads rapidly, making it difficult for the public to distinguish sources and authenticity. While Taiwan lacks comprehensive online censorship, but have several censorship mechanisms exist. These include the NCC<sup>28</sup>, private organizations like MyGoPen<sup>29</sup> and the Taiwan Fact-Checking Center (TFC)<sup>30</sup>, which verify suspicious online content and publish fact-checking reports. LINE also references their findings to combat fake news.

Nevertheless, Taiwan's internal regulation of fake news still inadequate. Major world powers have already taken action on internet regulation, indicating international recognition that future online development, we need to oversight to prevent adverse impacts on Taiwan's progress. Online media also significantly influences elections. If we allowing citizens to spread rumor unchecked, and the consequences would be unimaginable. Fake news frequently influences election outcomes. If politics become controlled by media, it will block our nation's development. Therefore, we will explore how to learn from successful international models and improve domestic legislative proposals to curb the proliferation of fake news in Taiwan. We must strike a balance between citizens' freedom of speech and maintaining a healthy online media environment. This approach will gradually foster public acceptance of oversight mechanisms without depriving citizens of their right to free speech, thereby ensuring not to obstacles the media industry's future.

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<sup>28</sup> The National Communications Commission (NCC, formerly known as the National Communications Council) is the highest regulatory authority in the Republic of China for telecommunications, broadcasting, and other information dissemination industries. As an independent agency under the supervision of the Executive Yuan, it was established in 2006.

<sup>29</sup> MyGoPen was founded in 2015 and is one of Taiwan's earliest fact-checking organizations.

<sup>30</sup> The Taiwan Fact-Checking Center (TFC) is a non-profit fact-checking organization in Taiwan. It was jointly established on April 19, 2018, by the Taiwan Media Watch Education Foundation and the Quality Journalism Development Association.

## Comparison of cross-border news censorship mechanisms

The current media environment is undergoing rapid changes, and the control of news in various countries also presents different censorship methods according to different political and social and cultural backgrounds. The practices of many countries show that press censorship is not so much a government suppression of the media, but a control method formed by the combined action of various factors such as law, technology, economy, and social culture in different institutional contexts.

Qiuqing Tai<sup>31</sup> (2014) pointed out that China's censorship model is a dynamic and diverse system, combining national norms, corporate self-discipline, and user self-censorship, demonstrating the highly interactive and non-linear control characteristics of the digital age. Lin Fen<sup>32</sup> (2018) uses the concept of "power and information paradox" to analyze how China can strengthen the dominance of public opinion through institutional arrangements while maintaining the parallel tension between political control and media marketization, thereby consolidating the legitimacy of the regime.

In contrast, Germany, as a model of democracy, tends to manage information through the rule of law. Sabrina Maaß et al.<sup>33</sup> (2024) conducted a study on the effectiveness of the implementation of the NetzDG on Facebook and found that the law not only did not have a chilling effect, imposing fines on platforms that could remove illegal speech, but also successfully encouraged platforms to increase their willingness to remove illegal content, indicating that regulations can also effectively

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<sup>31</sup> Tai, Qiuqing. "China's Media Censorship: A Dynamic and Diversified Regime." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 14, no. 2 (2014): 185–210. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800008900>.

<sup>32</sup> Lin Fen. < *The Paradox of Power and Information: Studying the National Perspective of Chinese Media*. *Journal of Communication and Sociology* No. 45 (2018): Pages 19-46. Doi:10.30180/CS.201807\_(45).0003

<sup>33</sup> Sabrina Maaß, et al., "Evaluating the Regulation of Social Media: An Empirical Study of the German NetzDG and Facebook," 2024.

promote media responsibility in a democratic society. Another study conducted by Stockmann<sup>34</sup> et al. (2023) shows that Germany has formed a tripartite cooperative model of state, business, and civil society in dealing with online hate speech, which breaks away from the coercive logic of traditional censorship and provides a new direction for maintaining public order in a democratic system. South Korea, which also adopts legal channels, has a multi-level review and verification mechanism in elections and public issues. The Central Election Commission (NEC), as the highest competent authority, is responsible for monitoring the fairness of elections and proactively clarifying misinformation. At the same time, the government, through the Korea Communications Commission (KCC), can block websites that are deemed illegal or harmful in accordance with the law. Technology platforms such as Naver work with the NEC to establish whistleblowing mechanisms and strengthen regulations on election disinformation and deepfake content. At the private level, Seoul National University's Fact Check Center is real, but it still seeks a balance between freedom of speech and content control (SNU Fact Check) and major media outlets also conduct independent checks. Overall, South Korea's news censorship model is a "multi-party collaborative type", combining the power of the government, platforms and media to maintain election transparency and information balance.

Unlike Germany and South Korea, where information is managed by regulations, Finland embodies another model of democratic paradigm governance. Finland is known for its high degree of media freedom, transparency and media literacy education, and has a high level of credibility in the Finnish media. CNN reporter Eliza Mackintosh pointed out that after Finland realized the seriousness of fake news, it

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<sup>34</sup> Daniela Stockmann, et al., “*Social Media Governance and Strategies to Combat Online Hatespeech in Germany*”(2023).

called on citizens to fight fake news together in 2014, and the government also consulted American experts and formulated strategies. Therefore, Finland has cultivated the ability to think independently from an early age, and through long-term media literacy education and strong public media, it has built social immunity against fake news. Finns' self-directed thinking is also reflected in people's reading habits, with Finland ranking first in the reading performance column of the International Student Competency Assessment Scheme (PISA) among EU member states.

In stark contrast to China and Germany, Iran has adopted technical covert censorship. Anderson<sup>35</sup> (2013) used internet speed detection methods to reveal how Iran used "throttling" technology to effectively curb protests and information proliferation without obviously blocking websites. This method of repression, which is difficult for the international community to detect, embodies the evolved form of implicit control of digital authoritarianism. In addition, Russia's censorship of news has expanded not only domestically but also to the international public opinion space. Beseler<sup>36</sup> and Toepfl (2024) conducted a study on alternative media in German-speaking regions and found that these ostensibly local media actually spread pro-Russian and anti-Western discourses through organizational, personal, and content connections, becoming part of the Kremlin's external information warfare. This operation of exporting ideology through unofficial media shows that censorship of the press has become part of Russia's geopolitical strategy.

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<sup>35</sup> Collin Anderson, *Dimming the Internet: Detecting Throttling as a Mechanism of Censorship in Iran* (2013), <https://arxiv.org/abs/1306.4361>.

<sup>36</sup> Beseler, A., & Toepfl, F. (2024). *Conduits of the Kremlin's Informational Influence Abroad? How German-Language Alternative Media Outlets Are Connected to Russia's Ruling Elites*. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 30(3), 659-678. <https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612241230284>

Although Taiwan has a high degree of freedom of journalism, it faces structural problems of media concentration and political intervention. Luo Shihong<sup>37</sup> (2013) advocates that a "structural + content" dual-track strategy should be used to deal with media monopoly, including strengthening ownership transparency, standardizing media integration, and promoting media literacy to ensure information diversity and fairness, and prevent political capital from joining forces to control public discourse. It is worth noting that press censorship is not unilaterally imposed by the state, but social forces can also be an important source of restrictions on press freedom. Anderson<sup>38</sup>, Commins, and Whitten-Woodring (2023) proposed the concept of bottom-up censorship, pointing out that in societies with high nationalist sentiments, media often self-censorship due to public pressure, and even with legal protections, their actual operations may still be strongly constrained by public opinion. This perspective complements the traditional understanding of press censorship, revealing that public opinion and cultural pressure can also restrict press freedom.

To sum up, the press censorship mechanism has evolved from a single state suppression to a composite governance that combines law, technology, ideology and social forces. Authoritarian regimes such as China and Iran emphasize structural and technological control, democracies such as Germany and Finland maintain order through regulations and media literacy education, Russia demonstrates external information warfare strategies, Taiwan highlights the risks of market monopoly and

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<sup>37</sup> Luo Shihong. < *How to prevent media monopoly? How to maintain media diversity? - Towards a composite control path*. *Communication Research and Practice* Volume 3 Issue 2 (2013): Page 1-25. Retrieved from Huayi Online Library on September 22, 2025.

<sup>38</sup> Anderson, N., Commins, A., & Whitten-Woodring, J. (2023). *Fostering Bottom-Up Censorship From the Top-Down: Nationalism and Media Restrictions*. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 29(4), 869-890. <https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612231172306> (Original work published 2024)

political interference within democratic institutions, and nationalist-driven social censorship presents new dynamics. In the current era of accelerated global information flow and the growth of social media, the understanding of news censorship should be more detailed and multi-layered, and pay close attention to its specific practices and influences under different systems and cultures. Overall, the intertwining of social media, cognitive biases, and fake news affects the political attitudes of first-time voters, highlighting the importance of improving media literacy.

### **The combination of fake news censorship and AI technology**

Due to the rise of digital media and social networks, which have led to rapid information dissemination and lack of editorial control, fake news has increased and affected political, social, and democratic systems. In recent years, fake news has frequently appeared in Taiwan's elections and social events, causing cognitive confusion and social division, so there is a need for a review mechanism for fake news. Taiwan currently has a few network security mechanisms. In addition, with the development of modern technology, many countries have begun to use AI to detect fake news, and the 2016 US presidential election fake news has gone viral, so the United States has begun to invest AI in the detection of fake news. In recent years, Taiwan has also used AI technology to assist us in checking fake news, such as Cofact.

Chinese Journal of Communication, The 39th issue<sup>39</sup> also discusses the detection of fake news by AI, they used a large amount of general news and a large amount of

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<sup>39</sup> Weijing Wang , Zhishan Liao, Xuzheng Jiang, Kunzhang Zhou . "An Empirical Study on the Use of AI Technology to Detect Fake News". Chinese Journal of Communication, No. 39 (2021): p. 43-70. Retrieved from Huayi Online Library on November 7, 2025.  
doi:10.3966/172635812021060039002

fake news to train AI to recognize characteristics, and the AI's language detection system judged that fake news uses common nouns, commas, and adverbs more frequently than ordinary news, and was more verbose and inflammatory. Although AI has high potential in identifying fake news (90% accuracy) and can effectively distinguish between true and fake news, AI can still have vulnerabilities, so it can be manually checked to achieve the best results.

According to Yu Qi Lin's research<sup>40</sup>, AI can use models to identify fake news, and this study also compares humans with AI and found that AI can quickly check fake news, but the true semantics in the article are limited. In summary, although AI can quickly detect fake news through language models, the judgment of fake news ultimately requires critical human thinking and understanding. In addition to the combination of AI technology and manual censorship mechanisms, it is also necessary to improve citizens' media literacy to curb the proliferation of fake news in this era of information explosion.

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<sup>40</sup> Yuqi Lin, "Using artificial intelligence technology to detect Chinese fake news", Master's Thesis, National Taiwan Normal University, 2021. Retrieved from Huayi Online Library on November 7, 2025. doi:10.6345/NTNU202100039

## Summary

First, we study the differences in newsperception between first-time voters and non-first-time voters through questionnaires, and adopt a general questionnaire method to widely collect the impact and views of various age groups on fake news. We also hope to explore the basic differences between different ethnic groups, voting characteristics, sources of information obtained, types of media they usually pay attention to, and differences in the degree of influence of fake news from independent variables such as age, education, party preferences, first-time voters and non-first-time voters. By setting up a basic research-framework to classify them, we can fully explore the research results. Furthermore, in response to whether Taiwan's media censorship system should be reformed, we collected opinions from professionals through in-depth interviews, hoping to draw constructive results from them.

The survey results found that first-time voters are susceptible to misinformation and fake news due to their lack of voting experience and mainly rely on social media to obtain election information, which in turn shapes their perception of candidates and political parties. Voters' political perceptions are a dynamic process that is influenced by a combination of personal values, media narratives, and stratosphere effects. When fake news successfully caters to specific positions or emotional demands, it can reinforce existing prejudices, reduce the likelihood of accepting different perspectives, and even lead to political antagonism and group division.

## **METHODOLOGY**

This research focuses on the impact of fake news on Taiwan's elections and voter perceptions, and the current fake news censorship mechanism in Taiwan is still inadequate, and most of them are self-organized institutions by civil society groups. To investigate these questions, we used convenience sampling to investigate the impact of fake news on Taiwanese voters through a general questionnaire. In addition, we interviewed civil society groups and legislators with backgrounds related to the censorship mechanism to obtain information about the Taiwanese and the censorship mechanism. The reason why we chose to use interviews and questionnaires is to better collect relevant information, our research questions 1 and 2 were mainly about the influence of public perception and voting on fake news, and pay more attention to the thoughts and feelings of voters themselves, so we mainly used quantitative analysis for analysis. The third research question was mainly about how the public responds to this misinformation and the strategic comparison with other countries, so we focused more on the qualitative part, we interviewed relevant professionals to obtain more accurate answers, and the quantitative part, through questionnaire, we could better understand the views of various age groups on this issue and how they respond.

### **Source of Data**

The data sources of this study were divided into two parts, the first part was questionnaire data, with a total of 36 questions. It included true or false questions, five-point scales, question and answer questions, and multiple-choice questions. The respondents ranged in age from 20 to over 60 years old, and they were all people who had voted in the presidential election. The main purpose of the study was to understand the impact of fake news on voters' perceptions and voting intentions, the

content of the questionnaire covered the sources of fake news, whether people will affect their voting intentions and moods because of fake news, their motivation for use social media, and the extent to which respondents of different ages and educational backgrounds were affected by fake news, whether the public agrees with the introduction of foreign media censorship mechanisms and their views on whether Taiwanese people need to strengthen media literacy education. The second part was interview data. In order to obtain more professional information about the fake news censorship mechanism and the Digital Intermediary Service Act, and to collect more opinions and comments on the introduction of foreign media censorship mechanisms, we invited Taiwanese private fake news censorship agencies (such as MyGoPen and Taiwan Fact-Checking Center verification reporters) and former legislator Bi ru Tsai to conduct in-depth interviews understand the verification process, challenges, and countermeasures and how to increase the media literacy of Taiwanese people.

**Table 1 List of interviewee**

<b>Mygopen (MGP)</b>	Mygopen, whose name comes from the Taiwanese word Don't Lie, is a private Taiwanese fact-checking center, established in 2015, focusing on the verification of rumors and false information, and has passed the IFCN certification.
<b>Taiwan Fact-checking center (TFC)</b>	Taiwan Fact-Checking Center established in 2018, is a non-profit, third-party impartial checking organization that mainly checks information related to public affairs, such as political speech or social issues. It has passed the IFCN certification.
<b>Legislator Tsai Bi ru</b>	Miss. Tsai Bi ru is a member of the Taiwan People's Party, a nurse who turned into a politician, and in 2020, she represented the Taiwan People's Party in the Legislative Yuan and became a member of the 10th legislature
Miss. Tsai Bi ru Interview in 9/24	

## **Data Collection and Research Instruments**

After consulting civil society groups related to the verification mechanism and legislators who had paid attention to the Digital Intermediary Service Act, we contacted them by e-mail, and after obtained the consent of the other party, we first showed the interview outline to the other party, and after confirming that there was no problem, we used Googlemeet to record the entire online interview on September 24, October 8 and October 9 respectively, and then we listed the interview content in a verbatim transcript. Through content analysis and comparative analysis, the key points of the interview content were sorted out, and the answers of different respondents are compared and filtered. Finally, the corresponding conclusion was drawn. After designing the questionnaire, we invited 3 people to help test whether the questionnaire was wrong. After confirming that the questions in the questionnaire were all correct, we started distributing the questionnaire through social media on October 2nd, and after collecting data from Line, Instagram, Facebook, Threads and Dcard, as of October 21st, we had received 156 questionnaires.

## **Ways of Data Analysis**

We used interviews and questionnaires to collect data, we organized the content of the interviews into the transcript, use content analysis and comparative analysis to extract the key points, and compared the answers of each professional with each other. For the questionnaire part, we used SPSS software to organize the main questionnaire content, including reliability, descriptive statistics, one-way ANOVA, Welch, post-hoc test, independent sample T-test, and regression linear.

In order to analyzed how different age groups, educational backgrounds, and different motivations for using social media differ in various aspects of their reception of fake news, we choosed to use one-way of Anova and independent sample T-test,

and the multiple-choice questions were analyzed with Likert scales. Because most of our questions had more than two options, we used Anova to compare data from different independent variables with other dependent questions one by one. We wanted to draw different conclusions from people with different characteristics, and in the analysis of first-time and non-first-time investors, we used the independent sample T-test. In the Reliability Analysis and Descriptive Statistics section, we picked up the questions on the five-point scale for comparison. However, True or false questions used descriptive statistical analysis.

## DATA ANALYSIS

This study was a mixed-methods approach combining qualitative and quantitative analysis to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the impact of fake news on voters during election periods, and the countermeasures adopted by Taiwan, and how these strategies differ from those of other countries.

The qualitative part primarily utilized interviews, conducted through content analysis and comparative analysis. The quantitative part presented public perceptions and attitudes toward fake news through questionnaires and statistical data.

### Questionnaire Response Results

This study investigated how fake news influences public perception and voting intentions during presidential elections. Used Google Forms, a total of 156 completed questionnaires were collected by October 21.

### Sample Structure Analysis

According to the survey results in Table 2 , aged 20-30 in the questionnaire was significantly higher than other age groups. Since our questionnaire was distributed via social media, it can be inferred that the majority of those who used social media and happened to see our questionnaire were young people. Regarding educational background, the majority of respondents held bachelor's degrees, total 75.6%. Those with advanced degrees such as master's or doctor's accounted for 3.2%. Regarding political party affiliation, 70.5% were no political parties to support. Although minor support rates existed for parties, such as the Democratic Progressive Party (12.2%), Kuomintang (9%), and People's Party (8.3%), these figures remained significantly lower than the no party support's proportion. This indicates that voters today were less

inclined to align with specific parties, instead adopted a neutral perspective when they vote.

Regarding most frequently used social media platforms, this question was multiple choice. The percentages in the table were calculated based on the total number of respondents (N=156), summing to 100%. Results showed Instagram was the primary platform (46.5%), followed by Threads (25.5%), Facebook (21.1%), and Twitter (5.5%). This indicates that most respondents frequently use Instagram, then compared to Instagram's high usage rate, Twitter's 5.5% showed its popularity remained low within Taiwan's social media landscape. While Facebook still had a significant user base, it lagged considerably behind Instagram, which was driven by short video content. Facebook's relatively low usage rate compared with Instagram, indicated its declining influence among younger respondents.

Regarding whether 2024 was their first-time voting, non-first-time voters constituted 64.1%, while first-time voters accounted for 35.9%. Although non-first-time voters were in the majority, indicating the sample primarily comprised individuals with two or more voting experiences, but first-time voters still represented approximately one-third of the sample. This sufficiently reflected the opinions of young first-time voters and holds representativeness.

Based on the above results, we found that the primary respondents in this survey were predominantly young individuals, and they mostly held university degrees (including four-years colleges and two-years colleges).

This indicates the research sample primarily appears the perspectives of young people with a certain level of education. The majority of respondents did not express clear party tendency. Shows that most voters today tend toward neutrality and rational thinking in their political stances.

Additionally, Instagram emerged as the dominant social media platform among respondents. Its showed that Instagram has high penetration and influence within the younger generation. The sample characteristics align with the research focus on “first-time voters” and “young voters,” effectively respond to the exposure and attitude of these groups towards political information and fake news in the context of media.

**Table 2 Profile analysis of Respondents**

Item	Option	N	Percentage
Age	20 – 30 years old	122	78.2 %
	31 - 40 years old	17	10.9 %
	41 - 50 years old	7	4.5 %
	51 - 60 years old	7	4.5 %
	Over 60 years old	3	1.9 %
Education	Before senior	4	2.6 %
	Senior high school/Vocational school	19	12.2 %
	Five-years college	10	6.4 %
	University/Two-years college	118	75.6 %
	Master/Doctor	5	3.2 %
Party preference	Democratic Processive party	19	12.2 %
	Kumintang	14	9 %
	Taiwan People's Party	13	8.3 %
	NO party to support	110	70.5 %
Most used social media (multiple choice)	Instagram	128	46.5 %
	Threads	70	25.5 %
	Facebook	58	21.1 %
	Twitter	15	5.5 %
	Others	4	1.5 %
In the 2024 presidential election, whether it is the first time to vote	Yes	56	35.9 %
	No	100	64.1 %

**Note:** N=Number of sample

Source: author sorted

This study conducted descriptive statistical analysis on the five-point scale items to understand respondents' average responses and overall trends across each question. We employed a Likert scale design (1 means Strongly Disagree and 5 means Strongly Agree). According to results in Table 3 showed that for the question "Did you feel nervous or experience special emotions when you voted for the first time?", the mean was 3.39 with a standard deviation of 1.073. This indicates that many respondents reported moderately to highly emotional reactions to their first voting experience. The average score for the question "Your voting decisions are influenced by party affiliations" was 2.92 with a standard deviation of 1.247. This indicates that most respondents tended to disagree with this statement, suggesting their independent voting behavior. The average score for the question "The information on social media is mostly credible." was 2.57 with a standard deviation of 0.866. This indicates low trust in social media information among respondents. The average score for "Fake news frequently appears on social media" was 3.69 with a standard deviation of 0.931, showed that most respondents think fake news as a widespread issue on social media. The average score for "Information is often proven false during presidential elections" was 3.88 with a standard deviation of 0.872, indicating that over half of respondents clearly perceive the phenomenon of misinformation during election periods. The average score for "You often obtain information related election through social media" was 3.18 with a standard deviation of 0.846, indicating that social media is increasingly becoming an important channel for respondents to access political information. The question "Misinformation affects your perception of candidates" had an average score of 3.98 and a standard deviation of 0.715, ranking among the highest overall scores. This indicates that fake news has a significant potential impact on the public's political attitudes.

After analyzing the above data, it is evident that respondents generally maintain a doubtful attitude toward information obtained on social media. They do not fully trust such information and retain a questioning stance. However, the majority of respondents strongly agree that the emergence of fake news significantly impacts their political perceptions.

**Table 3 Respondents' attitudes toward voting, party preference and fake news**

	N	Mean	S.D
6. You felt nervous or special when you voted for the first time	56	3.39	1.073
8. You vote influenced by your political party's stance.	156	2.92	1.247
11. The information on social media is mostly credible.	156	2.57	0.866
12. Fake news usually show up on social media.	156	4.16	0.869
13. During presidential elections, information is often proven wrong	156	3.88	0.872
14. You often get election-related information through social media.	156	3.18	1.161
22. Misinformation can influence your perception of candidates.	91	3.98	0.715
24. What is the extent to which a false issue makes you confused or uneasy about a political issue?	107	3.69	0.851
25. During the election period, when you received a large amount of misinformation, to what extent did it affect your emotions?	156	2.94	1.045

Source: author sorted

In the reliability analysis, we used question 12, 13, 14, 22, 24, and 25 from the five-point scale. After following exploratory factor analysis, items with lower values were removed. The Cronbach's Alpha values after delete the items, all met the academic standard of 0.7 or above. Table 4 Reliability Analysis presented our reliability measurement value of 0.734.

It can be seen that our study possesses good reliability, with questionnaire items

exhibiting a certain degree of correlation and stability. This demonstrates that the measurement results of the entire questionnaire are trustworthy and can serve as the basis for subsequent statistical analysis.

Table 5 listed the questions selected for reliability measurement. We identified items using a Likert scale and excluded three of them, Question 6 due to insufficient sample size, and Question 8 and 11 because they were reverse items.

**Table 4 Reliability Analysis**

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha value based on normalization	Number of items
<b>0.734</b>	<b>0.748</b>	<b>6</b>

Source: author sorted

**Table 5 Items used for reliability measurement**

	Mean	S.D.
12. Fake news usually show up on social media.	4.20	0.807
13. During presidential elections, information is often proven wrong	3.94	0.852
14. You often get election-related information through social media.	3.29	1.064
22. Misinformation can influence your perception of candidates.	4.00	0.698
24. What is the extent to which a false issue makes you confused or uneasy about a political issue?	3.75	0.839
25. During the election period, when you received a large amount of misinformation, to what extent did it affect your emotions?	3.18	0.997

Source: author sorted

## **Voters' Perceptions of Fake News Exposure During Taiwan's Presidential Election and Factors Influencing These Perception Differences**

### **Descriptive statistics**

In Table 6, We used a five-point Likert scale to measure respondents' perceptions of the fake news they encountered during the presidential election. Among our respondents, 56 (32.75%) were first-time voters. 156 respondents felt they were not highly influenced by party positions when voting (Mean=2.92). They perceived information on social media as less credible (Mean=2.57) and believed fake news appeared frequently on social media (Mean=4.16). However, they felt that although misinformation was clarified and corrected during the presidential election, they didn't feel it particularly high (Mean=3.88). Respondents frequently obtained informations related to election through social media (Mean=3.18), with an SD value of (1.161), it can say that the frequency with which respondents obtained informations related to election via social media reached high-intermediate. The mean value exceeded the scale's midpoint, indicating that social media has become a significant and frequently used source of election information among respondents.

Question 18 (refer to Table 7) showed that 82.7% of respondents believed that fake news was prevalent during the presidential election period, indicating that the majority of the public feel strongly about the prevalence of fake news during the presidential election.

**Table 6 Respondents' views on the fake news they encountered during the presidential election.**

	N	Mean	S.D
8. You vote influenced by your political party's stance.	156	2. 92	1. 247
11. The information on social media is mostly credible.	156	2. 57	0. 866
12. Fake news usually show up on social media.	156	4. 16	0. 869
13. During presidential elections, information is often proven wrong	156	3. 88	0. 872
14. You often get election-related information through social media.	156	3. 18	1. 161

Source: author sorted

**Table 7 Fake news during election periods than usual?**

True-False questions	Yes	No
18. Do you think there is more fake news during election periods than usual?	82.7%	17.3%

Source: author sorted

### One way Anova

In the ANOVA analysis, we initially selected age and educational background as independent variables. Although our questionnaire put the question to asked respondents which political party they supported, but the percentage for each party were relatively low. 70.5% of respondents indicated no particular party preference. To ensure the validity of our findings, we decided not to include political party affiliation as an independent variable in the analysis.

Certain questions in this survey utilized a skip logic design for some items, such as requiring respondents to answer subsequent questions only if they selected “Yes.” This design significantly reduced the number of valid samples for that question, resulting in a high proportion of missing values. After evaluation, it was determined

that the data for this question was insufficient to support statistical analysis.

Therefore, Question 24 was deleted to maintain the stability of the analysis results.

Furthermore, the missing data caused by the skip logic design is classified as design-based missing data, not due to respondent refusal. Thus, deleting this question does not affect the overall representativeness of the study.

To answer the first research question, age was first included as a factor in the testing process. Questions 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 22, and 25 were used as dependent variables. After analyze, we did an initial screening. Questions with a Levene Test p-value greater than 0.05 for homogeneity of variance were considered to pass the preliminary procedure. Questions 11, 12, 13, 14, 22, and 25 all demonstrated homogeneity (Table 8). However, Question 8 did not meet homogeneity ( $p=0.016$ ), so we did the Welch's analysis.

**Table 8 Levene' test of question(age)**

Age	Levene's test	P value
8. You vote influenced by your political party's stance.	3.152	0.016
11. The information on social media is mostly credible.	0.580	0.678
12. Fake news usually show up on social media.	0.902	0.464
13. During presidential elections, information is often proven wrong	1.786	0.134
14. You often get election-related information through social media.	1.415	0.232
22. Misinformation can influence your perception of candidates.	1.838	0.129
25. During the election period, when you received a large amount of misinformation, to what extent did it affect your emotions?	0.572	0.683

Source: author sorted

Next, we examined the significance of the ANOVA for Question 11, 12, 13, 14, 22, and 25. When P value  $< 0.05$  indicated significance. Only Question 22 showed significance (

Table 9).

**Table 9 Anova analysis of age and likert scale**

Age	F	P value
11. The information on social media is mostly credible.	0.522	0.719
12. Fake news usually show up on social media.	2.292	0.062
13. During presidential elections, information is often proven wrong	0.896	0.468
14. You often get election-related information through social media.	0.620	0.649
22. Misinformation can influence your perception of candidates.	2.639	0.039
25. During the election period, when you received a large amount of misinformation, to what extent did it affect your emotions?	0.461	0.764

Source: author sorted

Finally, a post-hoc test was conducted using Tukey HSD to further analyze significantly different items. We found two age groups showed significant differences in whether misinformation influenced perceptions of candidates, both are 20-30 years old and 51-60 years old.

As shown in Table 10, the mean for respondents aged 20-30 years old (4.04) exceeded that of respondents aged 51-60 (3.00), indicating that the 20-30 age group is more easy to altering their views on candidates due to misinformation. However, the sample size for those over 60 was too small, although the mean was 4.50, it may not adequately represent the entire population.

Table 11 showed that the degree of influence was greater for the 20-30 age group (I value) than for the 51-60 age group (J value). The difference between I value and J value was 1041, indicating that younger groups are more likely to be disturbed by misinformation and political intentions, while older groups are more determined in their political intentions and are less likely to be misled or change their views on candidates.

Analysis of other questions (11, 12, 13, 14, 25) by age group, revealed no significant differences. Although statistical results showed no clear significant in

respondent responses for these questions, the average scores indicate whether they are higher or lower (Table 10).

**Table 10 The average responses for each age group to questions 22**

Group by age	Number of sample	Mean	S.D.
20 - 30 years old	73	4.04	0.655
31 - 40 years old	9	3.89	0.333
41 - 50 years old	3	3.67	0.577
51 - 60 years old	4	3.00	1.633
Over 60 years old	2	4.50	0.707
Total	91	3.98	0.715

Source: author sorted

**Table 11 Post Hoc of Tukey HSD**

Age(I)	(J)	Mean diff (I-J)	P value
20 - 30 years old	31 - 40	0.152	0.971
	41 - 50	0.374	0.888
	51 - 60	1.041*	0.034
	Over 60 years old	-0.459	0.885
31 - 40 years old	20 - 30	-0.152	0.971
	41 - 50	0.222	0.989
	51 - 60	0.889	0.211
	Over 60 years old	-0.611	0.789
41 - 50 years old	20 - 30	-0.374	0.888
	31 - 40	-0.222	0.989
	51 - 60	0.667	0.713
	Over 60 years old	-0.833	0.678
51 - 60 years old	20 - 30	-1.041*	0.034
	31 - 40	-0.889	0.211
	41 - 50	-0.667	0.713
	Over 60 years old	-1.500	0.098
Over 60 years old	20 - 30	0.459	0.885
	31 - 40	0.611	0.789

41 - 50	0.833	0.678
51 - 60	1.500	0.098

Note: Mean diff = mean different

Source: author sorted

Another independent variable we wished to examine was educational background. We compared educational background with the dependent variables in Table 12. Questions 8, 11, 13, 14, and 25 all have homogeneity, meeting the criteria for ANOVA. When conducted the ANOVA analysis, only Q11 showed statistical significance (Table 13). However, since Q11 is a reverse item, it was recoded as follows: 1 becomes 5, 2 becomes 4, 3 remains unchanged, 4 becomes 2, and 5 becomes 1.

**Table 12 Levene' test of question (Education Background)**

Education background	Levene's test	P value
8. You vote influenced by your political party's stance.	2.057	0.089
11. The information on social media is mostly credible.	0.840	0.502
12. Fake news usually show up on social media.	3.251	0.014
13. During presidential elections, information is often proven wrong	2.334	0.058
14. You often get election-related information through social media.	1.190	0.318
22. Misinformation can influence your perception of candidates.	4.048	0.005
25. During the election period, when you received a large amount of misinformation, to what extent did it affect your emotions?	0.714	0.583

Source: author sorted

**Table 13 Anova analysis of education and likert scale**

Education background	F	P value
8. You vote influenced by your political party's stance.	1.581	0.182
11. The information on social media is mostly credible.	2.851	0.026
12. Fake news usually show up on social media.	1.967	0.102

13. During presidential elections, information is often proven wrong	0.640	0.635
14. You often get election-related information through social media.	1.639	0.167
22. Misinformation can influence your perception of candidates.	1.195	0.319
25. During the election period, when you received a large amount of misinformation, to what extent did it affect your emotions?	1.461	0.217

Source: author sorted

The Tukey HSD analysis in Table 14 reveals that respondents with an education level below high school are more likely than those with a high school education to perceive social media information as untrustworthy.

**Table 14 Post Hoc of Tukey HSD**

Education (I)	(J)	Mean diff	P value
Before senior high school	Senior high school	1.382*	0.028
	Five- years college	1.050	0.226
	University	1.377*	0.014
	Master degree /Doctoral degree	-1.350	0.127
Senior high school	Before senior	-1.382*	0.028
	Five- years college	-0.332	0.854
	University	-0.004	1.000
	Master degree /Doctoral degree	-0.032	1.000
Five- years college	Before senior	-1.050	0.226
	Senior high school	0.332	0.854
	University	0.327	0.766
	Master degree /Doctoral degree	0.300	0.967
University	Before senior	-1.377*	0.014
	Senior high school	0.004	1.000
	Five- years college	-0.327	0.766
	Master degree /Doctoral degree	-0.027	1.000
Master degree/ Doctoral degree	Before senior	-1.350	0.127
	Senior high school	0.032	1.000
	Five- years college	-0.300	0.967
	University	0.027	1.000

Source: author sorted

For the other question in which the p-value for Levene's test was less than 0.05, the Welch analysis revealed that the significance of Question 12 was not high (p-value = 0.355), indicating that individuals across all educational backgrounds agreed that fake news always appears on social media (see Table 15).

**Table 15 Welch analysis**

Welch	df1	df2	P value
12. Fake news usually show up on social media.	4	11.485	0.355

Source: author sorted

### **Regression Analysis – Motivation of using social media**

Table 16 presented the different motivations for using social media among respondents. Since both questions were multiple-choice, the sample size exceeded the total number of completed questionnaires. However, for calculation convenience, 100% was used as the baseline.

It is evident that 41.8% of respondents used social media primarily for entertainment pastime, though they may occasionally encounter political topics through algorithmic recommendations; 33.5% of respondents used social media for social interaction. This indicates that respondents frequently communicate via social media because modern contact methods are increasingly digitalized. People are becoming more reliant on social media to maintain daily connections and share updates with friends.

Additionally, 22.1% of respondents used social media to gather information, but they were not specifically targeting political topics; only 2.6% used social media for political purposes, a very low proportion. This indicates that political issues are not the primary focus for Taiwanese people. The reason they see political news may be simply because social media pushes notifications to them.

**Table 16 Commonly used social media**

		N	Percentage
Motivation of using social media	Gather information	75	22.1%
	Social interaction	114	33.5%
	Entertainment pastime	142	41.8%
	Political use	9	2.6%

Source: author sorted

Continuing to discuss motivations for media use, we examined whether respondents' differing motivations for social media use affected the stability of their voting intentions, whether exposure to misinformation influenced their perceptions of candidates, and whether fake news easily influenced or readily confused them.

Table 17 presented the Linear Regression analyses of multiple-choice questions and five-point scales, and the results revealed significant findings for Questions 22 and 24.

**Table 17 P value of Regression Linear**

Question	F	P value
8. You vote influenced by your political party's stance.	1.478	0.212
22. Misinformation can influence your perception of candidates.	3.034	0.022
24. What is the extent to which a false issue makes you confused or uneasy about a political issue?	4.285	0.003
25. During the election period, when you received a large amount of misinformation, to what extent did it affect your emotions?	2.232	0.068

Source: author sorted

To ensure the stability of the model, a collinearity diagnostic was performed on the predictor variables. The results indicated that the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for all independent variables (Number 22 and Number 24) ranged between 1.043 and 1.126, which was well below the common threshold of 10. This confirmed that the

regression model was free from serious multicollinearity issues, ensuring that the estimates of the regression coefficients were reliable (look at Table 18 and Table 19)

Research findings in Table 18 revealed that the social media motivations for political use ( $P = 0.008$ ) and entertainment pastime ( $P = 0.009$ ) significantly influenced users' perceptions of candidates through exposure to misinformation. In contrast, participants whose primary motivations were gathering information and social interaction did not exhibit statistical significance in this study and therefore were not discussed.

The motivation for political use on social media had a significant positive effect on the degree of influence on perceptions ( $B = 0.819$ ,  $P = 0.008$ ). This indicates that the more individuals use social media for political purposes, the more susceptible they are to misinformation influencing their perceptions of candidates. Among the four motivations, although the  $P$  value for entertainment pastime was significant, its beta value (0.282) was slightly lower than that for political purposes. This indicates that the degree to which entertainment-pastime use is influenced by fake news in shaping perceptions of candidates is lower than that for political purposes.

**Table 18 Regression Linear Post Hoc Q22**

	P value	B	Beta	VIF
Gather information	0.197	-0.198	-0.139	1.126
Social interaction	0.864	0.029	0.018	1.100
Entertainment pastime	0.009	0.708	0.282	1.089
Political use	0.008	0.819	0.286	1.105

Note :  $B^{41}$  = Unstandardized Coefficients , Beta $^{42}$  = Standardized Coefficients

Source: author sorted

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<sup>41</sup> When the independent variable increases by 1 unit, how much does the dependent variable change on average?

<sup>42</sup> Comparative indicators of the influence of different variables

The motivations for gathering information and social interaction on social media did not reach statistical significance in terms of the degree of confusion or unease felt about fake news. However, entertainment pastime and political use, which showed significance in Question 22, were also examined in this analysis.

Table 19 shows a significant positive correlation between the motivation for political use of social media and the degree of confusion or unease about fake news ( $B = 1.074$ ,  $P = 0.003$ ). This indicates that among all motivations, individuals who are more inclined to use social media for political purposes also experience higher levels of confusion or unease regarding political issues.

The motivation for entertainment pastime also significantly and positively predicted the level of confusion or unease ( $B = 0.523$ ,  $P = 0.040$ ). Thus, the stronger the purpose of entertainment pastime, the higher the level of confusion or unease respondents felt about political issues. When comparing Beta, political use (0.292) had a greater impact than entertainment pastime use (0.195).

**Table 19 Regression Linear Post Hoc Q24**

	P value	B	Beta	VIF
Gather information	0.119	0.256	0.151	1.103
Social interaction	0.804	0.045	0.024	1.091
Entertainment pastime	0.040	0.523	0.195	1.043
Political use	0.003	1,074	0.292	1.059

Note : B = Unstandardized Coefficients = Standardized Coefficients

Source: author sorted

#### **T-test of the first-time or non-first-time voter**

Since we aim to examine the extent to which first-time voters and non-first-time voters are influenced by fake news, the questionnaire asked: “During the 2024 presidential election, will this be your first time voting?” Since this question only

offered two response options, we could not use ANOVA analysis. Therefore, this study employed an Independent Samples t-test for analysis. Q5 (whether the respondent is a first-time voter) was compared with the following questions in the questionnaire: (8. Your voting decisions are influenced by party positions. 11. Information on social media is mostly trustworthy. 12. Fake news frequently appears on social media. 13. During presidential elections, information is often proven false. 14. You often obtain election-related information through social media. 22. Misinformation affects your perception of candidates. 24. To what extent do misleading narratives confuse or unsettle you about a political issue? 25. How emotionally affected are you when exposed to a large volume of false information during an election?)

We first confirmed the Levene score ( $p > 0.05$ ) before proceeding with analysis. (Table 20) However, in Table 21 the mean scores between first-time voters (35.9%) and non-first-time voters (64.1%) did not show statistically significant differences on most items ( $p > 0.05$ ). Although the one-tailed p-values for Question 13 and 25 were 0.048 and 0.041 respectively, indicating a slight tendency toward difference, they failed to reach significance under the two-tailed test.

This suggests that both groups share similar perspectives on the frequency of fake news exposure, their ability to discern authenticity, and their emotional responses. It indicates that voters across different age groups exhibit converging levels of sensitivity and reaction intensity toward fake news.

**Table 20 Independent Samples t-test of first-time voter and non- first-time voter**

Levene test	F	P value
8. You vote influenced by your political party's stance.	0. 057	0. 812
11. The information on social media is mostly credible.	3. 596	0. 060

12. Fake news usually show up on social media.	1. 642	0. 202
13. During presidential elections, information is often proven wrong	2. 751	0. 099
14. You often get election-related information through social media.	0. 248	0. 619
22. Misinformation can influence your perception of candidates.	3. 114	0. 081
24. What is the extent to which a false issue makes you confused or uneasy about a political issue?	0. 225	0. 637
25. During the election period, when you received a large amount of misinformation, to what extent did it affect your emotions?	0. 499	0. 481

Source: author sorted

**Table 21** Levene's test

		Sig. O	Sig. T
8. You vote influenced by your political party's stance. °	Using equal variances Not using equal variances	0.431 0.431	0.862 0.861
11. The information on social media is mostly credible.	Using equal variances Not using equal variances	0.420 0.415	0.840 0.829
12. Fake news usually show up on social media.	Using equal variances Not using equal variances	0.069 0.054	0.138 0.109
13. During presidential elections, information is often proven wrong	Using equal variances Not using equal variances	0.053 0.048	0.106 0.096
14. You often get election-related information through social media.	Using equal variances Not using equal variances	0.127 0.128	0.255 0.255
22. Misinformation can influence your perception of candidates.	Using equal variances Not using equal variances	0.075 0.057	0.150 0.113
24. What is the extent to which a false issue makes you confused or uneasy about a political issue?	Using equal variances Not using equal variances	0.226 0.223	0.453 0.446
25. During the election period, when you received a large amount of misinformation, to what extent did it affect your emotions?	Using equal variances Not using equal variances	0.045 0.041	0.091 0.083

Note: O = One-tailed Test, T = Two-tailed Test

Source: author sorted

## The Impact of Fake News on Voters' Understanding and Emotional Responses

### Qualitative analysis

In the qualitative part, we mainly focus on respondents' cognitive and emotional reactions to fake news in a society where fake news is rampant, and how they are affected by fake news. When we interviewed the interviewees: What emotions do you find most provocative about fake news? For example, the Taiwan Fact-Checking Center mentioned that there are actually all kinds of emotions, whether happy or angry, and any message will basically have an emotional transmission. However, other interviewees answered with a more negative view, Legislator Bi Ru Tsai mentioned that there will be anger and fear, and she also gave examples, such as during the Covid-19, the news reported that Taiwan was about to be closed, causing a group of people to rush to supermarkets to buy livelihood supplies, which caused panic among the people.

*Once these false information are widely disseminated, there will definitely be a starting point for its dissemination, which is the emotion in communication, that is, the emotion you set, so as long as any information is actually basically an emotion, there will be an emotional transmission, for example: some people will be very happy when they see politics, and some people will be very angry when they see it. In fact, the same message can produce different emotions on both sides, so I don't think it's necessarily the emotions that are provoked, but the main ones, but these messages themselves may be a starting point for provoking emotions. -TFC*

*The most powerful thing about fake news is that it manipulates emotions and makes people irrational, which is terrifying. In May this year, Japanese manga artist and author Ryo Tatsuki wrote in the manga "The Future I See" in Japanese, “本当の大災難は 2025 年 7 月に”, which means "The real cataclysm will happen in July 2025". This rumor has been widely circulated on social platforms, but Good Luck Japan pointed out that it has no scientific basis, and the Japanese government and professional organizations have not published such predictions. You know that many of my friends said they wanted to immigrate, and I wanted to have this world*

*catastrophe. So you can see that there are still people who will panic or fear because of this, so probably the main thing about false information is panic and fear. -Miss Tsai*

According to the interviewees' answers, we can find that fake news can trigger various emotions, with different people and different positions of the same information producing different emotions, and political aspects causing more negative emotions.

## Quantitative analysis

Table 22 presented the frequency distribution table for descriptive statistics. We first analyzed the mean and standard deviation for each item on the five-point scale.

For Question 22: “Does misinformation affect your perception of candidates?” the mean value was 3.98 and the standard deviation was 0.715. This indicates that most respondents believe false information affects their perception of candidates. The standard deviation is not particularly high, which suggests limited variation among respondents. It is widely acknowledged that false information alters their original impressions of candidates.

For Question 24: “To what extent do false issues make you feel confused or uneasy about a particular political issue?” the mean value was 3.69 with a standard deviation of 0.851, indicating that most voters experience psychological stress and uncertainty when confronted with fake news. This not only triggers negative emotions but also causes significant unease regarding political issues. When misinformation about political topics or policies circulates online, the majority of the public loses trust in politics.

For Question 25: “During the election period, to what extent were your emotions affected by receiving a large amount of false information?” the mean value was 2.94

with a standard deviation of 1.045. The results for this question were not particularly high, differing from Question 24. This discrepancy may stem from the fact that the public is not affected by all types of fake news, as fake news comes in many forms. When we specifically asked about reactions to receiving false political information, the public's response was stronger than when asked about receiving a large volume of fake news. This reflects that the public is more significantly impacted by false information and fake news related to political matters.

**Table 22 The extent of respondents were influenced by fake news**

		N	Mean	S.D.
22. Misinformation can influence your perception of candidates.	91	3.98	0.715	
24. What is the extent to which a false issue makes you confused or uneasy about a political issue?	107	3.69	0.851	
25. During the election period, when you received a large amount of misinformation, to what extent did it affect your emotions?	156	2.94	1.045	

Source: author sorted

However, in the true-false questions (Table23), over half of respondents (66.7%) indicated that news or reports would alter their views on candidates, demonstrating that social media has now evolved into a crucial campaign tool. Additionally, 58.3% of respondents reported that misinformation had influenced their impressions of candidates, while 68.6% felt that misinformation caused confusion or unease regarding political issues. Only 21.2% of respondents changed their voting stance due to fake news.

**Table 23 Percentage of respondents reacting to fake news**

	Yes	No
20. Would you change your opinion of a candidate based on news reports or online posts?	66.7	33.3
21. Has misinformation ever influenced your perception of a candidate?	58.3	41.7
23. Have false narratives caused you confusion or unease regarding a political issue?	68.6	31.4
26. Have you ever changed your voting preference or policy stance due to fake news?	21.2	78.8

Source: author sorted

**Taiwanese citizens' response strategies in the face of misinformation are compared with those of other countries**

This section is divided into current countermeasures and future counter measures, we mainly focus on the countermeasures taken by the respondents at this stage, and whether there are other feasible plans in the future. The interview questions are related to Taiwan's response, comparison of censorship mechanisms in other countries, and the Digital Intermediary Service Act. The purpose of the interview is to better understand the countermeasures taken by Taiwanese civil society groups and legislators in the face of fake news, and how we can better improve Taiwan's censorship mechanism compared to the countermeasures implemented by other countries.

**The countermeasures that Taiwan can use to deal with fake news at present**

This part mainly focuses on what countermeasures Taiwanese citizens have taken to deal with this misinformation at this stage in the case of the increasing prevalence of fake news. The respondents all mentioned promoting media literacy education, we

asked what policies we hope Taiwan will adopt to solve the problem of fake news.

Respondent MyGoPen mentioned that it is possible to educate the public and make the public more information literate, in order to solve the proliferation of false information. The Taiwan Fact-checking Inspection Center mentioned to promote media literacy education to the public. It can also cultivate the public's resistance to false information, and legislator Bi Ru Tsai believes that media literacy can be added to school education as a curriculum. In addition, some respondents said that when encountering fake news related to their professional fields, they will ask experts in related fields to solve doubts, use AI-assisted tools to detect fake news and cooperate with online platforms.

*No organization is equipped to handle AI tools. While certain AI tools may address AI-generated content, no entity can keep pace with the rapid evolution of AI information. The fundamental solution lies in enhancing public information literacy through education. -MGP*

*We have previously obtained the Taiwan Media Literacy Education Project, our company is an educational foundation, with a total of three departments, one is administration, one is the editorial department where I am currently located, and the last one is the education department; I'm not sure if there are any new and specific plans at the moment, but we have obtained Google's literacy program, which means that we will continue to promote media literacy education to the public in the future, and it can also cultivate people's resilience to false information. -TFC*

*Elementary school students must start teaching media literacy education. In fact, it is easier to spread in smaller communities and elementary schools, so in addition, I think media literacy should be taught from an early age.- Miss Tsai*

*The media literacy education will tell you, for example, there are many fraud groups now. It wanted to teach the elderly how not to be scammed by the fraud groups, so it went to make a propaganda vehicle like this, from school to community, so they have to tell the children, from the interpretation and judgment of the title to tell them that they are either sensational or true, I often think that the news media is very sensational now. Everyone didn't have time to read the content,*

*everyone just read the title and believed it. As for the elders in the community using TV stations, or short videos, so that the elderly can understand, because fake news is not only a problem for young people, but also spread among the elderly.-Miss Tsai*

According to the interviews, we found that one of the current responses of all respondents is media literacy education, and the respondents said that they should continue to vigorously promote media literacy education, starting from primary school, and cultivating the ability to think independently to solve problems from the root. In addition, fake news is not only a problem encountered by young people, legislator Cai Biru mentioned that we can make propaganda vehicles to the community to publicize, or use easy-to-understand ways for the elderly to understand. Since this is the age of AI, there will definitely be more and more disinformation, so we also asked the respondents if there are any countermeasures against AI disinformation in the future.

*We categorize the LINE messages reported by the public and then determine whether it is necessary to verify them based on the relevant content. After the verification, we will ask the verification team to break down the issues and consult relevant experts or use publicly available information for verification.-MGP*

*The second method is like some health and finance-related issues, we can simply understand what is written in the law, but when it comes to interpretation, we may need experts to explain it for us.-TFC*

*The new feature may add more AI parts for information comparison and image verification to help the verification process operate-MGP*

*In the era of AI, this tool is actually very important, whether it is the ChatGPT we commonly use now, it may have its own imagination. If the Fact-checking organization has their own AI chat database, it is easier for readers to understand and use.-TFC*

*In fact, there has always been cooperation with related units, and Meta, Google, Line has always had related project cooperation, so in fact, this is probably some small projects at present.-MGP*

*In terms of simply promoting the prevention and control of fake news, we have launched a podcast with educational radio stations or our editor-in-chief will record the popular disinformation this week or recently, which are the directions we currently cooperate with. In the past, the Executive Yuan had a verification platform called Line called Fake Information, and we joined it at that time, so that the public could see what content was, and we were also partners of Meta. -TFC*

Then we also specifically asked the Taiwan Fact-Checking Center, so you mentioned earlier that in addition to verification work, you have also begun to invest in media literacy education. For example, is there another way to cooperate with the school?

*In fact, most schools invite us, they're interested, and then contact our relevant personnel, and then we will go to the local area to give a speech, which may include the AI issues just mentioned, how to watch AI pictures, AI videos, or false information, what methods we can verify it. For example, we can geolocate and search back with pictures, which are very simple ways to check, and even teach you what is a credible source, such as if you see an X account or Facebook fan page saying something to you, can you trust it? What can be trusted is part of our media literacy education. -TFC*

Through the respondents' answers, we can find that Taiwan's current response strategy is mainly on media literacy education, as well as cross-platform publicity and verification cooperation (Meta, Google, Podcast). Then when faced with fake news in a professional field, difficult to verify, or from other countries, they will look for experts or use AI tools and cooperate with organizations in other countries.

## Countermeasures that Taiwan can use in the face of fake news in the future

In this part, we analyzed Taiwan's possible countermeasures to deal with fake news in the future, and we mentioned the draft about Taiwan in the literature review<Digital Services Act>, we interviewed three respondents separately about their views on the <Digital Services Act>draft, and some of the respondents maintained an open attitude, first of all, Mygopen maintained a neutral and open attitude towards this draft, and the Taiwan Fact-Checking Center also maintained an open attitude within the organization. However, checking reporter Qiu Shaoan said that the <Digital Services Act>content concept is good, but some of the content of the draft is too rough and will be difficult to implement. However, some respondents expressed support, and legislator Cai Biru believes that it needs to be promoted<Digital Services Act>, but the draft may involve freedom of speech, so there is still room for improvement in this draft. Overall, the respondents' views on the draft are still neutral, and it will take time to better improve the bill if it is implemented in the future.

*If it is the part mentioned before <Digital Services Act>, he has actually finished before he even found the part of the expert interview, so it is impossible to support or not support it, because we don't know what we will actually do in the end. -MGP*

*I put forward my opinion with my personal opinion. I think the overall concept of the <Digital Services Act> is good, but some of the content is too rough when shaping these bills, and even says that it needs to be processed within 72 hours, which is actually difficult to do. In addition, in the implementation of <Digital Services Act> One step is to review first and then remove it from the shelves. So who controls the mechanism of review and the mechanism of re-shelf? Does the industry need to follow the guidance or requirements of government agencies? This may not be handled so carefully. I'm not sure what percentage of Taiwan copied when the European Union was driving those contents at that time; I think the starting point is good, but some places are difficult to do. -TFC*

*I think the <Digital Services Act> should be pushed. And it is also necessary. This direction is necessary, because it was just said that there is also such a bill in the European Union, but because it is easily used for the censorship of speech, it is necessary to judge what is fake news and what is illegal. These should not be decided by the administrative unit, so this law should be optimized, it should be handed over to the judicial unit to judge, because in the end, it can determine whether you are illegal or not. –Miss Tsai*

*I think the draft of the last term can be taken out and optimized. I personally think that this law is necessary to be promoted in the next two years. Because of the current proliferation of fake news and fake news in Taiwan, I think we need to have this set of <Digital Services Act>. So how to make it optimize it? Then I think this is the direction that can be taken. – Miss Tsai*

### **Comparison of measures between Taiwan and other countries**

This part focuses on the differences between Taiwan and other countries' countermeasures in the face of the proliferation of fake news. We found that compared with other countries' verification organizations, Taiwan's verification mechanism started later than that of other countries. Taiwan's Fact Checking Center said that it was established in 2018, while foreign verification organizations have been there since 2000. Compared with Taiwan, there are more tools to verify more carefully. In addition, the verification organizations in Spain and Brazil have generated AI robots. They throw all the inspection reports to the robots. If the robots know that there is a verification report, they can reply immediately. The interviewees felt that if Taiwan's verification center had its own AI database, it could allow the audience to understand the content of the press release more accurately; legislator Cai Biru expressed a positive view. She believed that although Taiwan's private verification organizations still have shortcomings, they have done a good job. The interviewee also mentioned that Finland has been learning media reading from an early age to cultivate the ability of independent thinking, and South Korea has a fact-checking center of the Central Election Commission during the election period. The

interviewee feels that Taiwan can use the example of these countries to improve our countermeasures in the face of fake news.

*Compared with other countries, Taiwan's development speed is relatively slow, but Taiwan's development is quite fast. There will be some companies cooperating or NGOs cooperating with each other. There will probably be such a situation in the international side. It may be different implementation methods according to the characteristics of the local government or the people. -MGP*

*Some foreign inspection organizations are larger in scale and investigation methods than us, using AI technology to collect online rumors, such as folfac in the United Kingdom, and robot learning verification reports in Spain or Brazil to answer readers' concerns. Taiwan also needs to develop a similar mechanism, but it needs to comply with local systems and ensure that the sources of reports are transparent and have a grievance mechanism. In the future, we can deal with this part; everyone's methods or systems may be relatively similar. We are Meta's partners, and we need Who are the members of the organization to certify IFCN through international fact check? What are the sources of funds? Whether there is a fund from a political party or politician, if there is no need to see whether there is multiple data in the content of our report, it is not only a single source, whether these data can be reviewed or if the public feels that there is a problem with our report, is there a place to accept the complaint, which is the opportunity that needs to be checked. System, I don't think there is any difference between these mechanisms at present. -TFC*

*I mentioned two countries. You can refer to these two countries. The first is Finland, Finland seems to be the world at present, it seems that democracy and freedom are relatively high, and the people are more prosperous and comfortable, then there is South Korea, Finland because he has been educated since he was a child, he is from education, then elementary school students begin to learn media literacy, then the government does not need to censor, it is up to the people to interpret, the people themselves will think this is false information, and they will report it themselves. What kind of fact-checking center did the Central Election Commission set up in South Korea during the election, in fact, we also have it. It's just that we don't work, so we all learn from others and then learn half a set. When he saw which country was good, he went to learn it, and what happened after he learned it? He did not implement it definitely, so Taiwan can learn this model of government assistance but not leading, which is difficult. -Miss Tsai*

## Descriptive statistics

Table 24 presented a percentage narrative statistical table for true and false questions, revealing that over 62.2% of respondents verified the authenticity of online information upon encountering it. This shows that Taiwanese voters possess a basic awareness of countering fake news. To avoid being easily influenced by misinformation, respondents proactively verify content, demonstrating that most Taiwanese voters have established basic media literacy skills. Although 62.2% of respondents demonstrate media literacy by proactively verifying information to avoid misinformation, 37.8% still do not verify information after receiving it.

Therefore, we investigated whether respondents believe Taiwan should promote media literacy education, starting from an early age to cultivate cognitive skills and fake news prevention abilities, and the result was that a significant 88.5% of respondents believed Taiwan should implement foundational media literacy education within its national education system. After all, information from social media is ubiquitous in today's society.

Without instruction on how to discern fake news and AI-generated misinformation, public understanding could be significantly distorted by misinformation. However, a minority (11.5%) opposed establishing media literacy education. This opposition likely stems from skepticism about educational intervention, concerns over political neutrality, or the belief that media judgment should be an individual responsibility rather than a systemic one. This indicates that when implementing media literacy education, not only curriculum design, but also it is very necessary to consider public concerns regarding trust and neutrality.

**Table 24 Respondents' acceptance of measures to combat fake news**

	Yes	No
31. When obtaining information from social media or news reports, do you verify the content's accuracy?	62.2%	37.8%
33. Do you think schools or society should promote media literacy education?	88.5%	11.5%
36. Do you believe that Taiwanese government should introduce foreign media censorship mechanisms to reduce the proliferation of fake news?	87.2%	12.8%

Source: author sorted

In Table 25 can see that Question 32 in the survey was a multiple-choice question (What do you do when you encounter fake news?). It revealed that when encountering fake news, 62.7% of respondents chose to ignore it. This high percentage indicates that most people only want to verify the information's authenticity but do not wish to share or inform others afterward.

20.5% of respondents would question those people spreading the fake news; 13% of respondents share the news while warning others that it is fake; only 3% of respondents share the news without warning others that it is fake.

**Table 25 Percentage of the respond from the fake news**

	N	percentage
Respond		
Ignore	116	62.7%
Share the news while warning others that it is fake;	24	13.0%
Only share	7	3.8%
Question those people spreading the fake news	38	20.5%

Source: author sorted

## CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION

This study examined how misinformation during Taiwan's election period influenced voters' cognition and emotions, as well as their coping strategies when encountering false information, through both questionnaires and interviews.

Findings reveal that while most respondents maintain skepticism toward social media content, they generally perceive misinformation as causing some disruption to their political understanding.

Survey findings indicate that respondents were predominantly young adults, with most citizens tending to maintain neutrality. Regarding social media usage behavior, the primary motivation is entertainment pastime. The majority of citizens generally consider online information unreliable and report being easily influenced emotionally by false information. Young adults aged 20-30 are more susceptible to fake news than middle-aged and older adults aged 50-60. Furthermore, social media usage motives influence the impact of fake news. Users primarily seeking political issues are most likely to have their voting intentions swayed by misinformation. Besides, those using social media for political purposes are more prone to feeling confused about political issues.

In interviews, civil society fact-checkers and legislators emphasized that the true danger of misinformation lies not merely in factual inaccuracy, but in its potent manipulation of emotions, such as fear, anxiety, or anger, which exacerbate social divisions. These perspectives align with survey findings, confirming that misinformation indeed influences voters' emotional responses and fuels unnecessary social unrest during elections. Additionally, this study compared countermeasures against misinformation in other countries. While Germany, France, and the United States have established relatively mature legal frameworks or platform collaboration

mechanisms, Taiwan's relevant legislation (Digital Intermediary Services Act) remains highly contentious. As a democratic nation, Taiwan faces heightened social backlash when misinformation governance conflicts with freedom of speech.

Interviews revealed that all three respondents believe the most feasible approach at this stage is to strengthen media literacy education for the public. This involves teaching citizens from a young age how to verify the authenticity of information sources and distinguish AI-generated videos or images. Additionally, supplementary measures such as AI detection technology, fact-checking organizations, and platform collaborations should be employed. This multifaceted approach not only empowers citizens to discern the veracity of news but also effectively prevents the spread of fake news.

In summary, Taiwanese society's vigilance against misinformation is gradually increasing, but the ability to discern false information still requires strengthening. Preventing misinformation should not rely solely on the government. Optimal results require the joint participation of media outlets, fact-checking organizations, technology platforms, and citizens. Younger generations, who engage with information through diverse channels, particularly need enhanced media literacy training within the education system. Only through the parallel advancement of education, institutional frameworks, and technology can Taiwan establish a healthier information environment while safeguarding freedom of speech.

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## APPENDIX A

### INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT

#### Mygopen

1.台灣社會最需要查核的假訊息類型有哪些？（例如：政治、健康、社會議題等）回答完再問：那你們查核的步驟是什麼？

1.What are the types of disinformation that need to be checked most in Taiwanese society? (e.g., politics, health, social issues, etc.) After answering, ask again: What are the steps for your check?

台灣最需要的應該是一些公共議題吧 公共安全公共衛生之類是對台灣比較重要的，根據民眾回報的 line 訊息去做歸類分類再依照相關的內容去選擇是否有必要去查證，檢查之後我們會請查核組針對題目去做拆解再去問相關的專家或是用公開資訊去查核

Taiwan needs most should be some public issues, public safety and public health are more important to Taiwan .After the inspection, we will ask the verification team to disassemble the topic, and then ask relevant experts or use public information to check.

2.在查證時最常使用的資訊來源有哪些？

2.What are the most commonly used sources of information for verification?

多半來自於我們自己去詢問的專家意見 公開新聞報導 法興社入透射 公共電視

Most of it comes from experts by ourselves, public news reports, public television.

3.你們查證是如何審核民眾，政府提供的訊息？

3.How do you verify the information provided by the public and the government?

根據民眾的訊息數量做排序跟分類，不會隨便一個人傳我們就去查

Sorting and classifying according to the number of messages from the public .We will not adopt information simply.

4.遇到難以查證或需要國際合作的案件時，你們會怎麼處理？

4.How do you deal with cases that are difficult to verify or require international cooperation?

我們會請國際事實查核單位來去協助,難以查證的資訊多半可能是陰謀論或者是預測個人觀點，過去並沒有相關的資料輔助，可能是 ai 生成或是無中生有的內容，不見得所有資訊都有辦法查證。

Most of the information that is difficult to verify may be conspiracy theories or predictions of personal opinions, and there is no relevant data to assist in the past, it may be AI-generated or content created out of thin air, and not all information can be verified.

5. 作為一個民間團體，在查證實會不會受到外界壓力？如何維持中立與專業？

5. As a civil society organization, will there be external pressure during the investigation? How to maintain neutrality and professionalism?

多半會以民眾詢問為主為什麼那麼久還沒查到,我們只是一般的民間單位沒有無義務或使命一定要去做查證 我們比較是針對民眾的公共需求來去做比較像社會企業而已 該進行查證的應該是政府單位新聞媒體該去做 那對於我們這樣的事實查核單位其實並沒有那樣的公權力。

Most of the time, it is mainly based on public inquiries, why it has not been found for so long, we are just ordinary private units, there is no obligation or mission to do verification, we are more focused on the public needs of the people, more like social enterprises, what should be verified, it should be the government units, news media should do it, then for fact-checking units like us, there is actually no such public power.

6. 第三方查核機構在監測假新聞時，主要面臨哪些挑戰？

6. What are the main challenges faced by third-party verification agencies in monitoring fake news?

監測上不太會有什麼樣的挑戰 主要是依照民眾回報的訊息為主 假如要是更廣更深入或者接觸到更多民眾的資訊可能資訊來源、過濾比較需要做功課

There shouldn't be any major challenges in monitoring. It mainly relies on information reported by the public. However, if we want broader and more in-depth content or access to more information from the public, we might need to do more work on information personnel and filtering.

7. 第三方查核機構如何讓更多人願意使用、相信、轉傳你們的查核結果？

7. How can third-party auditors make more people willing to use, believe and relay your audit results?

會信的就會信，作為媒體素養推廣的話，希望民眾多多設略不同資訊來源自己去做查證和檢查 我們不會要求民眾一定要相信我們。

Believe it or not. As a media literacy promotion, I hope that the public will set up more different sources of information to verify and check by themselves. We will not ask the public to believe us.

8. 第三方查核機構未來還會拓展哪些新功能或合作計畫？

8. What new functions or cooperation plans will the third-party auditor expand in the future?

新功能和合作計畫一直都有，新功能可能會多加一些 ai 的部分做訊息的比對、圖片的查證去幫助查證流程的運作，那相關單位的合作其實一直都有，meta google line，一直都有相關的專案合作，所以其實這大概是目前的一些小計劃。

There are always new features and cooperation plans, and the new features may add more AI parts to do information comparison and image verification to help the operation of the verification process.

9. 未來 AI、假訊息會更多，MyGoPen 有什麼因應計畫？

9. There will be more AI and disinformation in the future, what are MyGoPen's response plans?

針對 AI 的內容可能會有一些 AI 的工具可以去處理面對，但是假如說要針對變化這麼快的 AI 的訊息，可能沒有什麼單位有辦法可以去因應這個變化，除非在教育方面讓民眾更有資訊素養才是比較根本的解決之道。

While there may be AI tools available to handle AI-related content, few organizations can effectively respond to the rapidly changing nature of AI-generated information, unless improving public information literacy through education is the only solution.

10. 你們對<數位中介服務法>草案有什麼看法？你們是支持還是反對政府立法進行言論審查？

10. What do you think of the “Digital Service Act”draft? Do you support or oppose government legislation on censorship?

如果是數位仲介法之前講的那個部分，他其實連找專家訪談的那一塊都還沒到就已經結束了，所以也談不上支持或不支持，因為我們根本也不知道最後實際會做的內容是什麼。

If it is the part mentioned before the Digital Intermediary Law, he has already finished the interview with an expert before he arrives, so we cannot say whether we support it or not, because we don't know what the actual content will be in the end.

11. 您認為未來台灣針對假新聞的查核機制可以如何改進？（民間或政府）

11. How do you think Taiwan's checking mechanism for countering fake news can be improved in the future? (private or governmental)

希望更多民眾一起來，然後增加自己的資訊素養。

I hope more people will come together and increase their information literacy.

12. 你們覺得有機會跟政府合作一起推動假新聞防治嗎？

12. Do you think there is an opportunity to cooperate with the government to promote fake news prevention and control?

我覺得政府單位做好他們的事情就可以了，就是像政策的推廣，然後闢謠解釋，因為像我們單位也不會特別去找政府說要去闢謠查證，要求他們一定要做什麼，因為這本來就是政府單位或者其他一些公家機關應該要做的事

I think government units can do their job well, just like promoting policies and then refuting rumors, because units like ours will not go to the government to refute rumors and verify rumors, and ask them to do something, because this is what government units or other public agencies should do.

13.您覺得哪些國家的經驗對台灣最有借鏡價值？為什麼？

13. Which countries' experiences do you think are most valuable for Taiwan? Why?

自由民主國家對新聞審查應該不會存在，如果是自由民主國家對於新聞審查應該是不存在，除非新聞的內容對民眾造成影響，那相關單位才會去加以介入，不然基本上自由民主國家不太會做新聞審查這種事情。

In a free and democratic country, there should be no news censorship. If it was a free and democratic country, news censorship should not exist, unless the content of the news has an impact on the public, in which case the relevant authorities might intervene. Otherwise, in general, free and democratic countries would not engage in news censorship.

14. 您覺得台灣與這些國家的機制相比，有什麼差異？

14. What do you think are the differences between Taiwan and these countries in terms of their mechanisms?

跟別的國家相比台灣發展的速度算是比較慢起步的，但是台灣發展蠻快的，會有一些公司協力或者NGO們彼此的合作，那國際方面也大概會有這樣的狀況，可能要依照當地政府的特性或者是民情，然後有不同的執行方式。

Compared to other countries, Taiwan's development started relatively slowly, but it has been developing quite quickly. Some companies or NGO collaborate with each other, and internationally, there are similar situations. The approach may need to be adapted according to the characteristics of the local government or public sentiment, resulting in different implementation methods.

### Taiwan fact-checking center

1.台灣社會最需要查核的假訊息類型有哪些？（例如：政治、健康、社會議題等）

1. What are the types of disinformation that need to be checked most in Taiwanese society? (e.g., politics, health, social issues, etc.)

我覺得類型上就PFC上來講，我們分類的類別其實在我們官網上蠻清楚的列舉出來有哪些例如政治、健康、科學跟能源，其實只要是牽涉到事實層面或是對社會有重大意義的都是我們查核的對象，至於類型的話，社會議題有點廣泛，還要再細分成我們剛剛所提到的能源，像前陣子核三公投的時候，就有做一些核能基本事實的查核，主要類型的話大概是這些。

In terms of type, I think PFC is an example. We categorize are clearly listed on our official website, such as politics, health, science, and energy. In fact, anything involving facts or of great social significance is subject to our verification. As for the types, social issues are quite broad and need to be further subdivided into energy, as we just mentioned. For example, during the recent nuclear power referendum, we did some verification of basic facts about nuclear energy. These are the main types.

2.你們查核的工作流程是如何進行的？

2..How does your audit process work?

大概可以分成五個主要流程

一、選題(1)確認收到這個訊息他是否是一個可查核的訊息，比方說他是詳細的事實內容還是意見評論，那意見評論就不是我們的查核範疇，他就是一個個人的意見抒發、行使言論自由的方針，那這種的我們就不會處理。(2)去看流傳量廣不廣泛，如果當流傳量很廣泛的時候，我們就需要處理，因為社會可能就想討論這些問題 (3)訊息對於整體的危害性，例如中國很紅的于謄謄案也有讀者傳給我們，但這個訊息對於台灣社會的影響力及危害度其實並不大，那可能就不是我們要查核的目標

第二個是查證，

第三個是編輯室確認（互相檢視） (1)我們查核報告的選題就是由每個記者去挑選的，編輯室會依據上面提到的準則來決定是否要處理這個問題或是要擋置這個問題，當記者寫完稿後，整個編輯室每個記者都需要去互相查看報告，看報告是否有缺漏的地方或是有哪些寫的不詳盡、一般民眾可能會看不懂的地方，我們會互相檢視，檢視完大家都簽名完才會由總副編輯來去改稿然後去確認稿件的內容是沒問題的才會上架到我們官網

第四個是總副編輯的校稿，

第五個是發布報告

It can be roughly divided into five main processes:

1. Topic Selection:

(1)First, we verify whether the submitted content is fact-checkable. For example, whether it contains verifiable factual claims rather than personal opinions or commentary. Opinion-based content does not fall within our scope.

(2) We assess how widely the message has been circulated. If it has spread broadly, we need to address it since society is likely already discussing it.

(3)We evaluate the potential harm the message could cause. For instance, some readers once sent us the popular Chinese rumor about actor Yu Meng long , but because it had minimal impact on Taiwanese society, we did not prioritize it.

2. Verification

3. Editorial Review (Mutual Checking):

(1)Reporters choose topics based on the criteria above.

(2)After a reporter drafts the fact-check, the entire editorial team reviews it to check for missing information or unclear explanations that the general public may not understand.

(3)Everyone signs off, and only then does the deputy editor-in-chief revise and confirm the content before publication.

4. Final proofreading by the deputy editor-in-chief

## 5. Publishing the report

3. 在查證時最常使用的資訊來源有哪些？是否會去現場實際訪談？

3. What sources do you rely on most during verification? Do you conduct on-site interviews?

來源呢大致上是我上面講的那些，至於會不會去現場採訪，我覺得不多比較少。

The sources are generally those I mentioned earlier. As for on-site reporting, it doesn't happen often. It's relatively rare.

4. 你們查證是如何審核民眾、政府提供的訊息？

4. How do you verify information submitted by the public or the government?

我不確定用審查這個詞是不是一個好的字，因為對我們來說我們好像不是審查，我們是事實查核，比較不是用審查。我們的查核工作大概分為三個方向，第一假設它是一個舊的文章或是影片來移花接木來說是一個最近發生的事情，我們會以圖反搜或者找到過去的舊報導的圖片，我們就可以去用多家媒體的比對方式就可以確認這一個圖片的原始事件是什麼，這是我們查核的其中一個方法；第二個方法是像是一些健康、財政相關的議題，有些東西我們可以單純看懂法條上它在寫什麼，可是在牽涉解讀層面的話，我們可能需要專家來替我們解釋，那財政的話我們分為財政學者或稅法學者，醫療的部分我們就找醫生、熟悉這個領域的教授，這些是我們採訪比較常使用的一種手段；第三個就是透過開源工具來定位，例如有一場抗議是發生在西班牙，我們就會看說畫面中出現哪些東西，比如說街上的招牌明明寫的是緬甸文卻背說是西班牙抗議，我們就可以透過地理定位的方式來破解這個傳言說它所描述的地點或是時間根本就不正確，時間上的判斷我們也可以從天氣，有可能會收到這是某某遊行的畫面，當天明明是大太陽可是上傳的影片卻是雨天或陰天，跟實際上活動現場狀況不一樣，那我們也可以從這個地方去破解這篇文章。

I'm not sure if "censorship" is the right word to use, because for us it doesn't feel like censorship. We're fact-checking, not censoring. Our fact-checking work falls into three main areas. First, if an old article or video is repurposed to claim it's about a recent event, we'll do a reverse image search or find images from past reports. By cross-referencing multiple media sources, we can confirm the original context of that image that's one method we use. Second, for health or finance-related topics, some content can be understood by simply reading the legal text. However, when interpretation is involved, we may need experts to explain it for us. For finance, we consult finance scholars or tax law scholars. For medical matters, we seek doctors or professors familiar with the field. This is a method we frequently use in our interviews. The third method involves using open-source tools for geolocation. For instance, if a protest is claimed to have occurred in Spain, we examine what appears in the footage. If street signs clearly display Burmese script yet the caption claims it's

a Spanish protest, we can use geolocation to debunk the claim by showing the location or timing is fundamentally incorrect. We also assess timing through weather analysis. If footage purporting to show a specific protest displays sunny conditions while the uploaded video shows rainy or overcast weather discrepancies with actual event conditions, we can debunk the post based on this discrepancy.

5.遇到難以查證或需要國際合作的案件時，你們會怎麼處理？

5.How do you handle cases that are difficult to verify or require international cooperation?

難以查證我比較難想像。例如我們找不到一個確切答案的時候，我們可以寫說沒有證據顯示或是沒有媒體報導；就像我們在做疫苗陰謀論時，可能會講說打哪一種疫苗會產生癌症，有可能像新冠疫苗這麼新興的一個疫苗並沒有科學實證，我們也沒辦法去證明它在短時間內有沒有發生癌症的可能性，我們就沒辦法告訴民眾說某個實驗做出來就是不會有癌症的可能性，我們會以反正的方式說目前手上大規模的現有資料來說並沒有資料能佐證說施打新冠疫苗就會導致癌症，這是我們遇到一個查證困難的時候第一個處理的方法。至於國際合作的話，我們在查國際題目的時候，我之前有做過立陶宛、波蘭，以這兩個為例，我會去問當地的查核組織或是直接寄信給當地的政府機關，比方說立陶宛的貿易出口額因被中國抵制的關係，它的貿易出口額下降的快速，那這個數字也蠻好找的，因為各國政府其實都會公布相應的數據，低一個可以先佐證這個數據是否真實，第二個我們可以直接去問當地的查核組織就你們的觀察而言有沒有發生這樣的事情然後再問政府機關說從你們的數據來看跟查核中心找到的數據，我們看到的這個內容跟傳言講的內容是否一樣，誰說的是比較正確的，我們會用這個方式去詢問。如果是跨國合作的話，我們目前比較少在查核工作上面有題目直接跟跨國合作，不過之前在烏俄戰爭、新冠疫情的時候，我們會跟國外的查核組織一起建一個網站，像是我們有查證過哪些資訊，我們都會把資訊放上去，哪一個國家有查證過哪些，我們就可以在那個平台上相互看一下哪些題目是我們查過的，就可以相互引用。

It's rare for us to encounter something truly unverifiable. When we cannot find definite evidence, we will note that "there is no evidence showing..." or "there are no media reports confirming...". For example, conspiracy theories about COVID-19 vaccines causing cancer cannot be confirmed or disproven due to limited scientific evidence. We can only state that current large-scale data does not support such claims. Regarding international collaboration, when fact-checking topics about countries like Lithuania or Poland, we contact their fact-checking organizations or government agencies directly. We compare publicly released government statistics and also ask local fact-checkers what they have observed. Cross-country joint fact-checking on individual topics is still uncommon, but during the Russia–Ukraine war and COVID-

19 pandemic, we co-built platforms where different countries upload their fact-checks so others can reference them.

6. 作為一位查核記者，在查證時會不會受到外界壓力？如何維持中立與專業？

6. As a fact-checker, do you experience external pressure? How do you maintain neutrality and professionalism?

我覺得壓力的話比較沒有，目前沒有感受到有什麼外界壓力；至於維持中立和專業，以我來講，盡可能少在公共場合跟社群媒體發表相關可能會引起爭議的內容；編輯大家都會有一致的概念，在處理文稿跟選題的時候大家都會有比較著重的地方跟可能需要思考哪些東西需要謹慎處理，一個比較自我心證的方式來判斷，在團體內我們會有守則來維持大家對於報告標準的判斷。

I don't feel particularly pressured at the moment. I haven't sensed any external pressure. As for maintaining neutrality and professionalism, personally, I try to minimize posting potentially controversial content in public forums and on social media. Editors share a common understanding when handling manuscripts and selecting topics, we all have areas we prioritize and consider requiring careful handling. We rely on a self-assessment approach to judge these matters, and within our team, we have guidelines to maintain consistent standards for report quality.

7. 第三方查核機構在監測假新聞時，主要面臨哪些挑戰？

7. What challenges do third-party fact-checking organizations face when monitoring misinformation?

以目前來說，到底哪些地方的錯誤訊息，我們可能找不到或沒看見但他在社會上時常流傳所以我們目前收集的方式有透過 Line，我們自己有一個 Line 的聊天機器人，讀者看到這個訊息時可以回報到我們的機器人裡面，機器人會比對我們之前做過的報告，如果我們以前做過的話他會自動回覆，沒有的話，我們記者可能就會啟動查核；第二個方式就是我們現在只能透過手動的方式去撈取，用關鍵字去看，像是 FB、Thread、IG、Tiktok 上面在流傳什麼訊息，但這肯定會有相對的局限性，因為我們可能會因為演算法或是自己對於某些議題的不熟悉就有可能失去大家真正在討論的問題

A major challenge is that we may not see all the misinformation circulating in society. First, through our LINE chatbot, where readers can submit suspicious content. Second, manual keyword searches on platforms like Facebook, Threads, Instagram, and TikTok—though algorithms and personal familiarity with topics inevitably limit what we can find.

8. 第三方查核機構如何讓更多人願意使用、相信、轉傳你們的查核結果？

8. How do you encourage more people to use, trust, and share your fact-check results?

這其實也是我們想要努力的一個方向，除了經營社群，像是我們的臉書和 ig 發貼文把我們的查核報告轉成比較淺顯易懂的圖卡讓更多人去接觸，我們也有製作影音，把假訊息製作成短影音或是解釋性的內容變成長影音，我們也有

走到線下，去社區大學或者是學校演講，同時來推廣我們的品牌跟報告，讓大家可以學習到相關內容。

This is something we're continually working on. We operate social media pages, turn reports into easy-to-understand visual cards, and produce short and long-form videos. Not only this, We also engage offline by giving lectures at community colleges and schools to promote media literacy.

9. 第三方查核機構未來還會拓展哪些新功能或合作計畫？

9. What new functions or collaborations will fact- checking organizations explore in the future?

新功能目前還不確定；合作計畫我們一直以來都處於蠻開放的，例如我們之前有獲得台灣媒體素養教育專案，我們公司是一個教育基金會，總共有三個部門，一個是行政，一個是我現在所在的編務部，最後一個是教育部門；我不太確定目前有什麼很新很具體的計劃，不過我們有拿到 google 的素養計劃，這代表我們未來會持續向民眾推廣媒體素養教育也可以培養民眾對假訊息的抵禦能力。

We are open to collaborations. For example, we joined Taiwan's media literacy education project and Google's literacy initiative. As for new features, there are no concrete plans yet, but we will continue expanding media literacy education.

10. 未來 AI、假訊息會更多，請問您有什麼因應計畫？

10. With AI increasing the spread of misinformation, what are your response strategies?

回到上述幾題所提到的，我們因為有教育部門，教育部門其實也肩負著要推廣媒體教育素養的內容；至於 AI 誕生後假訊息可能會變得更多，這是一直以來我們都需要面對的事情，我們也還在思考可以用什麼方式來應對；比方說前陣子有 youtube 頻道用 AI 生成一篇文章在用 AI 的語音功能將內容變成影片版本，對我們而言其實一直去查核這些偽照的影片內容其實蠻耗時的，所以我們就開始在想說從教育方面去著手教大家只要看到哪些東西或哪些細節就可以知道是 AI 影片，不一定要透過我們來證實這是一個假訊息，民眾就可以自己辨別，這是我們比較希望的方向

As mentioned, our education department plays a key role. AI-generated fake videos and content take significant time to debunk, so we focus on teaching the public what signs to look for they can identify AI-generated misinformation themselves without relying on us.

11. 你們對<數位中介服務法>草案有什麼看法？你們是支持還是反對政府立法進行言論審查？

11. What is your view on the draft “Digital Intermediary Services Act”? Do you support government-led content moderation?

我覺得這個在我們組織內部不是一個被廣泛討論的話題，我們並不是一個執行機關也不是一個法案研究的學術單位所以我們內部對於這個法案沒有過多的反應，就我們目前來說我們不會對它有一個很明確的看法

Our organization has not discussed this extensively. We are neither an enforcement agency nor a legal research institution, so we don't have a strong opinion on this draft.

12.雖然數位中介服務法只是草案並未通過，但您認為如何修改法案才可以適用台灣？

12. Although the Digital Intermediary Services Act is only a draft and has not been passed, how do you think the bill should be amended to make it applicable to Taiwan?

我沒有仔細去想，現在草案也被退回，短時間來說行政院跟 NCC 也沒有打算推出新版本；等他們推出新版本再操勞；像我知道的民間團體跆拳會其實有曾經對數位中介服務法來提出評論和質疑，或許等他們會有更多相關的草案提出來之後再來討論

I haven't thought deeply about this. Since no new version is planned yet, it's difficult to comment. Some civil groups, such as the Taiwan Association for Human Rights, have raised concerns—perhaps future discussions could build on their suggestions.

13.台灣為了因應歐盟的數位服務法而提出數位中介服務法，您認為數位服務法中有哪些內容是可以供台灣參考？

13. Taiwan proposed the Digital Intermediary Services Act in response to the EU's Digital Services Act. What content of the Digital Services Act do you think Taiwan could refer to?

以我個人的意見來提出我的看法，我覺得數位中介服務法的內容整體來說構思是好的，可是在形塑這些法案的時候部分內容過於粗糙，甚至在說 72 小時要進行處理，這其實有很多窒礙難行的地方，另外在執行數位中介服務法時有一個步驟是需要先審查再下架，那這個審查的機制跟下架的機制是由誰來管控的？那業者是否需要聽從政府機關的指導或要求？這都可能會不是那麼仔細處理的東西，我不確定當時歐盟在行駛那些內容時，台灣是抄了多少；我覺得出發點是好的但有些地方窒礙難行

Speaking personally, I think the Digital Services Act overall concept is good, but some sections were too rough in execution. For example, the requirement to process certain cases within 72 hours, which may be unrealistic. In addition, when implementing the Digital Intermediary Service Act, there is a step that needs to be reviewed before being removed, so who controls this review mechanism and the removal mechanism? Does the industry need to follow the guidance or requirements of government agencies? This may not be a very careful thing, and I'm not sure how

much Taiwan copied when the EU was running that content at the time. The content is good, but many areas are impractical.

14. 你們覺得民間有機會跟政府合作一起推動假新聞防治嗎？

14. Do you think civil fact-checking groups can cooperate with the government to combat misinformation?

我個人覺得是有機會，只是我們的界線要保持得很清楚，要知道我們哪些東西是可以合作哪些是不行；以現在來說我們與政府的合作（不泛指金錢的合作），單純推廣防治假新聞議題上面，我們有與教育廣播電台有推出媒體釋讀的podcast 或是在漢伸廣播電台我們的主編會去錄製這週或是近期比較熱門的假訊息，這些都是我們目前有合作的方向；過去行政院有一個 Line 叫假訊息的查證平台，我們那時候有加入，民眾可以看到有哪些內容；我們對於跟政府合作並不會排斥，我們會拒絕在金錢上的合作，在推廣議題上我們是 ok 的。

Yes, but boundaries must be clear. We currently collaborate with government-affiliated broadcasters on educational content, such as podcasts and radio programs about misinformation. In terms of simply promoting the prevention and control of fake news, we have launched a podcast with educational radio station or our editor-in-chief will record the popular disinformation this week or recently, which are the directions we currently cooperate with. In the past, the Executive Yuan had a Line verification platform called false information, and we joined it at that time, so the public could see what content it was. We refuse financial cooperation but are open to joint public-service projects.

15. 呈上 那要如何施行？

15. How should the cooperation be implemented?

未來要怎麼施行可能會牽涉到董事會他們的決策跟方向，我不太確定他們會希望朝什麼方向前進，這個問題我比較沒辦法回答

This depends on the board of directors and their decisions. I'm not certain what direction they will choose. I can't answer this question.

16. 您覺得哪些國家的假新聞審查機制對台灣最有借鏡價值？為什麼？

16. Which countries' fake news censorship mechanism are most useful for Taiwan as references? Why?

對我們而言其實為什麼查核這件事要由第三方來決定就是因為政府如果自己去做這件事的話可能會求人見裁判，在一個民主國家的話可能不是一個大問題可是在獨裁國家或內閣制的國家，執政黨可能就會有真裁判的問題所以我不覺得多數國家會有熱愛審查假新聞，那他們可能會有一些法律上的提起訴訟的一些保全受段，比方說以台灣來說可以以社違法來辦制或是疫情的時候傳播假新聞的話可能有處罰的機制但是大規模的針對假訊息審查機制，我個人覺得應該是比較少再加上我們是民間單位主要是看到各國的查核組織在如何運用哪些工具來提升他們查核的量或是找議題、可以提供給民眾更容易看懂的報告。

For us, the reason why the audit is decided by a third party is because if the government does this by itself, it may ask for a referee, which may not be a big problem in a democratic country, but in a dictatorship or a cabinet system, the ruling party may have the problem of true refereeing. For example, in Taiwan, it can be punished for social illegality or spreading fake news during the epidemic, but there is a large-scale disinformation censorship mechanism. Personally, I think it should be relatively small, and since we are a private unit, we mainly see how the inspection organizations of various countries use what tools to increase the amount of their inspections or find issues that can be provided to the public with easy to understand reports.

17.您覺得台灣與這些國家的機制相比，有哪些有效或不足之處？

17.Compared with these countries, what are Taiwan's strengths and weaknesses?

我覺得以大多數的民主國家比較不是問題，以體制來說其實審查言論這件事可能會造成言論自由限制的狀況，所以我不清楚其他國家的審查機制是否有被他們的民眾熱愛或是得到正面的回饋；以台灣目前的體制來說是一個尚可接收，民眾也公平的狀態，政府也比較少提起國家的力量來反制假訊息，除非它的危害程度相當高才會像我剛剛提到的透過社違法或是一些相關的法律來處理這些問題。

I think it is not a big problem for democratic countries. In terms of the system, censorship of speech may lead to restrictions on freedom of speech. I don't know if the censorship mechanisms of other countries are loved by their people or receive positive feedback. Taiwan's current system is acceptable and the people are fair, and the government rarely mentions the power of the state to counter disinformation, unless it is very harmful to deal with these issues through social violations or some related laws as I just mentioned.

18.您認為未來台灣針對假新聞的查核機制可以如何改進？或是可以參考哪一國的假新聞審查機制？（民間或政府）

18.How should improve the fake news censorship mechanism in Taiwan? Or which country's fake news censorship mechanism can be referenced? (private or governmental)

政府的話我覺得先不用說好了，民間的話，查核中心其實是一個蠻晚才起步的組織，我們是 2018 年才成立，國外有些查核組織是從 2000 年就開始了，他們不管是規模還是調查方式其實比我們大的多、查核的細節也比我們更仔細、更有工具來去做這些問題，我之前看到英國的 folfac，它是有用 AI 的方式去撈取網路上的謠言，像是 Fb、Ig、Thread 他們都有方法去撈取，這點對我們而言其實也蠻需要的，我們也沒辦法完全的效仿，因為他們的機械設置不見得是可以完全適用在台灣的體制上，但我覺得他們的服務跟發想是很不錯的，還有一個西班牙或巴西的查核組織，最近因為 AI 生成式的機器人產生後他們把所

有的查核報告都丟到機器人，機器人會先去學習那些內容，那讀者只要遇到不確定的東西可以直接問機器人，如果機器人知道有查核報告可以立刻回覆，沒有的話他就會說沒有，以 AI 這個時代來說這個工具其實是很重要的，不管是我們現在比較常用的 chatgpt，都可能有自己憑空想像的地方，若查核組織可以建立自己的 AI 聊天的 database，對讀者而言是可以更容易理解、更容易去使用；我們在寫稿的時候我們可能會我們大家會一起看但我們寫的東西可能我們了解讀者不見得會了解，但如果有 AI 機器人的話就可以問到懂為止，我們也可以去看後台哪些東西是讀者比較不懂的，未來我們可以針對這部分去做處理；大家的方法或制度面大家可能比較大同小異，我們是 Meta 的合作夥伴，我們需要透過國際事實查核 IFCN 去認證，組織成員有哪些？資金來源是哪些？是否有接受政黨或政治人物的資金，若都沒有再來看我們報告的內容是否有多重資料並不是只有單一的來源，這些資料是不是可以經過檢視或者是民眾若覺得我們報告有問題的話有沒有地方可以接受申訴，這都是需要被檢視的機制，目前這些機制上面的話我覺得沒有什麼差別。

I think we should avoid talking about the government for now. As for the private sector, the fact-checking center is actually a relatively new organization. We were founded in 2018, while some foreign fact-checking organizations have been around since 2000. They have larger teams, more sophisticated investigative methods, and more tools to address these issues. I recently came across a British organization called Folfac that uses AI to identify online rumors on platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and Threads. This approach is also relevant to us, but we can't simply imitate them because their systems may not be fully applicable to the Taiwanese system. However, I think their services and ideas are excellent. There's also a Spanish or Brazilian fact-checking organization that recently used AI-generated robots to compile all their fact-checking reports. The robots would then Readers can learn from these contents. If they encounter something they're unsure about, they can ask the machine. If the machine knows of a fact-checking report, it can respond immediately. If not, it will say so. In this AI era, this tool is actually very important. ChatGPT, which we use more often, may have its own imaginative elements. If fact-checking organizations can establish their own AI chat database, readers can understand and use it more easily. When we write, we may look at each other's work, but what we write may not be understood by readers. With AI machines, however, readers can ask until they understand. We can also see in the back end which topics readers don't understand. In the future, we can address these issues. Everyone's methods and systems are similar. We are a Meta partner and need to be certified by the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). What are the organization's members? What are the funding sources? Have they received funding from political parties or politicians? Funding, and whether or not we have multiple sources of data, not just one. These data must be

verifiable, and there must be a place for citizens to submit complaints if they feel our reports are inaccurate. Currently, I don't see any significant differences in these mechanisms.

19. 為了因應假新聞日益增多，未來假新聞的防治必不可少，想問您覺得台灣是否要建立一套完整的官方審查機制來防治假新聞氾濫？

19. In the increasing number of fake news, the prevention of fake news will be essential in the future. I would like to ask you if you think Taiwan should establish a complete official censorship mechanism to prevent the spread of fake news.

以我個人的立場來說，官方不適合建立審查機制，要先判定是假新聞可能就涉及到審查或者是政治判斷的一個過程，但如果是要防範假新聞這個概念上，除了媒體素養教育國中小或者是大學來增加相關課程、制定一個周全的法律，例如社違法某些情況下它就可以去處理大部分的假訊息問題，那如果不夠的話我們是否只要將某些地方修正的更加仔細、明確，一方面可以讓執法者有權利去執行這個法律來制裁這些造謠者，另一方面也不會讓民眾覺得無助也不用害怕政府機關起來追殺。

In my personal opinion, the government is not suitable for establishing a review mechanism. To determine whether it is fake news, it may involve a process of review or political judgment. However, in terms of preventing fake news, in addition to media literacy education in primary and secondary schools or universities, we can increase related courses and establish a comprehensive law. For example, the Social Welfare Act can address most fake news issues. If this is insufficient, we can revise certain aspects to be more detailed and specific. This will empower law enforcement to prosecute those who spread rumors and prevent the public from feeling helpless or afraid of government agencies.

20. 繢 18 題 如果回答是：為什麼？那要如何確保官方審查機制的中立以及維護人民的言論自由？您覺得政府應該使用什麼手段以權衡利弊？

20. Continuing from Question 18: If the response is “Why?”, how can we ensure the neutrality of official censorship mechanisms and uphold citizens' freedom of speech? What measures do you believe the government should employ to balance the pros and cons?

以我們組織來說我們回到最開始說的，我們在查核一個內容時我們會去分它是一個評論還是事實，例如台灣浪費了兩億劑的疫苗，那這個東西應該不屬於評論範疇，這個數字就是浪費了多少劑或是沒有用到多少劑都是可以直接取得數據或證據，我們都可以藉來反駁這些內容；那在意見評論上的話，我覺得比較難用審查的方式來去處理，我們以前最開始只有查核報告，現在逐漸發展出了官網或是議體觀察室跟謠言風向處理，這都是我們延伸出來去推廣，可能網路上在討論一些議題，例如：之前賴總統宣布要恢復軍事審核、軍事法庭的這個制度，那這個東西有好有壞，因為一個制度上一定有好有壞，那大家也

會伴隨著意見評論，我們可以就事實面來去查核；例如像班長罵說不能吃早餐你就會被罰，我們就可以去問相關軍審人員說那這件事情會不會發生，如果不會的話或許網路上就是造謠，這我們就可以處理；以意見評論來講的話，我們會找專家來講說這個民眾講的東西推論合不合理或是他的表達方式是否前後有缺乏一些邏輯性，我們就可以用這種方式來告訴大家，我們不見得需要看到正確或錯誤或是怎樣的一個指標，那這對社會溝通來講也是比較有益處的。

For our organization, going back to what we discussed earlier, when fact-checking content, we categorize it as either commentary or factual information. For instance, the claim that Taiwan wasted 200 million vaccine doses, this falls outside the realm of commentary. Whether the figure represents wasted doses or unused doses can be directly verified through data or evidence, allowing us to refute such content. Regarding opinion based commentary, I believe it's more challenging to address through verification methods. Initially, we only produced fact-checking reports, but we've gradually expanded to include official websites, the Media Observation Room, and rumor trend management. These are extensions we've developed to promote. For instance, when online discussions arise about certain issues, like when President Lai announced plans to reinstate military review and court-martial systems, such topics inherently have pros and cons. People will naturally share opinions and commentary, and we can fact-check based on the facts. For instance, if a rumor claims that sergeants threaten punishment for skipping breakfast, we can verify with military personnel whether this actually occurs. If not, it's likely a falsehood we can debunk. Regarding opinion-based commentary, we engage experts to evaluate whether public statements are logically sound or if their arguments lack consistency. This approach informs the public without necessarily focusing on labels like "correct" or "incorrect," which is more beneficial for societal discourse.

21.那您前面有提到除了核查工作之外，你們也開始投入媒體釋讀教育，我想請問一下你們具體是怎麼執行的嗎？例如像跟學校合作還是有其他方式？

21. Earlier you mentioned that in addition to verification work, you've also begun investing in media literacy education. Could you elaborate on how you're implementing this? For example, are you collaborating with schools or employing other methods?

其實大多數以我所知道的都是學校來找我們，他們有興趣，然後聯繫我們的相關人員，那我們再去當地進行演講，演講內容可能包括剛剛提到的 AI 問題、要怎麼去看 AI 圖、AI 影片又或是假訊息的話我們可以有什麼方法來去查證。比方說我們可以做地理定位、以圖反搜，這都是非常簡單的方式可以去查，那甚至來教大家哪些東西是可信的消息來源，像是你如果隨便看到一個 X 帳號或是臉書粉專跟你說什麼東西，那它可以信嗎？哪些東西可以值得信任，這都是我們媒體素養教育的一環。

Actually, most of the time, as far as I know, schools reach out to us. They express interest and then contact our relevant staff. We then go to their locations to give presentations. The content might cover topics like the AI issues mentioned earlier, how to evaluate AI-generated images or videos, or methods for verifying misinformation. For instance, we can use geolocation or reverse image searches, these are very simple verification methods. We even teach people how to identify credible news sources. If you come across some random X account or Facebook page making claims, can you trust it? What information is trustworthy? These are all part of our media literacy education.

22. 請問您覺得假新聞最挑動的情緒有哪些？（例如激怒、恐懼、不安）

22. What emotions do you think fake news most effectively provokes? (e.g., anger, fear, anxiety)

各種情緒其實都有，包括愉快或興奮這都是包括在內的，其實做這些假訊息我覺得訊息一旦被廣泛傳播，一定會有它一個傳播的起點，那在傳播學上面就是情緒，就是你所定的情緒，所以只要任何訊息其實基本上他都會有一個情緒的傳播，例如：有些人看到政治會很開心有些人看到會很憤怒，其實同一個訊息在兩邊都可以產生不一樣的情緒所以我覺得不一定是挑起的情緒最主要有哪些而是這些訊息它本身可能就是一個挑起情緒的出發點，那至於會有什麼情緒的發生就要看你解讀的那個人他是怎麼看待這件事情。

All kinds of emotions exist, including joy or excitement—these are all encompassed. In fact, when creating these fake messages, I believe that once information spreads widely, it must have a point of origin for its dissemination. In communication studies, that origin is emotion, the emotion you set. So essentially, any message will carry an emotional transmission. For example: Some people feel elated when they see politics, while others feel furious. The same message can evoke different emotions in both groups. So, I don't think it's necessary to provoke specific emotions. The main point is that these messages themselves may be the starting point for provoking emotions. As for what emotions arise, that depends on how the person interpreting the message perceives the situation.

23. 請問您如何與傳統媒體（報紙、電視）合作，以避免假新聞被進一步擴散？

23. How do you collaborate with traditional media outlets (newspapers, television) to prevent the further spread of fake news?

我們過去有和華視合作做‘打假特攻隊’，因為後來某些原因我們就沒有和華視合作了，不過近期的話我們有和公式做一個節目叫‘啊真相大白’就是哈林主持的，應該網路上能找到，那這些都是我們在曝光一個假訊息的管道，那只是方式比較不同，過去跟華視合作的方式我們比較像是針對議題性，假設最近熱傳哪些我們就去播送或是提供內容給他們來製作相關新聞。那目前跟公視合作主要是集中在益智問答類似百萬小學堂那樣，反正就是問答類的節目，

就是拿我們過去的報告或是大家常有的一些迷思，然後我們來去做解答還有推廣查核報告；除了這兩個電視台之外我們也有與 yahoo 合作，我們就把我們的報告透過 yahoo 的一個平台，可能 yahoo 在演算法的方面比較強所以民眾在搜尋的時候也可以搜尋的到；那我們前面有提到說我們有跟漢森電台或是國立廣播電台合作做假訊息相關的影片除了這個之外，我們還有跟橘光園地，橘光園地也會來找我們講假訊息的事或是一些認知作戰的內容然後來教導民眾怎麼避免這個問題。

We previously collaborated with China Television on the program “Fake News Busters,” but due to certain circumstances, we ceased working with them. However, recently we've partnered with Formula TV on a show called “Ah, The Truth Is Revealed,” hosted by Harlem. It should be available online. These are all channels we use to expose false information, just through different methods. Our past collaboration with CTS focused more on specific issues, whenever something went viral, we'd broadcast it or provide content for them to produce related news segments. Our current collaboration with PTS focuses primarily on quiz shows similar to Million Kids' Academy, essentially question-and-answer programs. We use our past reports or common misconceptions to provide answers and promote fact-checking reports. Beyond these two broadcasters, we also partner with Yahoo. We distribute our reports through Yahoo's platform, leveraging their strong algorithmic capabilities so, the public can discover them during searches. As mentioned earlier, we've partnered with Hanssen Radio and National Broadcasting Radio to produce videos addressing misinformation. Beyond that, we also collaborate with Orange Light Garden. They reach out to us to discuss misinformation and cognitive warfare content, teaching the public how to avoid these issues.

24.查核結果出來後你們有追蹤過它對大眾輿論的影響嗎？

24. After the audit results were released, did you track its impact on public opinion?

我們會稍微看一下大家對我們報告的看法或是品質的問題，像我們的臉書就是一個可以蠻好觀察的媒介，大家有意見的話蠻常在貼文底下去熱烈的討論，這也是其中一個；我們也會去看說哪些媒體引用我們的報告把它做成新聞或是哪些東西他們比較愛做，這些我們都會去觀察，但也不一定說哪些東西比較好哪些東西比較不好，但是可以知道大家需要的內容或者訊息性質是哪些。

We'll briefly review public feedback on our reports or quality concerns. Our Facebook page serves as a particularly useful platform for this. People often engage in lively discussions in the comments section when they have opinions. That's one avenue. We also track which media outlets cite our reports to create news stories or what types of coverage they prefer. We monitor these trends, though we don't necessarily judge them as good or bad. Instead, we gain insight into the specific content or message types that resonate with our audience.

25.您覺得數位平台（Facebook、IG、Line 等）在假新聞治理中應負起多大的責任？

25. How much responsibility do you believe digital platforms (such as Facebook, Instagram, and Line) should bear in combating fake news?

我好像比較難用一個叫具體的百分比來說他們到底要付多大的責任，不過以他們的社會企業責任來說，我覺得平台需要一個公共問責機制，比方說大家看到一些不實內容或是一些仇恨暴力的內容，那他們有什麼比較標準的處理方式或是比較透明的處理方式讓民眾可以知道這些界線在哪還是防禦機制在哪甚至是檢舉機制是否有實質性的效益，我覺得這些都是社群平台需要面對的問題。那他們要拿多少資源或是進行義務教育（媒體素養教育），我希望他們可以再拿更多東西出來推廣，因為他們一年從社會中拿到的資源，其實相對來說比大家想的多更多，那理所應當要付出更多責任。

It's difficult for me to pinpoint an exact percentage to quantify their responsibility, but in terms of their social responsibility, I believe platforms need a public accountability mechanism. For instance, when users encounter false information or hateful and violent content, they should have standardized and transparent procedures. This would clarify boundaries, defensive measures, and whether reporting mechanisms actually work. These are issues social platforms must confront. Regarding resources allocated or mandatory education (media literacy programs), I hope they commit more to promotion. Given the substantial resources they receive annually from society. Actually, it's much more than most people think. They should naturally shoulder greater responsibility.

### **Ex-legislator Tsai Biru**

你好，我是蔡壁如，那我是上一屆在立法院的立法委員，那這一屆我目前在中壢選區我沒有選上，那過去我長時間是在台大醫院工作，這大概就是我的經歷了，我的經歷就只有台大醫院的護理師、台北市政府的市長室主任，然後就立法院的立法委員大概就這樣子好，謝謝你們謝謝。今天的題目很有意思啊好，開始吧！

Hello, I'm Tsai Biru. I'm a legislator in the Legislative Yuan last term. I've not been elected in the Zhongyu constituency this time. In the past, I worked in Taiwan University Hospital for a long time. This is probably my experience. My experience is only a nurse at Taiwan University Hospital and the director of the mayor's office of Taipei City Government, and then The legislators of the Legislative Yuan are probably like this. Thank you. Today's topic is very interesting. Okay, let's start!

1.台灣社會最需要核查的假訊息有哪些比如說政治兩岸議題，或是健康等等

1. What are the fake news that needs to be verified most in Taiwanese society, such as political cross-strait issues, or health, etc.

因為有時候就是一些，因為那個這個 google meet 的一些問題，不一定會講得很清楚，但是我覺得不管是叫假訊息，還是假新聞，在台灣上面，在台灣充斥有沒有厲害，不過不曉得各位同學怎麼覺得啦齁，那我個人是覺得可能是個人識讀的問題，但是是有一點點嚴重，所以我覺得就是需要查核的，不應該用類型來說是政治的比較需要去查核？或者是健康的？要是我，我 1 個護理師的觀點，我當然會覺得那個健康上面有不實的那個廣告，我覺得這個對人體來講，就會影響到個人我覺得那是最重要的，政治上面我覺得那個影響是一時的啦。如果你要用類型來分別的話，那也不是每個人都專注在政治上面，但是健康跟社會的議題上面，幾乎是我們每天都會去碰到的，所以我在那個擬答裡頭，我有講，有些長輩就會一直去傳啊要多喝水多喝水、多喝水好像也沒有多嚴重，就算你喝了再多，好像也沒有那麼誇張但是如果他告訴你說，他知道某個地方有某一口井，或者有一個泉水吃了，可以治百病，可以什麼養顏美容，這種有已經有明確的地方：泉水，某個地方的泉水台南的泉水、台中的溫泉水，然後他告訴你說可以增加抵抗力，這個已經是牽扯到健康的議題了各位同學你們可以分辨健康食品跟養生食品跟藥物怎麼分別嗎？

I think whether it's fake news or fake news, there are a lot of them in Taiwan. Is it awesome? I don't know what you think. Personally, I think it may be a problem of personal reading, but it's a little serious, so I think it needs to be checked. It should not be used as a type of political comparison that needs to be checked, or healthy. If it were me, a nurse's point of view, I would of course think that there is a false advertisement on the health. I think this will affect the human body and the individual. I think that's the most important thing. Politically, I think the impact is temporary. If you want to distinguish by type, it is not that everyone focuses on politics, but on health and social issues, which we will almost encounter every day, so in that proposed answer, I have said that some elders will always spread the word of drinking more water, and drinking more water does not seem to be too serious, just No matter how much you drink, it doesn't seem to be so exaggerated, but if he tells you, he knows that there is a well somewhere, or there is a spring water that can cure all kinds of diseases, and it can be beautiful. There is already a clear place, the spring water somewhere, the spring water of Tainan, the hot spring water in Taichung, and then he I told you that it can increase resistance, which is already an issue involving health. Can you tell the difference between healthy food, health food and medicine?

提問者：應該要看他的那個成分

Questioner: It should depend on his component.

健康食品跟什麼養生食品然後再來，因為藥物、藥物當然是你要治療某種藥嘛這個是比較明確的定義，但是健康食品跟一些養生的食品，這個就很難，字眼上面，他不可以去談到療效治療，比如說某個泉水可以增加抵抗力，這個抵抗力就跟我們的健康有關係的，所以他就會變成是1個，不知道是假訊息還是真的不知道，但是我覺得這個就有點誇大，但是很重要，如果說喝農藥可以殺菌，那就很嚴重了嘛。比如說最近這一兩天是什麼化學的漂白水去清洗大腸豬的內臟，那這件事情有沒有很嚴重？其實我們任何的藥物，他都有1個容許的範圍，他只是很危言聳聽用標題說話，工業用的漂白水去清洗豬的內臟大腸，然後流落到市面上，他只有這樣講，但是內容呢？也許他稀釋了10000倍、100000倍，那他可能就其實也無所謂，他就是1個清洗的用具，所以像這種就是要去查證，所以像這樣的訊息，他就是用標題很聳動的來告訴你，說漂白水是不行的啊。真的不行嗎？你每天去游泳，裡頭都是氯啊，所以這個就是變成我們等一下後面要講的識讀的一些的辨識，很重要所以大概我個人認為訊息不要用類型而是用輕重緩急尤其是會危害到身體健康的，我覺得比較重要，那再來就是就會有影響到公共利益的，我覺得也是比較重要，那至於一些常常大家比較會噴口水的就政治議題，我覺得那是你要不要去聽要不要去接受這個訊息的問題，大概就這樣好謝謝。

Healthy food and what health food is medicine, because medicine is of course you need to treat a certain disease, which is a relatively clear definition, but healthy food and some health food are very difficult. He can't talk about the therapeutic effect on the word, for example, a spring water can increase resistance, which a resistance is related to our health, so he will become one. I don't know if it's fake news or real, but I think this is a bit exaggerated, but it's very important. If drinking pesticides can kill bacteria, it's very serious. For example, what kind of chemical bleach has been used to clean the internal organs of large intestine pigs in the past two days. Is this matter very serious? In fact, he has an acceptable range for any of our drugs. He is just alarmist. With the title, industrial bleach is used to clean the internal organs and large intestines of pigs, and then spread to the market. He can only say this, but what about the content? Maybe he diluted it 10,000 times or 100,000 times, so he may not really care. He is a cleaning tool, so this kind of news needs to be verified. In this kind of news, he just tells you with a very shrugging title that bleach is not good. Is it really not possible? You go swimming every day, and it's full of chlorine, so this has become what we're going to talk about later. It's very important to know how to read some of the identification, so I personally think that the news should not be type, but to use priority, especially if it will harm your health. I think it's more important, and then there will be a shadow. I think it is also more important to affect the public interest. As for some political issues that people often scold, I think it's a question of whether you want to listen to it or accept this news.

2. 請問您覺得假訊息最影響民眾的情緒有哪些？

2. What do you think are the emotions of fake news that most affect the people?

就是憤怒跟恐懼，憤怒跟恐懼，比如說好人家說中共 2027 要攻台啦。台灣 2028 沒有選舉了，是不是真的傳得沸沸揚揚，那到底是不是真的？因為他還沒發生嘛。你不能說它真的還假的因為他還沒發生，但是他就散播，這種這叫謠言他不是 1 個真訊息或假訊息或假新聞？他因為他還沒發生嘛。2027 還沒發生，所以他是 1 個謠言但是如果說台灣快要被封城然後大家去搶購那個什麼超商衛生紙，最常的就是什麼某某颱風某某地震來了，所有超市的泡麵通通一掃而空，那這個大概就會造成老百姓的恐慌，那再來就是比較政治性的某個政黨要賣台啊這個大家就吵成一團，因為這是情緒問題，但是我這裡有舉 1 個例子，我覺得今年有 1 件事情喔因為同學應該會比較有興趣，就是今年 5 月的時候，那個日本漫畫家在講到 2027，就是今年 7 月會有什麼什麼什麼大災難啊他是預言，預言就是假訊息，還是謠言，還是假新聞，因為當時 5 月的時候 7 月還沒發生嘛。可是現在已經到了 11 月了，我們倒回去看就發現他當時就是 1 個表演，那也是 1 個假訊息的 1 個傳播，但是他就會造成很多人的恐慌你知道我有很多朋友說要移民，我心想要發生這世界大災難，那個有什麼恐慌，台灣要移民去哪裡會比較安全呢？所以你看還是會有人會因為這樣而造成恐慌，或者是害怕，所以大概假訊息大概最主要，大概就會在恐慌和害怕上面。

It's anger and fear. For example, it is said that China will attack Taiwan in 2027. There will be no election in Taiwan in 2028. Is it really spread? Is it true? Because it hasn't happened yet, you can't say it's true or false, because it hasn't happened yet, but he spreads it. This kind of rumor is not true news or fake news . Because it hasn't happened yet. 2027 hasn't happened yet, so he is a rumor, but if it is said that Taiwan is about to be closed and then everyone rushes to buy that supermarket toilet paper, the most common thing is that a typhoon or earthquake is coming, and all the instant noodles in the supermarket are swept away, which will probably cause panic among the people, and then it will be If a political political party wants to sell the stage, everyone will quarrel, because it is an emotional problem. But I have an example here. I think there is one thing this year that students should be more interested in. That is, in May this year, the Japanese cartoonist was talking about 2027, that is, what kind of disaster will happen in July this year. Is he a prediction? Is the prediction fake news or a rumor? Because it didn't happen in July when it was May. But now it's November. When we look back, we found that he was a performance at that time, which was also the spread of fake news. But he will cause a lot of people to panic. You know, many of my friends want to immigrate. I think there will be a disaster in the world. What's the panic? Where is it safer to immigrate in Taiwan? So you think there are still people who will panic or be afraid because of this, so the most important thing about fake news is probably panic and fear.

3.您覺得假新聞在台灣，社會的影響力有比其他國家更嚴重嗎？

3. Do you think the social influence of fake news in Taiwan is more serious than that of other countries?

我覺得比較嚴重一點點，因為台灣是1個民主社會，你說他民主也許就是太自由、民主了，所以我們每個人接收到訊息的管道非常非常的多元，因為我們不管是自媒體、傳統媒體、社會媒體，對於民眾的滲透力，真的非常的高，大概因為每個人都可以自媒體都可以胡說八道，到底是傳遞真的那個專業的知識給大家還是傳遞一些聳動的事情給民眾每個人都是1個自媒體都可以做，那其實我們也已經被法院認證過，有很多的網軍攻勢認知作戰，那在政治上面，政黨跟政黨之間都會覺得說啊。你就是認知作戰認知作戰，我們的執政黨也常講說，國防部、外國的勢力在做認知作戰，所以到底是不是認知作戰這件事情，我覺得這樣子應該是假訊息假新聞，還有造謠，這件事情在台灣，我覺得還是相當的嚴重，因為好像每個人張口就來啊。最近這幾天不是比較嚴重的就是那個館長嗎？說要斬首元首，然後他事後又出來辯稱，我不知道各位同學如果從頭到尾看完，你覺得他是在辯稱？他就真的他就真的去鼓動大家要去斬首我們的元首要斬首那個賴清德，雖然我跟他不同政黨啦我不希望，我也不希望館長這樣子，胡說八道，所以館長這個事件它是假訊息還是假新聞？還是他根本就是靠了這個社會的自由的程度在胡說八道，有時候就是講話講過頭了，有時候我們要禍從口出你要記得有時候你講話對一些社會的世界新聞，你還是要做到，你要查證，或者是要稍微節制，而不是毫無克制的，想怎麼樣就怎麼樣，我覺得這也會是造成社會上面的一種，她已經不是恐懼它是老百姓有一半會是憤怒一半會覺得說1個老百姓怎麼可以胡說八道，我們再怎麼不喜歡賴清德我們也不需要去講說要斬首那個元首這種話，對啊我也不喜歡賴清德跟大家講一下。

I think it's a little more serious, because Taiwan is a democratic society, maybe it's too free and democratic, so each of us receives information through very diverse channels, because whether we are self-media, traditional media, or social media, the penetration of the people is really very high, probably because everyone can do the self-media, and you can talk nonsense. Is it really to pass on professional knowledge to everyone, or to pass on some shrugging things to the people? Everyone can be self-media. In fact, we have also been certified by the court, and there are many online military offensive cognitive operations. In terms of politics, political parties will think that you are a cognitive war. Our ruling party also often says that the Ministry of Defense and foreign forces are doing cognitive warfare, so whether it is a cognitive warfare or not. I think this should be fake news, and rumors in Taiwan, I think It's still quite serious, because it seems that everyone will talk through one's hat. Isn't it the 館長(name of the YouTuber) that is more serious these days? He said that he would behead the head of state, and then he came out to argue afterwards. I don't know if

you think he is arguing if you read it from beginning to end. He really urged everyone to behead our head of state and behead Lai Qing de. Although I have different political parties from him, I don't want 館長 to talk nonsense like this, so is the incident of 館長 fake news or fake news? Or is he simply talking nonsense based on the degree of freedom of this society? Sometimes it's just overstep the mark, and sometimes words cause harm. You should remember that sometimes you speak to some world news in the society. You still have to do it. You have to verify it, or you have to be a little restrained, not without restraint. You can do whatever you want. I think this will also cause a kind of society. It's no longer fear. Half of the common people will be angry and half will think that how can a commoner talk nonsense? No matter how much we don't like Lai Qingde, we don't need to talk about beheading the head of state. Yes, I don't like Lai Qingde to tell everyone.

4. 選舉期間的假訊息特別多，立法院能採取哪些機制去協助或預防處理這件事

4. There is a lot of fake news during the election. What mechanisms can the Legislative Yuan take to assist or prevent this matter?

選舉是為了選贏嘛。所以我覺得這種各種不同的那種胡說八道都會出來，到底是為了製造自己的個人聲量還是說為了要選贏，特地去放這種訊息，因為在選民的心目中，有一種盲從的心理選舉是這樣的，它就是盲從的心理，我對這個候選人我可能不認識他，但是透過他大大的去宣傳，那可能就會開始增加他的好感度比如說，最近的國民黨的黨主席的選舉那大家都覺得說誰講的比較好呢？那大家都覺得鄭麗文很會講，那張亞中老師也很會講啊。所以有時候是選舉上面，為了勝選，為了要贏，他可能就會講話誇大了，那他也不經查證，他可能就是隨口就講出來，所以我覺得誇大這個訊息的內容，他可能是一分真九分假，我們很多政論節目裡頭都這樣，一分真，只有一分是事實，其他的都是他自己編造出來的，所以很多人家說政論節目都是那個，可以去當編審當編劇，但是我覺得立法院是這樣，立法院跟立法委員本身應該要自律啦。因為我覺得自律很重要，就是說你自己不可以變成那個造謠中心嘛。你可以自己不可以變成你不可以為了搏得聲量或搏得新聞版面或搏得眼球大家這些年輕的學生喜歡然後就胡說八道，我覺得以前印象中，中二選區那個三Q哥啊。那選舉的時候講的，我不知道你們聽得懂台灣話？我覺得這個自己不可以變成假新聞的製造中心，再來等一下我們會可能會談到那個數位中介服務法，這件事情其實有很多歐盟的這個數位服務法是值得我們去學習的啦。所以我覺得立法委員本身要有這樣的1個責任，而且立委的臉書、ig跟、Thread我覺得都很有影響力，也是1個可以釐清假訊息的地方好下一題。

Elections are for winning. So I think all kinds of different voices will come out. Is it to create their own personal buzz, or to release this kind of news in order to win the election? Because in the minds of voters, there is a kind of blind psychology. Election is like this. It is the psychology of blind obedience. I may not know this

candidate. But through his extensive publicity, it may begin to increase his goodwill. For example, in the recent election of the chairman of the Kuomintang, who do you think is better? Everyone thinks that Zheng Liwen is very good at talking, and Mr. Zhang Yazhong is also very good at talking, so sometimes in order to win, he may exaggerate his speech, then he has not been verified, he may just say it casually, so I think exaggerating the content of this news, he may be one point true and nine points false. Many of our political programs It's all like this. One point is true, only one point is the truth, and the rest is made up by himself. Therefore, many people who talk about political programs can become screenwriters. But I think the Legislative Yuan is like this. The Legislative Yuan and the legislators themselves should be self-disciplined. Because I think self-discipline is very important, that is, you can't become the center of rumors. You can't make these young students like it and then talk nonsense in order to beat the volume or the news page or the eyeball. I remember that in my previous impression, Chen Bai wei, the second constituency of Taichung, spoke during the election. I don't know if you can understand Taiwanese dialect? I don't think I can become the manufacturing center of fake news. After a while, we may talk about the <Digital Intermediary Service Law>. In fact, there are many things in the European Union. The <Digital Service Law> is worth learning. Therefore, I think the legislators themselves should have such a responsibility. Moreover, I think the legislator's Facebook, IG and Thread are very influential, and it is also a place to clarify fake information. Ok next.

5. 那像你剛剛說很多立委，他們的社群媒體都非常有影響力。那你覺得這些數位平台假新聞治理中應該要付多大的責任？

5. As you just said, many legislators are very influential. How much responsibility do you think these digital platforms should pay in the management of fake news?

要負一定的責任，但是是不是都是他們的責任？這個全部把責任歸給他們我覺得也不公平，因為他們可能就是1個公開的平台，那當然他們需要去審理，太誇張了他可能就必須要從後台去阻止，但是有一些他可能也沒辦法，大大小小他都去審核到啦。但是平臺是有要有一定的責任，因為他們自己本身掌握了，現在有很多的演算法很聳動的，怎麼去推播出去這件事情我覺得他們自己要有應該有相對的責任，要把這種假訊息和假新聞壓到最低、最低，那但是也不可以讓平台自己去決定說他是假新聞還是他不是假新聞所以我覺得等一下我覺得你們的題目今天訂的很好，會談到一些公正的第三方跟政府的規範，我覺得這是要規範清楚，到底他的責任歸屬的範圍到哪裡這個是很重要的。

They have to bear certain responsibilities, but not all of them are their responsibility. I don't think it's fair to attribute all the responsibility to them, because they may be an open platform. Of course, they need to be tried. If it's too exaggerated, he may have to stop it from the backstage, but there are some of them that he may

have nothing he can do. It's difficult. All of them have been reviewed. However, the platform has certain responsibilities, because they themselves have the management power. Now there are many algorithms that are very shrugging. How to overturn this matter? I think they should have a relative responsibility to minimize such fake news and fake news. However, you can't let the platform decide whether he is fake news or not, so I think your topic is very good today. It will talk about some fair third parties and government norms. I think it is very important to standardize clearly. It is very important what the scope of his responsibility is.

6. 你認為政府或立法院可以怎麼做讓更多人願意相信核查的結果

6. What do you think the government or the Legislative Yuan can do to make more people believe in the results of the verification?

怎麼去相信？我們都不大相信我們的政府現在講的話，所以我的態度是這樣子啦。齁，政府跟立法院要做的就是要跟這些查核組織或團體，我後面有寫啦我們台灣有幾個有3個已經經過認證的齁，那就要保持一定的距離，我講的是保持一定的距離，可以合作，但是我覺得不可以有一些經費的支持，要不然的話就會變成被他們操縱，所以呢跟這些政府跟立法院要跟這些查核的組織或團體保持一定的距離，那因為查核中心最常詬病的就是他們跟政府走太近，執政黨就會利用這種這些單位，因為他們覺得大家都會相信他，他一定是查核中心的，所以查核這件事情呢，我覺得只要是經過這個國際事實查核聯盟，就是IFCN的1個認證，因為有拿到認證的標章，因為這個IFCN他們每年會對這些查核單位做一些公開，還有一些的評審，那所以他們要一定要做到一定的公佈一些事實那一些查核的一些事項，那他們隔1年他們才會給他們標章，所以只要拿到這個標章，我覺得基本上，我們就給予信任吧，也不能夠說到最後什麼都不信任。

How to believe it? We don't believe what our government either now. So my attitude is like this. What the government and the Legislative Yuan should do is to check with these inspection organizations or groups. I wrote later that there are three of them in Taiwan that have been certified, and a certain distance should be kept. What I said is that keeping a certain distance can be cooperated, but I don't think there should be some financial support. Otherwise, it will be manipulated by them, so these governments and the Legislative Yuan should keep a certain distance from these verification organizations or groups, because the most commonly criticised by the verification center is that they are too close to the government, and the ruling party will take advantage of these units, because they think everyone will believe him, and he must be Check the center, so check this matter, I think as long as it goes through this international fact check alliance, it is a certification of IFCN, because there is a certification seal, because of this IFCN, they will make some public to these verification units every year, and there are also some evaluations, so they must do it.

When it comes to some announced checked matters, they will not give the mark every other year, so as long as we get this mark, I think basically, we will give trust, and we can't say that we don't trust anything in the end.

7. 請問您對於中介服務法草案的看法？

7. What do you think about the draft <Digital Services Act>?

這個，我上一屆第十屆在立法院，我開了很多公聽會，我跟那個國民黨的那個周韻采，她好像是淡大的教授，周韻采教授，開了公聽會。其實這個法案，基本上，是我也想要推的，但是他有一些中間的行政單位送來的一些法案，裡頭就有一些管制跟一些就是手段，好像就會變成他可能他手上握有利器，所以我覺得數位中介法是應該要推啦。而且也是必要的，這個方向是必要的，因為剛剛講說在歐盟也有這樣子的 1 個法案，但是因為它很容易被利用來做言論的審查，所以要判斷什麼是假訊息，什麼是違法的，這些都應該不是行政單位說了算，所以這個法裡頭應該要優化一點，應該要交由司法單位來判定，因為最後能夠判定你有沒有違法的還是司法單位。

I was in the Legislative Yuan of the last term, the tenth term. I held a lot of public hearings. I held public hearings with Zhou Yun cai of the Kuomintang, who seemed to be a professor of Danda. Professor Zhou Yun cai. In fact, this bill, basically, I also want to push it, but he has some bills sent by the middle administrative unit, in which there are some controls and some means, which seems to become a possible tool for him, so I think the <Digital Services Act> should be pushed. And it is also necessary. This direction is necessary, because it was just said that there is also such a bill in the European Union, but because it is easily used for the censorship of speech, it is necessary to judge what is fake news and what is illegal. These should not be decided by the administrative unit, so this law should To optimize, it should be handed over to the judicial unit to judge, because in the end, it can determine whether you are illegal or not.

8. 那您認為政府應該如何在就是審核假訊息跟保障我們的言論自由之間取得平衡？

8. So how do you think the government should strike a balance between reviewing fake news and protecting our freedom of speech?

這個剛剛講過，政府要先做好 1 個管制法規的框架，就像數位服務法、數位市場法對這些數位媒體的平台要有基本的這些管制架構，比如說每年要有一些評鑑，每年要有一些考核，那再來就是言論自由並不可以說毫無上限，剛剛講過，你不可以信手拈來，隨口就罵就公然的毀謗或公然的侮辱，我想這個都不可以啦。那像剛剛講的，最後，當然還是要由司法單位來做，所以可能當有在放小消息的時候，這些單位基本上動作可能就是要快，就是要快來來釐清這個這個事實，那這個上一屆的草案，我覺得應該可以再拿出來優化，那我覺

得最重要的是跟民眾的溝通，我不曉得同學對這個數位中介的服務法有沒有什麼樣一定的認識，我覺得這是如果你們在學校裡頭是相關地科系，我覺得這是要幫忙立法院來推的，立法院有 1 個就是那個，這個就是可以來拜訪各個立委來推廣這個法案，但是有一些有一些條文是行政單位自己加上去的管制啊。或是怎麼樣，我覺得是不可以讓行政單位自己隨便去加一些法條，那我個人認為是這樣，這個政策的形成一定是民意、專業、價值，這個法是我個人認為是在這一兩年內是勢必要推的，所以如果你們學校或老師或者是同學有興趣的話，應該就是要到立法院去做這個法案的催生者，那 1 個政策的形成，剛剛講過了，民意、專業、價值，民意的大概可以做那個民調，那再來就是要辦公聽會，找各個人都來發表他們對於這個數位中介法的看法。那專業的部分要找一些專業來做研討會，透過每 1 場，然後公聽會基本上要多辦幾場，因為可能要跟不同的 TA 跟不同的民眾做溝通，所以呢？這個民意專業價值就是價值這件事情，因為台灣目前假訊息跟假新聞的氾濫，所以我覺得我們需要有這一套數位中介服務法，那如何讓它把它優化一點，那我覺得這個是可以走的方向

第九題，怎麼樣去修法我覺得我不曉得你們對那個歐盟的那套法案有沒有研究，可以把它拿出來研究一下啦齁，因為我覺得法案要剛剛講過，要更明確要更接地氣，那因為我們不像歐盟那麼多的資源，跟法律去支撐，它寫的是很細很細很細的喔。就比如說某個記者發了 1 個新聞，那後面的人要跟的話基本上他是要付費的喔但是因為那個太細節了，現在就是新聞一大抄嘛。有 1 個新聞出來，後面的記者每一家報紙都哇，等一下就會全部一窩蜂去抄他，那抄了，有時候第一時間是對的，可是後面越講就越誇張，然後就沒有去做審查的 1 個動作，所以我覺得不需要照抄啦。但是我覺得可以去做參考，那就是說平台要多少，比如說平台要多少規模，才能夠去認證，致力機制的鼓勵跟推動，還有第三方認證機制的加入我覺得這個都可以放到法案裡頭來來來推行。

As mentioned just now, the government should first make a framework for regulating laws and regulations, just like the digital service law. The digital market law should have a basic control structure for these digital media platforms, for example, there should be some evaluations every year, some assessments every year, and then freedom of speech cannot be said to have no upper limit. Just mentioned, You can't just slander or insult openly. I don't think this is allowed. That's as I just said. In the end, of course, it should be done by judicial units, so maybe when there is little news, these units may basically act quickly to clarify this fact. I think the last draft should be taken out and optimized. I think the most important thing is to have a gap with the people. Tong, I don't know if you have a certain understanding of the service law of this digital intermediary. I think if you are in the relevant department in the school, I think this is to help the Legislative Yuan to promote it. The Legislative Yuan has one that can visit various legislators to promote this bill, but there are some

provisions that the administrative unit The control that has been added. I don't think you can let the administrative unit add some legal provisions at will. Personally, I think so. The formation of this policy must be public opinion, professionalism and value. I personally think that this law is bound to be promoted in the next two years, so if your school or teachers or classmates are interested, you should Go to the Legislative Yuan to be the initiator of this bill. The formation of the policy has just been mentioned. Public opinion, professionalism, value, public opinion can probably do a poll. Then it is necessary to hold a hearing in the office and find everyone to express their views on this bill. The professional part needs to find some experts to hold seminars, and then there are basically more public hearings, because they may have to communicate with different TAs and different people, so what? The professional value of public opinion is this matter. Because of the current proliferation of fake news in Taiwan, I think we need to have this set of digital intermediary service methods. How to optimize it? Then I think this is the direction we can go.

Question 9, how to amend the law. I don't know if you have studied the EU's bill. You can take it out and study it, because I think the bill should be clearer and more down-to-earth, because we don't have so many resources as the EU to support the law. It is written in great detail, for example, a reporter. A news was posted. If the people behind him want to follow, he basically has to pay, because that's too detailed. Now it's mutual copying of news. When a news comes out, all the reporters behind will plagiarize. Sometimes it's right at the first time, but the more you talk later, the more exaggerated it is, and then there is no review. One action, so I don't think it's necessary to copy it. But I think it can be used as a reference, that is to say, how much the platform needs, for example, how much scale the platform needs to be to be authenticated, the encouragement and promotion of the committed mechanism, and the addition of the third-party authentication mechanism. I think this can be implemented in the bill.

9. 未來如果再遇到大型的選舉您希望台灣透過哪些政策來解決假新聞的問題

9. If there is another large-scale election in the future, what policies do you want Taiwan to adopt to solve the problem of fake news?

其實我們台灣很機車，你知道我們的中選會裡頭有 1 個中選會的那個事實查核中心但是他基本上，都沒有發揮效果，那我覺得大型的選舉，因為幾乎台灣現在變成搞得每 1 年都在選舉，我覺得最重要的就是教育跟透明的機制。那教育的話，可以把這個課程加到媒體識讀的教育，其實從小學就要小學生就要開始教，我們教他新聞的小學生裡頭最會散播假新聞的，你知道嗎？就是他會告訴你，說那個什麼穿哪 1 個鞋子會長不高啊。喝什麼飲料會長高啊喝什麼飲料會讓你骨骼會長的很高，那對一些媽媽或一些比較矮個子的家長或個人就覺得說我應該要去喝什麼，其實他都是不爭事實，也沒有醫學認證的，所以我跟

你講可能大人的世界裡頭都關心在社會議題跟政治，可是其實很多的假訊息，不實的訊息應該說不實的民間的一些傳說啦。其實在更小的在社區裡頭跟小學裡頭更容易被傳播，所以另外，我覺得是媒體識讀要從小就要開始教。另外，當然選舉期間政府跟選委會可以提供即時的查核平台，其實有做啦但是因為他沒有去做查核。那像美國的選舉，他有那個什麼 Fact Check Election Center 它就是 1 個事實的查核中心，那集中澄清，他們每天都很忙，她就每個候選人發了哪些訊息，他們都會去查證，那有一半，真一半假，他們也會去幫忙做某部份講的是真的，但是某部分是偽證查證的，要請候選人要自己節制，所以第 1 個，當然政治人物自己要自律不要隨便去散播，這種假訊息再來就是說不要為了自己的聲量而到處去罵人家因為其實你罵人，這些人很有聲量但長時間來講，基本上他們是人格信用破產了，我覺得也不想要叫學生去做這種事情那再來就是說，畢竟假消息不是 1 天造成的，他沒有辦法靠 1 條法律就可以解決，還是要靠很多的，其實從教育做起，我覺得是 1 件比較實在的 1 個理論。

In fact, Taiwanese are a real pain in the butt. You know that there is a fact-checking center in our Chinese election, but it basically has no effect. Then I think large-scale elections, because almost Taiwan now has elections every year, I think the most important thing is education and transparency. In fact, elementary school students must start teaching from elementary school. It means that he will tell you that what shoes you wear will not grow taller. What drinks will make you taller, what drinks will make your bones grow taller, then for some mothers or some shorter parents or individuals who think what I should drink, in fact, they are all indisputable facts, and there is no medical certification, so I tell you that maybe the adult world is concerned about social issues and politics. But in fact, there is a lot of false information, and false information should tell some false folk legends. In fact, it is easier to spread in smaller communities and elementary schools, so in addition, I think media literacy should be taught from an early age. In fact, Taiwanese are a real pain in the butt. You know that there is a fact-checking center in our Chinese election, but it basically has no effect. Then I think about large-scale elections, because almost Taiwan now. In fact, elementary school students must start teaching from elementary school. It means that he will tell you that what shoes you wear will not grow taller. What drinks will make you taller, what drinks will make your bones grow taller, then for some mothers or some shorter parents or individuals who think what I should drink, in fact, they are all indisputable facts, and there is no medical certification, so I tell you that maybe the adult world is concerned about social issues and politics. But in fact, there is a lot of false information, and false information should tell some false folk legends. In fact, it is easier to spread in smaller communities and elementary schools, so in addition, I think media literacy should be taught from an early age.

10. 那未來 ai 跟假訊息會越來越多，請問您知道政府有什麼因應的計畫

10. There will be more and more AI and fake news in the future. Do you know what the government plans to respond?

所以我們還是要推那個數位中介服務法，甚至我們的連 ai 的基本法都沒有，像是 ai 的基本法，我覺得也要去推，那當然我不是那個理工女，我對那個 ai 其實不是那麼的熟悉，但是現在學生你知道現在小學生好像從國三小三就要開始教，那個程式寫程式 coding 這件事情，所以他也許下一代的小朋友，他對於 ai 應該有一定的認識，所以我覺得也應該如果學校的教授跟同學有相關的，也應該去立法院鼓吹立法委員去寫 1 個 ai 基本法，你知道不是立法委員很厲害，他就知道要去修什麼法跟立什麼法，基本上是那個相對的社群，或者是社會人士，有覺得有需要，然後就會到立法院去做這個法案的催生，立法院有一個遊說法，在遊說法裡頭就可以民間團體來遊說立法委員去訂什麼樣的法案，我覺得同學可以好好的善用。

So we still have to push the <Digital Services Act>. We don't even have the basic law of AI. Like the basic law of AI, I think we should also push it. Of course, I'm not a girl in science and engineering. In fact, I'm not so familiar with AI. But now students, you know, primary school students seem to start teaching that program from the third grade of junior high school or the third grade of elementary school, programming and coding. So maybe the next generation of children should have a certain understanding of AI. So I think if the professors of the school is related to their classmates, they should also go to the Legislative Yuan to advocate legislators to write a basic law of AI. You know that not the legislators are very amazing. They know what kind of law to be revised and what kind of law to enact. Basically, it is the relative community, or the social people who feel it is necessary, and then they will go to the Legislative Yuan to promote this bill. The Legislative Yuan has a lobbying method. In the lobbying law, civil groups can lobby the legislators to make what kind of bill. I think students can use it well.

12. 台灣為了因應歐盟的數位服務法而提出的數位中介服務法，那你認為數位服務法中有哪些內容是可以提供台灣參考的

12. Regarding Taiwan's proposed Digital Intermediary Services Act in response to the EU's Digital Services Act, what aspects of the DSA do you believe could serve as references for Taiwan?

我們不用全部抄啦，但是有兩個概念值得學習，就是透明度的報告跟責任分析，剛剛講過了透明度的報告，他每 1 項他都會有 1 個年度的報告，那透明度這樣子可以有年底的報告之後，有 1 個評比，然後再來就是說他的責任應該要負擔到哪裡我覺得這個是 1 個很重要的，就是每年要去公開假訊息處理的一些數據、下架的數據去判斷他的原因跟演算法的規範，我覺得這些都是台灣可以學的，那責任的話，我覺得就是抓大放小，有些小小的，反正台灣是 1 個多

元，我一直有很大很大的容忍度，容忍台灣多元這個是我個人對於台灣社會，所以有時候我們做政治這條路上當然有很多人罵我，其實我都不在意我每次都說比我小的罵我我都不會去回嘴，因為我覺得這個是台灣社會，第1個是太自由，第2個是太苦悶了，第3個是大家(用一句那個大陸的用語)大家太內卷了，讓大家罵政治人物，我覺得也沒什麼關係，所以有時候這個人家社群在罵我，或是個人在罵我，就我個人來講，我是覺得無所謂啦。但是有的人當然他心裡會不舒服，因為我們以前也發生過這樣子的1個假訊息，我不曉得同學知不知道幾年前，日本駐大阪的1個事務處的1個處長就是因為有1個在日本的1個訊息，好像當年是日本是大地震，然後就是說我們的住大阪的辦事處的處長沒有協助台灣的人員去撤離還是怎樣，像這樣的假訊息出來，我覺得有我們一般人澄清就好了，可是這個處長後來就因為受不了，這樣的1個假訊息就跳樓自殺，所以不要因為你一句不經證實的話而去害了人家1條命，所以有時候真的自己要稍微要稍微節制一點。

We don't need to copy everything, but two concepts are worth learning: transparency reporting and accountability analysis. As mentioned earlier, transparency reporting requires an annual report for each item. This transparency allows for year-end reporting followed by an evaluation. Then comes the crucial question: where should responsibility lie? I believe Taiwan should learn to publicly disclose annual data on misinformation handling, removal metrics, and the rationale behind decisions along with algorithmic standards. Regarding accountability, I advocate focusing on major issues while overlooking minor ones. After all, Taiwan thrives on diversity, I've always maintained a very high tolerance for diversity in Taiwanese society. That's my personal stance. So naturally, in politics, many criticize me. Frankly, I don't care. I always say I won't retaliate against those smaller than me who criticize me, because I believe this is Taiwanese society. First, it's too free. Second, it's too stifling. The Third one is that everyone is overly competitive (is the catchphrases of China). Letting people criticize politicians doesn't bother me much. So when communities or individuals attack me, personally, I don't really care. But of course, some people might feel uncomfortable. We've had this kind of fake news before. I don't know if you remember, but a few years ago, a director at the Japanese consulate in Osaka was targeted because of a message circulating in Japan. I think it was during the big earthquake back then. and it claimed our Osaka office director failed to assist Taiwanese personnel in evacuating or something like that. When false information like this surfaces, I think ordinary people clarifying it should suffice. But that director later couldn't bear the pressure from such false information and jumped to his death. So don't let an unverified remark cost someone their life. Sometimes we really need to exercise a bit more restraint.

### 13.那您是否支持政府與民間第三方機構合作

### 13. Do you support government collaboration with third-party organizations?

我當然是支持啦。我支持合作這件事情，但是要有距離喔。因為我們的政府剛剛講過了，就是說像台灣，我有寫了3個單位，就是我去查了，台灣有3個單位，大概就有得到那個這個查核中心的1個認證，我覺得那個都做得還不錯，那政府可以在資料上面去協助，但是不可以去指揮，最重要的，它不可以去給經費，因為給錢的就大爺，那這些查核中心，我覺得或者是民間的這些團體可能就會有一些等於是變成他的護隨組織，我們現在都會罵說什麼很多都是什麼民進黨的一些側翼啊。什麼媒體啊。三明治啊。我們都這樣罵，那到底是不是有時候我們也只是心情不好就隨便罵，但是我們好像也沒有事實，但是有些人他確實是拿了很多的經費，所以我覺得政府可以再跟民間做合作上面，但是最好不要去指揮，那不指揮的最高原則就是不可以給他經費，我覺得沒有經費，就可以讓第三方的查證單位比較能夠公正的去做事。

那下一題就是延伸起來 如何才不會有政府干擾，當然就是要制度透明跟經費獨立，那政府可以提供這個公共資料的平台或技術的資源但是最好不要有經費上的往來，像 IFCN 的認證標準中它就會很看重他每年去評比他就會很看重這些查核的組織的資金的來源，他不可以是某個大企業的金主，他也不可以是某個政府單位，所以這個就會很重要那另外，查核報告也要公開，只要查核的過程，公開可以檢驗，那大家就會去相信他。

Of course, I support it. I support cooperation, but there must be boundaries. As our government just mentioned, in Taiwan, I identified three organizations that have obtained verification center certification. I believe they perform their work quite well. The government can assist with data but must not issue directives. Most crucially, it must not provide funding. Because whoever holds the purse strings becomes the boss. These verification centers, or civil society groups, might then become their de facto protective organizations. We often criticize how many are supposedly pro-DPP factions, certain media outlets, or the “sandwich trio” (Sanli TV, Civic TV, Liberty Times). We criticize them like this, but sometimes we just vent when we're in a bad mood without concrete evidence. However, some entities do receive substantial funding. Therefore, I believe the government should collaborate with the private sector but avoid directing them. The highest principle of non-direction is not providing funding. Without funding, third-party verification units can operate more impartially.

The next question builds on this: How can we prevent government interference? The answer lies in institutional transparency and funding independence. The government can provide public data platforms or technical resources, but it should avoid financial ties. For instance, the IFCN accreditation standards heavily scrutinize the funding sources of fact-checking organizations during annual evaluations. They cannot be funded by a major corporation nor by a government agency. This is crucial.

Additionally, fact-checking reports must be publicly accessible. As long as the verification process is transparent and open to scrutiny, people will trust it.

15. 那您認為政府在假新聞防治上應該扮演什麼角色？

15. So what role do you think the government should play in combating fake news?

政府的角色應該是支援，而不是主導啦。常常不小心就會變成是好像是政府在造謠，我最近好像最近我覺得今年特別嚴重，不知道各位同學有沒有感覺，就是今年那個大罷免之後，我們政府跟在野黨之間以及政府跟民間，現在我們連民間都不相信政府講的話了，像這一次那個堰塞湖造成地方的災情，為什麼會那麼多的鏟子英雄自己穿著雨鞋拿著鏟子坐著火車去幫忙，因為他覺得你政府，你之前你賴清德政府說什麼要爬屋頂，老百姓要自己爬，什麼國軍不可以進去救援，那當然政府現在明天就會發現說有這樣的災難，那等一下我們的那個，賴清德總統又在講說不能夠去救援，那所以老百姓就會自動自發，我覺得這一次就是1個很明顯，就是那個之前我們的國家領導人的講的一些話，跟政府講的一些話，造成的1個社會的現象，那我是不支持大家這樣子，大家要當志工很好啦。當鏟子英雄很好，但是一窩蜂1天一兩萬人湧進去，我跟你講，你想想看一兩萬人三餐要吃飯吃的，都是便當都是一次性的，那個造成的垃圾環境的垃圾污染，還有再來，妳吃了就要大小便你那個衛生怎麼辦呢？過了兩三個禮拜我跟你講，那個衛生的問題就會來了，地方的那個病菌的一些滋生就會來了，所以我個人，我是覺得你要當志工，因為其實花蓮慈濟的志工團很強，倒是可以去跟他們報到，說我如何配合你們，而不是自己想當那個鏟子英雄就拿了就去，最近不是有1個先生，因為這樣子而後來發生令人遺憾的意外，因為他其實他身體本來就不好了，但是他又很堅持去做這件事情，所以這個我是都不支持啦。那倒過來就是說，政府在假新聞的防治上應該扮演什麼樣的角色，像這樣子的1個救災防救災他要給其實我們的災防的指揮中心，第1個，要每天要給正確的訊息那我們的新聞媒體每天也應該要幫他們報導正確的訊息出去，所以政府的角色應該是支援，而不是去主導，政府自己要先傳遞正確的訊息，像最近連老百姓都不信任我們的內政部，我們的政府講出來的話是真的，我為了要發1個10000塊的，這個，不是從幾月份就說要發10000塊吵吵鬧鬧，你看我們的行政院長一下，說我們沒有錢，啊一下說啊我們要去借錢，一下說我們超徵了4500億，哪一句話是真的，錢發下來是真的啦。我覺得所以搞的這些你看像這樣子的1個要普發10000塊現金，哪句話是真的，像這種我覺得政府首先要自己坐到不要濫用認知作戰，不要大家老百姓也覺得你在濫用認知作戰，像這次這幾天為了那個花蓮的賑災金額，花蓮收了很多的捐款就分一分，他就發現每個人可以發50000塊，他說很快發下去，那我們的總統就說啊我們可以花200000，結果這些人是捐錢捐到行政院去，然後他就說這是政府出的錢，所以整個政府自己不要帶頭去，不是他也不是造謠，他就覺得說我花錢給你，你要懂得感激，我覺得我們的政府很怪啊。我雖然我雖然跟他不

同政黨，但是我其實我很少罵他，我覺得這是政黨自己要自制啦。不然老百姓真的會用選票去推翻他，所以也不要讓認知作戰，這種負面的名詞出來。

The government's role should be supportive, not leading. It often inadvertently ends up looking like the government is spreading rumors. I feel this has been especially severe this year. I wonder if you all have noticed. After the major recall this year, trust between our government and the opposition party, as well as between the government and the public, Now even the public doesn't trust what the government says. Take this recent landslide dam disaster causing local flooding. Why did so many volunteer heroes put on rain boots, grab shovels, and take the train to help? Because they felt the government, specifically the Lai Ching-te administration had previously said things like “climb onto rooftops,” and that the military couldn't enter to rescue people. Of course, the government will discover tomorrow that such a disaster exists. Then, our President Lai Ching-te will start saying again that rescue efforts can't be carried out. So, the people will take matters into their own hands. I think this time it's very clear, it's a social phenomenon caused by the words spoken by our national leaders and the government. I don't support everyone doing this. Volunteering is great, of course. Being a shovel hero is commendable, but when tens of thousands flood in all at once, let me tell you, think about it. Tens of thousands needing meals three times a day, all disposable takeout boxes. The resulting garbage, environmental pollution, and then what about sanitation when you need to relieve yourself? After a couple of weeks, I'll tell you, the sanitation issues will surface. Local bacteria will start breeding. So personally, I think if you want to volunteer, since the Tzu Chi volunteer group in Hualien is quite strong, you should actually register with them and say how you can assist their efforts. Don't just decide you want to be a shovel hero and grab one to go. Recently, there was a man who suffered a tragic accident because of this. His health was already poor, yet he insisted on doing it. I don't support that approach at all. Conversely, what role should the government play in combating fake news? In disaster prevention and relief efforts, the government should provide accurate information daily to our disaster command center. Similarly, our news media should help disseminate correct information. The government's role should be supportive, not directive. The government itself must first convey accurate information. Take the recent case where even ordinary citizens distrust our Ministry of the Interior. When our government makes a statement, it should be truthful. For instance, regarding the 10,000-dollar payment, it shouldn't be a chaotic mess where they announce it one month, then backtrack the next. Look at our Premier, one moment he says we have no money, the next he says we need to borrow, then he claims we over-collected NT\$450 billion. Which statement is true? The only truth is the money was distributed. I think this is why, when it comes to something like this universal NT\$10,000 cash handout,

no one knows which statement is true. In cases like this, I believe the government must first sit down and stop abusing cognitive warfare. so the public doesn't feel like you're abusing cognitive warfare. Like these past few days over the Hualien disaster relief funds. Hualien received a lot of donations and started distributing them. They found each person could get NT\$50,000, and they said it would be distributed quickly. Then our president said, "We can spend NT\$200,000." But these people donated directly to the Executive Yuan, so he claimed it was government money. The government shouldn't lead by example like this. It's not him spreading rumors; he just thinks, "I'm spending money on you, so you should be grateful." I find our government quite peculiar. Even though I'm not in the same party as him, I rarely criticize him. I think the party itself needs to exercise restraint. Otherwise, the people will truly use their votes to overthrow him. So let's not allow terms like "cognitive warfare" these negative labels to emerge.

16. 那你覺得這些國家的假新聞審查機制對台灣最有借鏡價值的是哪些國家？為什麼？

16. So which countries' fake news review mechanisms do you think offer the most valuable lessons for Taiwan? Why?

我提了兩個國家，這兩個國家你們可以去參考，第一個是芬蘭，芬蘭恐怕是全世界目前看起來應該是民主自由思想比較高，而且老百姓過得比較富裕跟自在的齁，那再來就是韓國，芬蘭因為他是從小就教育，他是從教育，那小學生就開始學媒體識讀，那政府不必審查，那是靠老百姓去判讀，老百姓自己就會覺得這是假訊息，他自己就會提報上去，那韓國他是在選舉期間設有什麼中央選舉委員會事實查核中心，其實我們也有啦。只是我們沒有運作，所以我們都是學別人，然後就學半套喔。看到哪個國家很好然後他就去把它學起來學了之後呢？他又沒有確實的確實的去執行，所以台灣可以學這種政府協助但是不主導模式，很難喔。我們的執政黨都很喜歡，他覺得他就是要控制老百姓，他以為他是中共，這個實在是他告訴我們，他不喜歡中共，我看我們更不喜歡中共，因為中共就是用這種很專制的方法在統治他的老百姓，那再來就是像最近大罷免期間，其實就是假消息滿天，那我覺得這一次的大罷免，我想一下這一次的大罷免，我覺得會成功，並不是國民黨多厲害啦。我覺得他們早就輸掉了，在4月初的時候，他們有31個立法委員被到二階都通過，31比零，國民黨就很弱啊。他們居然有31個被在第二階段的時候被通過，所以真正後來贏的我覺得是老百姓：中間選民就像你們這樣的1個學生中間選民，他並沒有看哪1個政黨的，我覺得大罷免這次贏的是我們台灣的老百姓，要給我們的執政黨1個教訓，叫他們不要造謠了，連政府都自己帶頭造謠，對大概大概就這樣，因為其實我這一次我也看到台灣民主，我有時候還蠻悲觀的，我覺得台灣是民主到太民粹了，但是在大罷免這一次的投票出來，這麼多中間的選民出來去告訴

執政黨，你不可以這樣胡作非為，我覺得好像我們台灣又有救了齁，所以我們一起加油。

I'll mention two countries for your reference. The first is Finland. Finland is arguably the world's most democratic and liberal society today, where citizens live relatively affluent and carefree lives. The other is South Korea. Finland starts with education, teaching media literacy from elementary school. The government doesn't need to censor; it relies on citizens to discern. People recognize fake news themselves and report it. South Korea sets up a Central Election Commission Fact-Checking Center during elections. We have something similar too. But ours isn't operational. So we just copy others halfway. We see a country doing something well, adopt it, but then fail to implement it properly. Taiwan could learn this model of government assistance without direct control, but it's tough. Our ruling party loves this approach, they think they must control the people. They act like the Chinese Communist Party, which ironically tells us they dislike the CCP. I think we dislike the CCP even more, because that's exactly how authoritarian regimes rule their citizens. Then there's the recent recall campaign, where fake news was everywhere. I believe this recall effort will succeed, I believe this recall effort succeeded not because the KMT is particularly formidable. They had already lost by early April when 31 of their legislators advanced to the second stage of recall, 31 to zero. That shows the KMT's weakness. The fact that 31 of them made it to the second stage means the real winners were the people: Swing voters like you, a student swing voter, don't just follow one party. I think the real winners of this recall are us, the people of Taiwan. We need to teach our ruling party a lesson: stop spreading rumors. Even the government itself is leading the charge in spreading rumors. That's pretty much it. Because honestly, this time I also saw Taiwan's democracy, and sometimes I'm quite pessimistic. I feel Taiwan has become too populist in its democracy. But with this recall vote, so many swing voters came out to tell the ruling party: you can't just run amok like this. It feels like Taiwan might still have hope, huh? So let's all keep pushing forward.

17. 你覺得台灣跟這些國家的機制相比我們可以效仿哪些有效的然後那我們的不足之處是在哪裡

17. Compared to the mechanisms in these countries, what effective practices do you think Taiwan can emulate? And where do you see our shortcomings?

我覺得我們的民間沒有比別人差啦。台灣有民間的查核能量，事實上是很強，而且有很多義勇軍啊。自動自發去查核這些假訊息，假消息的，我覺得還蠻多的齁，那我上面有寫啦。我們台灣目前至少有三間，三家的民間組織，有獲得 IFCN 的認證，分別就是事實查核中心、My Go Pen 然後再來就是全民查假會社，那其實他們的力量都還蠻強的，那大家為什麼還是覺得假消息假訊息很多真的剛剛就講了，連我們的政府、執政黨本身都每天在散播不實的消息，這

個就是好像家裡的長輩帶頭造謠，你覺得我們會不會很嚴重？但是我們的民間力量我覺得我們不要去忽視它，我覺得我還是要支持民間的力量還是很強大的所以最重要的就是政府不要去干預，我們的執政黨常常想要去干預這些單位，想要給他們經費，那就覺得他們要聽他的話，最明顯的就是大家都知道說他們每年花很多的媒體預算，在三明治（三立電視、民間全民電視公司、自由時報），這個這些比較綠的媒體上面啊。最近其實有1個議題，我看我們黨都沒有人敢提啦但是我會稍微想拿出來討論，就是我們的黃國昌主席，這個養狗仔這件事情，這個無關乎假訊息或真訊息啦。因為他看起來他沒有否認，但是因為他應該是還沒有當立委的時候，他就在那個揭弊者協會，他揭弊者協會裡頭在做這件事情，那當然他一定會跟某些媒體的記者，一定會有合作，那這件事情，會比較讓大家詬病的就是說其實因為他已經去當了立法委員他有1個公權力的身份在，第2就是他後來柯主席後來不在他還去接了民眾黨的黨主席，當1個黨基本上是1個公益團體，所以它有這兩雙重身分，然後他再去利用這個揭弊者協會去養這些人當然大家講的大白話叫狗仔，其實就是說跟媒體合作啦跟媒體合作去跟蹤這件事情，就法律上可能沒有辦法，但是在就是觀點上面，大家會覺得太不可思議了1個黨的黨主席，然後1個立法委員去做這樣的事情，確實是不適合啦。我倒覺得這是額外延伸可以讓同學自己去討論，你說他犯法嗎？可能沒有，那大家就觀念不好，有記者來問我我說啊。他如果很想當狗仔，那就把黨主席跟立委辭掉，回到民間我覺得他就是民間的某1個查核中心，對不對是不是，就是這樣而且是很強的查核中心你看你要從哪個角度切入去討論這件事情，他如果沒有這些公權力的身分在，沒有這些公益團體的身分在，那他就是1個民間的揭弊者協會，她鼓勵大家有哪裡有弊案去跟他講，然後他跟哪些媒體去合作，這個就是1個很強的事實查核中心，對那就看你從哪個角度去思考他，但是看起來我們黨中沒有人替他出來講話，我是替他講講話啦。那就是你想當這種事實查核中心，我覺得我也是鼓勵，但是不要有這些公共的身分在，阿不然你看那個民進黨只會罵他啊。我們黨都沒有出來出來聽他講話，好像也不大對，就是1件事情看你從哪個角度去做評判，這個也許你們同學，你們都已經大四了，可以在這件事情上面可以去討論一下，我是支持大家來拿出來討論了。

I don't think our civil society is any worse than others. Taiwan has strong civil fact-checking capabilities, and there are many volunteers who proactively investigate fake news and misinformation. I mentioned this earlier. Currently, Taiwan has at least three civil society organizations certified by the IFCN: the Fact-Checking Center, My Go Pen, and the All-Citizen Fake News Investigation Society. Their capabilities are quite robust. So why do people still perceive an abundance of fake news? As mentioned earlier, even our government and ruling party disseminate inaccurate information daily. It's like having the family elders leading the charge in spreading rumors, don't you think that's a serious problem? But I believe we shouldn't overlook

the strength of our civil society. I still support the powerful force of these grassroots organizations. The most crucial thing is for the government not to interfere. Our ruling party often tries to meddle with these groups, wanting to control them financially, expecting them to follow their orders. The most obvious example is how everyone knows they spend a huge media budget annually on the “sandwich” media (Sanli TV, People's Television, Liberty Times). These outlets lean more toward the green camp. Recently, there's been one issue that I haven't seen anyone in our party dare to bring up, but I'd like to discuss it briefly. It concerns our Chairman Huang Kuo-chang and this whole paparazzi-hiring affair. This has nothing to do with fake news or real news. He hasn't denied it, but since he was involved with the Whistleblowers Association before becoming a legislator, he must have collaborated with certain media reporters. What's particularly problematic is that after becoming a legislator, he holds public authority. Second, after Chairman Ko stepped down, he took over as chairman of the People's Party. Essentially, a party functions as a public interest organization. So he held these dual roles. Then he used the Whistleblowers Association to fund these people what everyone bluntly calls paparazzi. Essentially collaborating with the media to track this story. Legally, it might be unactionable, but from a perspective standpoint, it seems utterly unbelievable for a party chairman and legislator to engage in such activities. It's certainly inappropriate. I see this as an extension for students to discuss: Did he break the law? Probably not. But it reflects poor ethics. When reporters asked me, I said, If he's so eager to be a paparazzo, he should resign as party chair and legislator and return to civilian life. I see him as a civilian fact-checking center, right? Exactly. And a powerful one at that. It depends on your perspective. Without his public authority or NGO status, he'd be a civilian whistleblower association. She encourages people to report corruption cases to her, then she collaborates with media outlets. That's a powerful fact-checking center. Right? It depends on your perspective. But it seems no one in our party is speaking up for her. I'm speaking up for her. If you aspire to be such a fact-checking center, I encourage it, but without these public affiliations. Otherwise, look at how the DPP only criticizes him. It doesn't seem quite right that no one from our party has come forward to listen to him either. It all depends on your perspective. Perhaps you students, since you're all seniors now, can discuss this matter. I support everyone bringing it up for discussion.

18. 那您認為未來台灣針對假新聞的查核機制可以如何改進？

18. So how do you think Taiwan's fact-checking mechanisms for fake news could be improved in the future?

我剛剛講過了，我們可以就是芬蘭跟韓國，那以這一次的光復風災來講，就是整個剛剛也講過了，這個災防中心每天要給正確的資訊，那其實政府應該要有1個公正，我們有1個NCC大家知道嗎？大家都知道，但是現在在野黨都

多麼希望把 NCC 廢掉，因為第一他沒有功能，第二他好像變成執政黨的這個東廠，大家都覺得他好像附和，而我們的執政黨這幾年好像他不是站在 1 個很公正的地方，這個就會變成是整個社會好像亂源的開始，所以 NCC 這一題呢？其實基本上呢？你們同學也可以拿出來做討論，也可以設計幾個題目去問人家，我到底我們 NCC 存在的目的是什麼那目前這些人到底有的功能是什麼我們看不出它的功能，它比我們這個名間這 3 個查核中心都還要弱，比黃國昌的那個查核中心還弱，他都沒有在查核，所以我們每年你知道我們每年還要花很多，錢去養 NCC 這些委員，還有 1 個 NCC 還有 1 棟很大棟的在交通部，在那個仁愛路跟杭州南路上面，1 棟很大棟的建築物，這個都是浪費國家的公帑，而沒有沒有真正發揮的效果，所以你想想看在公家機關裡頭，有 ncc 在，民間裡頭現在目前認證的有 3 個單位，那黃國昌也是另外 1 個單位啦。我覺得他是 1 個很強的 1 個查核中心，只是就是他目前不適合，如果它是 1 個民間人士，我倒給他很高的評價，所以我覺得這些都是同學可以值得去延伸去討論的，我想你們應該可以好好討論，因為我覺得你們這些題目都設計得很好來下一題

As I just mentioned, we can look to Finland and South Korea. Take the recent Typhoon Hato disaster as an example as discussed earlier, the Disaster Prevention Center must provide accurate information daily. The government should establish an impartial body. We have the NCC, right? Everyone knows it exists, but now the opposition parties are so eager to abolish the NCC. First, it lacks functionality. Second, it seems to have become the ruling party's secret police. Everyone feels it just echoes the party line. And our ruling party in recent years doesn't seem to stand on a truly impartial ground. This creates a source of chaos for the whole society. So, the NCC issue? Basically? You students can also bring this up for discussion. You can design a few questions to ask people: What exactly is the purpose of our NCC's existence? What functions do these people currently have? We can't see its functions. It's weaker than our three private audit centers, weaker than Huang Kuo-chang's audit center. It doesn't even conduct audits. So every year, you know, we still have to spend a lot of to maintain these NCC commissioners. Plus, the NCC occupies a massive building at the Ministry of Transportation, right where Ren'ai Road meets Hangzhou South Road. That huge structure is a waste of public funds without delivering real results. Think about it: within government agencies, we have the NCC, while the private sector currently has three certified units, Huang Kuo-chang's being another one. I believe it could be a very strong verification center, but it's currently unsuitable. If it were run by private citizens, I would give it high praise. So I think these are topics worth exploring further in class. I believe you can have a good discussion because I think these questions are very well designed. Let's move on to the next one.

19. 想問您，覺得台灣是否要建立一套屬於我們自己的官方審查機制來防止假新聞氾濫，為什麼？

19. I'd like to ask you: Do you think Taiwan should establish its own official review mechanism to prevent the proliferation of fake news? Why?

我是不支持官方的審查機制，那個就是 NCC 嘛。還是你們下次再來做個問卷 NCC 如何改進？

現在你看我們的官方機構就是 NCC 啊對不對？那 NCC 其實是目前沒有 function 沒有功能，那可能大家又有許多的話語，比如說民進黨可能就是說因為那個什麼在野黨刪掉他的預算，然後讓他的委員沒辦法選舉，其實倒過來，為什麼他們會刪那預算，因為他沒有發揮它該有的，就是公家機關領錢不辦事嘛齁，啊這些委員呢又很偏頗，所以基本上是好啦。我不支持官方的審查機制，因為審查這件事情就最後就很容易變成政治的工具，我覺得不要讓政府單位有審查權，因為最後其實是司法單位說了算，所以呢就是最後我們要讓民間的力量來發揮，那如果真的有問題的話，再把他引導進入司法階段，我覺得這會比較能夠服眾，那我個人剛剛講過，我是 1 個支持多元文化的，所以有時候你講錯話，有時候你有一些雜音，我覺得也還可以接受，但是我們不可以讓政府決定誰可以講話誰不能講話我覺得認定上是每個人都可以講話，但是你要為你所講的話負責任齁，如果你不經查實就信口捻來，我覺得那就自己要負責任，我不知道館長的下場是什麼，它就是 1 個標準的信口捻來要斬首元首地誇大的話啦。那我覺得我們要建立的不是審查機制，而是讓整個資訊透明全民都可以去查核，全民都可以去查好下一題嗎？

I don't support an official review mechanism, that's the NCC, right? Or should you conduct a survey next time on how the NCC could improve?

Currently, our official institution is the NCC, correct? Well, the NCC currently lacks functionality. People have various opinions, like the DPP might say it's because the opposition party cut its budget, preventing its commissioners from being elected. But conversely, why did they cut that budget? Because it wasn't fulfilling its duties. It's a government agency taking money without doing its job, right? Plus, these commissioners are biased. So basically, I don't support official censorship mechanisms. Censorship easily becomes a political tool. I believe government agencies shouldn't hold censorship powers. Ultimately, the judiciary should decide. We need to empower civil society. If real issues arise, guide them into the judicial process, which I believe would be more convincing to the public. As I mentioned earlier, I personally support multiculturalism. So sometimes you might say the wrong thing, sometimes there might be some noise, and I think that's acceptable. But we cannot let the government decide who can speak and who cannot. I believe the principle is that everyone can speak, but you must take responsibility for what you say. If you make unfounded claims without verification, you must bear the consequences. I don't know what the curator's fate will be, but it's a classic case of reckless exaggeration, like demanding the head of a leader over baseless accusations.

What we need to establish isn't a censorship mechanism, but a system of transparency where all information is publicly verifiable. Everyone should be able to fact-check. Alright, next question.

20. 那如果我們不設置的話，你覺得我們應該要如何改善台灣未來將會面臨的困境

20. If we don't establish these measures, how do you think we should improve the challenges Taiwan will face in the future?

跟 3 位同學講那麼多我覺得就從三部分來第 1 個是從小的教育，從小的媒體識讀的教育很重要，那可能大人的世界關心的是政治議題，但是在民間小孩子方面，我比較關心的是他們的健康跟資訊對不對的議題，道聽塗說，尤其是年輕的父母親，為了讓小孩子變聰明什麼聰明丸吃了會聰明，然後呢什麼跳繩跳了會變高這個我倒覺得我比較關心的是這些事情，第 1 個是從教育，第二是透明，政府就本身就是要公開資訊，我們以前早年在 2015 還是 2016 唐鳳剛當政委的時候，蔡英文總統找他來當政委的時候，那時候他們在政府單位有 1 個叫做，叫做什麼公開政府，他們去辦，就類似政府要公開、透明的意思，想到再寫給你們好了，反正他們就是當時就是在推，後來慢慢的，有很多的資訊都這樣放上去的就是公開資訊，公開資訊就是把政府的每 1 個訊息都是公開資訊，那也因為那樣子，後來不是大家都覺得說能源的發電，所以你現在上台電的 1 個網站上面，你可以看到每天到底我們的煤炭發電占幾趴，我們的火力發電占幾趴，那個都是後來就是政府的公開透明的那個網站之後再推廣之後，她慢慢很多的政府資訊就放到網站上面去，讓民間去查，我覺得這個政府只要把開放資料放到網站上面去就好了，那讓民間去做這樣子的 1 個查核的速度，應該就還可以那我覺得剛剛講過，對於假訊息跟假消息，因為它來得快，但是呢？我覺得官方常常是慢半拍，所以關鍵要改進的關鍵不是多 1 條法律，而是這個反應的速度，我們的 NCC 雖然沒有任何反應，反應的速度跟信任機制，所以讓民間來做這樣的 1 個反應速度跟信任，而且民間來查的話相對的增加了這樣的 1 個信任機制，這是我的想法。

After discussing so much with the three students, I believe we should focus on three areas. First is education from a young age, media literacy education is crucial. While adults may be concerned with political issues, I'm more concerned about their health and the accuracy of information they receive. Rumors and hearsay, especially among young parents who seek "smart pills" claiming to boost intelligence or jump ropes promising height growth, these are the issues I find more pressing. First, education. Second is transparency. The government itself must disclose information. Back in 2015 or 2016, when Audrey Tang was newly appointed as Minister without Portfolio by President Tsai Ing-wen, the government launched an initiative called "Open Government." It promoted government openness and transparency. I'll write more about that later. Anyway, they were pushing that initiative back then. Gradually,

a lot of information started getting uploaded as open data. Open data means every piece of government information becomes publicly accessible. Because of that, people later started paying attention to energy generation. So now, if you go to the Taiwan Power Company website, you can see daily figures like what percentage of our power comes from coal, and the percentage from thermal power generation. All this came after the government promoted its transparency website. Gradually, more government information was put online for the public to access. I think the government just needs to put open data on the website. That way, the public can verify things at a reasonable pace. As I mentioned earlier, regarding fake news and misinformation, it spreads fast, but? I believe official responses are often slow to follow. Therefore, the key improvement needed isn't adding another law, but enhancing response speed. Our NCC has shown no response, no speed of reaction, and no trust mechanism. So, letting the public handle this response speed and build trust and when the public investigates, it relatively increases this trust mechanism, that's my view.

21. 您覺得台灣未來要如何加強媒體識讀教育？

21. How do you think Taiwan should strengthen media literacy education in the future?

媒體識讀喔我跟你講，以前我在台中，我在台中時候有碰過1個學校的老師，他就開了1輛宣傳車，然後他就到每個宮廟去，然後他就製作了1個影片，然後教一些社區發展協會的老人家，這些媒體的識讀，他就會告訴你，比如說現在詐騙集團很多，這個也是詐騙集團很多，她一開始就想要教老人家如何不被詐騙集團，所以他就去做這樣子的1個宣傳車，我就覺得那個就很好，從學校到社區，然後學生從國小小學，就要開始去教育，所以要告訴小朋友，從標題的判讀判斷來開始告訴他們不是聳動就是真的，我常常我們現在新聞媒體都非常的聳動，大家都沒有時間看內容，大家都讀標題而已，心以為真。那社區長輩的部分，我覺得就是我剛剛講的那個教授，他就利用寒暑假的時間，她就深入到每1個社區去用這樣子，用社群、用電視台、或是短影片的這種，讓老人家聽得懂的語言，因為假新聞不是只有年輕人的問題，很多老人家也在傳啊。你要知道台灣是全世界洗腎密度的國家就是台灣，為什麼？我們的中南部的老人家都提醒那個地下電台吃很多的中藥，你說這個嚴不嚴重我跟你講，這個我們要去關心他，這個我覺得這個才更嚴重，然後吃了之後呢？就常常肝不好腎不好，所以我們的洗腎的比例非常的高，那肝炎這個部分就是這幾年，我大概從台大醫院，我們就開始在推消滅C肝消滅B肝，那大概目前我們這些肝病大概都已經慢慢的被控制了但是呢這個中南部的地下電台這個，去教育老人家亂吃藥這件事情我覺得這個是也許也是你們同學應該要去關心的，所以今天跟兩位3位談完之後我覺得有幾個有幾個議題也許你們，可以學生可以去關心的第1個，就是ncc對第2個就是在立法院來推這個數位中介服務法，我覺得這個法要推，我也覺得這個是對的，但是裡頭有一些方向，那因為這個前置

作業要做很多，要辦很多的問卷，大家支不支持問卷然後再來就是辦公聽會跟不同的 TA 都要能夠去做面對面的溝通再來就是專家學者要辦很多場，甚至北、中、南甚至很多場的這種研討會，然後讓大家凝聚，其實很重要，在這個社會上面是凝聚共識，1 個法才能夠容易推得起來上個會期沒有推成功，是因為行政單位一直想要來規範，感覺好像就是不準誰講話的樣子，所以那時候是被我跟國民黨我們把它擋掉了，但是我覺得這個還是要推的，我只能承認說他是應該要推的 1 個法案。

Media literacy, huh? Let me tell you, back when I was in Taichung. When I was in Taichung, I met a teacher from a local school who drove around in a promotional vehicle. He visited every temple and shrine, created a video, and taught media literacy to seniors in community development associations. He'd explain things like how there are many scam groups nowadays, and this is also a scam. His goal was to teach seniors how to avoid scams, so he created this mobile unit. I thought it was brilliant taking education from schools into communities. Students should start learning this in elementary school. We need to teach kids to judge headlines: not everything sensational is true. I often find our news media is extremely sensationalist. People don't have time to read the content; they just skim the headlines and believe them to be true. For community elders, I think the professor I mentioned earlier is doing exactly that. She uses her winter and summer breaks to go deep into every community. She uses social media, TV stations, or short videos, language that seniors can understand. Because fake news isn't just a problem for young people; many seniors are spreading it too. You must understand that Taiwan has the world's highest density of dialysis patients. Why? Because seniors in central and southern Taiwan are constantly urged by underground radio stations to consume large amounts of traditional Chinese medicine. Tell me, isn't this serious? We need to address this. I believe this is the more critical issue. And what happens after they take it? They often end up with poor liver and kidney function, leading to our extremely high dialysis rates. Regarding hepatitis, over the past few years, starting from Taipei University Hospital, we've been pushing to eliminate Hepatitis C and Hepatitis B. Currently, these liver diseases are gradually being controlled. However, this issue of underground radio stations in central and southern Taiwan educating the elderly to take random medications. I think this is something you students should also pay attention to. After speaking with the two of you today, I see several issues students might focus on. First, the NCC's role. Second, promoting the Digital Intermediary Services Act in the Legislative Yuan. I believe this law should be pushed forward, and I think it's the right thing to do. However, there are certain directions within it. A lot of preliminary work needs to be done, such as conducting numerous surveys to gauge public support. Then, public hearings must be held, and face-to-face communication

with different target audiences is essential. Furthermore, experts and scholars need to organize many seminars, even multiple sessions in the north, central, and southern regions, to help everyone come together. This is actually very important. Building consensus in society is essential for a law to gain traction. The previous legislative session failed to pass it because the administrative branch kept trying to impose regulations, as if they were silencing voices. That's why the KMT and I blocked it then. But I still believe this bill must be pushed forward. I have to admit it's a bill that should be enacted.

## **QUESTIONNAIRE**

1. What is your age?
2. What is your highest level of education?
3. Which political party do you support?
4. Which social media platform do you use most frequently? (Multiple choice)
5. Will the 2024 presidential election be your first time voting?
6. Did you feel nervous or experience any particular emotions during your first vote?
7. Do you feel your mood, stance, thoughts, or judgment differed between your first vote and now?
8. Do political party positions influence your voting decisions?
9. Do you participate in political events? (Rallies, campaign events, etc.)
10. What motivates your social media use? (Multiple choice)
11. The information on social media is mostly credible.
12. Fake news frequently appears on social media.
13. During presidential elections, information is often proven to be false.
14. You frequently obtain election-related information through social media.
15. You have been deeply affected by a piece of fake news.
16. Which piece of fake news left the strongest impression on you?
17. Have you ever shared a story only to later discover it was fake news?
18. Do you believe there is more fake news during election periods than usual?
19. Do family members influence your political party preference?
20. Do news articles or online posts change your view of a candidate?
21. Has misinformation ever affected your perception of a candidate?
22. Does misinformation affect your perception of candidates?
23. Have false narratives ever made you feel confused or uneasy about a political issue?
24. How much did false narratives confuse or unsettle you regarding a political issue?

25. How emotionally affected were you when exposed to large amounts of fake news during an election?
26. Have you ever changed your voting intention or policy stance because of fake news?
27. Do you only pay attention to information from your preferred political party?
28. Have you ever shared political content on social media platforms?
29. If you encounter someone with different political views, would you continue discussing political issues with them?
30. When reading online information, do you typically read the entire article?
31. When obtaining information from social media or news reports, do you verify the content's accuracy?
32. What do you do when you encounter fake news? (Multiple choice)
33. Do you believe schools or society should promote media literacy education?
34. Do you know of any platforms or organizations dedicated to fact-checking?
35. Which fact-checking platforms or organizations do you know? (Multiple choice)
36. Do you think the Taiwanese government should adopt foreign media regulatory mechanisms to reduce the proliferation of fake news?