

**The Survival and Challenges of Third Parties: A Comparative Analysis of the
UK Liberal Democrats and Taiwan People's Party**

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Submitted to the Faculty of
Department of International Affairs in partial fulfillment of
The requirements for the degree of
Bachelor of Arts in International Affairs

Wenzao Ursuline University of Languages

2026

WENZAO URSULINE UNIVERSITY OF LANGUAGES
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2026

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Wenzao University of Languages, 2026

Abstract

Former Taiwan People's Party Chairman Ko Wen-je, after being detained for nearly a year due to his involvement in the Jinghua City case, was granted bail and has since returned to the political arena, setting a record for the highest bail amount in politics, attracting widespread public attention. Facing this significant turning point, the future of the TPP—whether it will uphold its reform ideals and become a driving force for change, or become marginalized and reduced to a political fringe—serves as the starting point of this study.

This research adopted an archival research method and uses the UK's Liberal Democrats as a comparative case to explore the development paths and challenges of 'Third Parties' under a two-party system. Additionally, analysis of reports from Taiwan's major media outlets, UDN and LTN, is employed as an auxiliary tool to observe the TPP's political image and its interaction with public opinion, helping to reveal the difficulties and developments it faces in real-world politics.

Based on the analysis above, this paper argues that, as Taiwan's third-largest party, the TPP should not merely navigate between the blue and green camps opportunistically but should courageously assume the role of a reform promoter, uphold a centrist ideology, respond to public demands, and propose forward-looking policies and represent the new vision for the new generation of Taiwan people. Only by centering on public opinion and becoming a key force for

democratic stability can the party avoid falling into the trap of power compromises and losing voter trust and its legitimacy.

Keywords: Taiwan People's Party, Ko Wen-je, UK Liberal Democrats, Third Party, Two-party System, Voter Trust

摘要

台灣民眾黨前黨主席柯文哲因涉入京華城案，羈押將近一年後獲准交保，不僅重返政壇，更創下政界保金最高紀錄，引起社會各界高度關注。面對此重要轉折，民眾黨的未來究竟是堅持改革理想、成為改革推手，還是被邊緣化、淪為政治邊陲？本研究即以此為起點，深入探討民眾黨所面臨的發展挑戰與轉型機會。本研究採用檔案研究方法，並以英國自由民主黨作為跨國比較對象，探討第三勢力在兩黨制體制下的發展路徑與困境。同時，以對台灣主要媒體聯合報與自由時報相關報導的分析，作為觀察民眾黨政治形象與民意互動的工具，幫助揭示其在現實政治中所面臨的困境與發展。基於上述分析，本文主張，身為台灣第三大黨，民眾黨不應僅停留在藍綠夾縫中左右逢源，而應勇於擔負改革推動者的角色，堅守中道理念，回應民意需求，提出具有前瞻性的政策主張以及代表臺灣新世代的新願景。唯有以民意為核心，成為民主穩定的關鍵力量，才能避免陷入權力妥協的陷阱，失去選民信任與政黨存在的正當性。

關鍵詞：台灣民眾黨、柯文哲、英國自由民主黨、第三勢力、兩黨制、選民信任

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION	1
Background	1
Motivation	2
Research Purpose	2
Research Question.....	3
Contribution	3
Limits	4
Delimits	4
Analytical Framework.....	4
LITERATURE REVIEW	6
Electoral Systems and Party Configurations.....	6
Case Study: The 2010 UK General Election — Not Just a Three-Party Race, but a “Three Types of Two-Party Race”	7
Case Study: The UK 2015 General Election.....	9
Regional Patterns of Liberal Democrats’ Electoral Performance	10
The Institutional Marginalization of Third Parties in the UK.....	11
METHODOLOGY	16
Research Design.....	16
Research Process	17
DATA ANALYSIS.....	19
First Section (The Geographical Concentration of Support for the Taiwan People's Party)	20
Second Section (Alliances and Attacks Among the Two Major Parties)	24
Third Section (Talent Recruitment and Political Influence Expansion)	27
Third, but Not the Same: Divergent Paths of the UK and Taiwan’s Third Parties	31
First Section (Differences in party founding contexts and institutional origins)	31
Second Section (The strength of charismatic leadership and party dependence)	33
Third Section (The gap between organizational structure and membership base)	35

CONCLUSION.....	38
Comparative Implications	39
Implications and Possible Developments.....	40
APPENDIX-UDN.....	42
APPENDIX- LTN.....	54
REFERENCES	65

List of Tables

Table 1 Common Characteristics of Third Parties.....	14
Table 2 Raw Data Collected.....	20
Table 3 Politicians Who Defected to the Taiwan People's Party	29

List of Figures

Figure 1 LDP Seat Changes by District (2010 to 2015)	11
Figure 2 TPP Party Vote Variation Analysis (2020 to 2024)	24

INTRODUCTION

Background

In 2024, the former mayor of Taipei and chairman of one of Taiwan's most prominent third parties became involved in a major legal controversy, with judicial proceedings still ongoing. Under his leadership, the party obtained approximately 23 percent of the national vote in the 2024 presidential election, emerging as the third-largest political force in Taiwan. Rather than focusing on individual cases, this development raises broader analytical questions regarding how third parties rise within competitive party systems and the structural vulnerabilities they encounter during periods of political uncertainty.

While two-party competition continues to dominate many democratic systems, such arrangements often limit political diversity and constrain the representation of alternative policy preferences. In this context, the emergence of third parties is frequently associated with public dissatisfaction toward established parties, particularly when dominant parties fail to address the concerns of specific social groups or younger generations. Third parties may therefore serve as channels for political realignment and institutional adaptation within democratic systems.

In Taiwan, the rise of third parties reflects not only shifting political preferences but also generational change. Younger voters have increasingly expressed skepticism toward traditional parties and have shown support for political actors emphasizing reform-oriented narratives and alternative governance styles. Nevertheless, third parties in Taiwan face persistent structural constraints, including limited legislative leverage, unequal access to media exposure, restricted organizational resources, internal coordination challenges, and uncertainty regarding their long-term political viability.

Within this environment, third parties have become recurring participants in Taiwan's political competition. Although some have temporarily influenced policy debates or electoral outcomes, others have struggled to sustain organizational stability and electoral relevance over time. Previous cases, such as the People First Party and the New Power Party, demonstrate the difficulties third parties face in maintaining long-term survival within a polarized party system. Against this background, this study examines the development of the Taiwan People's Party and explores the structural challenges that shape the prospects of third-party politics in Taiwan.

Motivation

The motivation for examining third parties lies in their complex and often ambiguous role within democratic systems. On the one hand, third parties may enhance political competition by introducing new policy agendas, mobilizing previously disengaged voters, and expanding the range of political choices available to the electorate. On the other hand, their participation may complicate coalition dynamics, increase legislative fragmentation, or generate instability under certain institutional conditions.

This dual role raises important analytical questions regarding the conditions under which third parties contribute to democratic representation and when they face constraints that limit their effectiveness. Comparative perspectives from other democratic systems can provide useful analytical reference points. By examining how third parties operate under different institutional arrangements, this study seeks to situate Taiwan's experience within a broader comparative framework.

Research Purpose

This study aims to examine the development and operation of third parties across different democratic contexts, using the United Kingdom's Liberal Democrats as a comparative case. By

analyzing their electoral performance, patterns of party cooperation, and organizational and talent structures, the study provides a reference framework for evaluating the Taiwan People's Party since its establishment in 2019.

Furthermore, this research investigates how major parties in both the United Kingdom and Taiwan respond to the presence of third parties, particularly in terms of electoral competition and strategic cooperation. By applying a consistent analytical framework across cases, the study seeks to assess the structural challenges faced by third parties and to identify factors that shape their political survival within competitive party systems.

Research Question

This paper addresses the following research question:

How can the experience of the UK Liberal Democrats help us understand the development and challenges of the Taiwan People's Party within Taiwan's political system?

Contribution

This research contributes to the study of party systems by examining the survival and challenges of third parties within polarized and institutionally constrained political environments. By focusing on structural conditions rather than individual political actors, the study highlights how electoral systems, patterns of party cooperation, and organizational capacity shape third-party trajectories.

Beyond its theoretical implications, this research provides a comparative perspective that may inform broader discussions on political competition and party system development in Taiwan. The findings contribute to ongoing debates on the role of third parties in enhancing political representation and institutional adaptability within democratic systems.

Limits

For a student researcher, this study faced practical constraints that limited access to firsthand data. Interviews with key political actors were not feasible, and the analysis therefore relies primarily on secondary sources, including media reports, public statements, and publicly available datasets. In addition, overseas fieldwork related to the UK Liberal Democrats was not possible due to time and resource constraints.

Despite these limitations, systematic analysis of media coverage and existing literature allows for a structured examination of party strategies and institutional interactions. These constraints are acknowledged, and the findings should be interpreted within this methodological context.

Delimits

This study focuses on the Taiwan People's Party from its founding in 2019 to recent national and local elections. The United Kingdom is selected as a comparative case, with the Liberal Democrats serving as a reference point for third-party development under a different electoral system. The analysis relies exclusively on secondary data sources, defining the scope of the study while maintaining analytical consistency.

Analytical Framework

Based on the foregoing discussion, this study examines the survival and challenges of Taiwan's third-party politics within a competitive party system. To avoid remaining at the level of political events or individual political figures, a clear and consistent analytical framework is adopted. The framework consists of three dimensions.

First, electoral performance is analyzed to assess third-party competitiveness across different electoral levels and institutional settings. Second, party cooperation is examined to

explore patterns of interaction, alliance formation, and strategic coordination between third parties and major political actors. Third, organizational and talent structures are investigated, focusing on internal party organization, candidate recruitment, and local organizational capacity.

The subsequent literature review, data analysis, and conclusion follow this framework to systematically evaluate the constraints faced by third parties and their potential paths of development.

This study focuses on the Taiwan People's Party since its founding in 2019, analyzing its participation in local and central elections. The United Kingdom serves as a comparative case, with the Liberal Democrats providing relevant insights for understanding third-party development. Analysis relies on secondary sources, including media reports, public statements, and existing datasets, as interviews and overseas fieldwork were not feasible. These delimitations define the study's scope while acknowledging practical constraints.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review examines the Taiwan People's Party alongside the UK Liberal Democrats to explore how third parties operate under institutional constraints within political systems dominated by two major parties. Drawing on theories such as Duverger's Law and existing scholarship on majoritarian electoral systems, the literature emphasizes the structural disadvantages faced by third parties and the strategic trade-offs they encounter in pursuing political survival. A central concern in the literature is whether third parties can overcome entrenched binary political divisions—such as Taiwan's Blue–Green cleavage and the UK's Labour–Conservative competition—to establish sustained political relevance.

Scholars offer differing assessments of the role of third parties within such systems. Some argue that third parties can function as mediators, contributing to policy pluralism and coalition bargaining. Others contend that third parties primarily serve as vehicles for protest voting, with limited capacity to translate electoral support into long-term institutional influence. This divergence highlights the importance of examining the structural conditions under which third parties operate, rather than evaluating their performance solely through electoral outcomes.

Electoral Systems and Party Configurations

According to Duverger's Law, single-member district plurality systems tend to generate two party competition, whereas proportional representation systems provide more space for multiparty development.¹ This theoretical link between electoral institutions and party systems has been widely observed across democracies. For example, the United States and the United Kingdom are typically regarded as two-party systems, with electoral rules that discourage

¹R. Kenneth Carty, "Political Turbulence in a Dominant Party System," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 39, no. 4 (2006), <http://www.jstor.org.wenzao.idm.oclc.org/stable/20451826>.

smaller parties from achieving parliamentary representation.² By contrast, countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy—operating under proportional or mixed electoral rules—are characterized by multiparty systems, where coalition governments are a common outcome.³ These cases suggest that institutional design creates powerful incentives shaping the survival and competitiveness of 'third parties'. Taiwan represents a hybrid case: while its single-member district system for legislative seats pushes the system toward two-party dominance, the proportional representation tier allows new parties, such as the Taiwan People's Party, to gain parliamentary footholds. This dual structure makes Taiwan an important case for examining how 'third parties' adapt under both constraining and enabling institutional conditions.

To more concretely illustrate the practical impact of institutional constraints on the development of 'third parties', this paper will examine the case of the UK Liberal Democrats, focusing on their performance and strategies in the 2010 and 2015 general elections. Through this case study, it is possible to observe how a third party seeks to carve out space for itself within a majoritarian electoral system—particularly in terms of regional competition, policy positioning, and electoral outcomes.

Case Study: The 2010 UK General Election — Not Just a Three-Party Race, but a “Three Types of Two-Party Race”

Although the UK party system is often perceived as being dominated by three major parties—Conservatives, Labour, and the Liberal Democrats—the 2010 general election revealed a political landscape more accurately characterized by a series of regionally specific two-party

² "Two-Party System," *Economic and Political Weekly* 33, no. 9 (1998), <http://www.jstor.org.wenzao.idm.oclc.org/stable/4406447>.

³ Manus I. Midlarsky, "Political Stability of Two-Party and Multiparty Systems: Probabilistic Bases for the Comparison of Party Systems," *The American Political Science Review* 78, no. 4 (1984), <https://doi.org/10.2307/1955799>, <http://www.jstor.org.wenzao.idm.oclc.org/stable/1955799>.

contests.⁴ Specifically, electoral competition could be categorized into three main patterns: first, Conservative–Labour contests in the North of England and traditional industrial regions; second, Conservative–Liberal Democrat battles in southern and rural constituencies; and third, Labour–Liberal Democrat competition in urban cores.

Beyond the geographic distribution of votes, the participation of 'third parties' also shaped the policy dynamics between the major parties. Existing studies suggest that third-party involvement often amplifies policy differentiation between the two main parties, rather than blurring ideological lines.⁵ In the 2010 election, although the Liberal Democrats did not outperform either of the major parties in terms of vote share or seats, their campaign messages and policy positions had a notable impact on the broader policy discourse.⁶ Moreover, the election highlighted the representational distortion caused by the UK's First-Past-the-Post electoral system: despite receiving approximately 23% of the national vote, the Liberal Democrats secured only 57 seats, revealing a significant gap between voter support and parliamentary representation.

At the level of electoral strategy, both structural and tactical factors played a crucial role in shaping the outcome. Labour's losses were partly attributable to boundary changes in constituency delineation. While these changes were administered by neutral boundary commissions, the resulting shifts produced district-level effects similar to "gerrymandering," creating structural imbalances between vote share and seat outcomes. Meanwhile, the Conservative Party employed a meticulously planned target constituency strategy, focusing

⁴ R. O. N. Johnston and Charles Pattie, "The British general election of 2010: a three-party contest - or three two-party contests?," *The Geographical Journal* 177, no. 1 (2011), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41238001>.

⁵ Matt Cole and Helen Deighan, *Political Parties in Britain*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh University Press, 2012). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctv2f4vh9m>.

⁶ David Cutts, Andrew Russell, and Joshua Townsley, *The Liberal Democrats: From hope to despair to where?* (Manchester University Press, 2023). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/jj.8595629>.

resources on winnable districts and maximizing returns within the constraints of the FPTP system.

Although the Liberal Democrats won a limited number of seats, they nevertheless held decisive influence in several key constituencies and emerged as a pivotal player in the post-election coalition negotiations.⁷ This case illustrates that even within a structurally restrictive electoral system, 'third parties' can exert meaningful influence on both policymaking and government formation through strategic constituency targeting and regional positioning—especially in scenarios where no party secures an outright majority, resulting in a hung parliament.

Case Study: The UK 2015 General Election

The 2015 UK general election presents a striking example of how majoritarian electoral systems can distort party competition and limit the influence of centrist or third-party actors. While traditional spatial models of party competition—such as the median voter theorem—suggest that major parties will converge toward the center when facing centrist challengers, empirical findings suggest the opposite often occurs.⁸ Rather than shifting toward moderation, major parties tend to adopt more polarized positions in order to retain their core base, particularly in systems like First-Past-the-Post, where winning a plurality in each constituency is paramount.

The Conservative Party's unexpected majority victory in 2015 illustrates this logic in action. Contrary to pre-election expectations of a hung parliament, the Conservatives succeeded in consolidating right-leaning voters, while Labour suffered major setbacks in Scotland due to the

⁷ Gary Cox, "Electoral rules and electoral coordination," *annual Review of Political science* 2, no. 1 (1999).

⁸ James Adams and Samuel Merrill, "Why Small, Centrist Third Parties Motivate Policy Divergence by Major Parties," *The American Political Science Review* 100, no. 3 (2006), <http://www.jstor.org.wenzao.idm.oclc.org/stable/27644363>.

rise of the Scottish National Party.⁹ Meanwhile, the Liberal Democrats—despite their prior role in the coalition government—experienced devastating losses, dropping from 57 to just 8 seats. Their centrist positioning failed to appeal to disillusioned voters from either side, further underlining the vulnerability of 'third parties' in FPTP systems.

Additionally, the performance of minor parties like UKIP and the Green Party revealed the representational inefficiencies inherent in FPTP. UKIP received nearly 13% of the national vote but won only a single seat, while the Green Party's 3.8% translated into just one seat as well.

¹⁰These disparities underscore the structural disadvantages faced by smaller parties, regardless of popular support, and highlight how majoritarian systems skew political representation in favor of the dominant two parties.

Far from incentivizing convergence or moderation, the presence of centrist and protest parties in 2015 instead contributed to greater polarization, strategic vote consolidation, and a clear marginalization of alternative voices.¹¹ As such, the election serves as further evidence that 'third parties' under FPTP are constrained not only by strategic missteps but by the institutional mechanics of the electoral system itself.

Regional Patterns of Liberal Democrats' Electoral Performance

This table illustrates the Liberal Democrats' shifting electoral performance between the 2010 and 2015 UK general elections, highlighting their reliance on regional strongholds. In

⁹ Hans-Hartwig Blomeier, *CLEAR ELECTION WINNERS – UNCERTAIN OUTLOOK A REVIEW OF THE GENERAL ELECTION IN THE UK*, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Gerhard Wahlers, 2015), <http://www.jstor.org/wenzao.idm.oclc.org/stable/resrep10110.8>.

¹⁰ Stephen D. Fisher, Jouni Kuha, and Clive Payne, "Editorial: Getting it right on the night, again—the 2010 UK general election exit poll," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (Statistics in Society)* 173, no. 4 (2010), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40925394>.

¹¹ Jamie Gough, "Why the Labour Party Lost the British 2019 General Election Social Democracy versus Neoliberalism and the Far Right," *Class, Race and Corporate Power* 8, no. 2 (2020), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48644421>.

2010, the party gained 24.2% of the vote in England, but by 2015 this had fallen sharply to 8.2%. The South West of England remained the party's strongest region, with a 34.7% vote share in 2010 and a comparatively higher 15.1% in 2015, despite a substantial decline. Similar downward trends were evident across other regions, including London, Scotland, and Wales. These results suggest that the party's national strength was heavily dependent on concentrated regional support, and that the erosion of this support base significantly undermined its overall electoral position.




Figure 1 LDP Seat Changes by District (2010 to 2015)

The Institutional Marginalization of Third Parties in the UK

Under a single-member district, first-past-the-post electoral system, the structural incentives strongly favor two large parties. Third parties typically emerge either because they introduce a new issue agenda that the major parties ignore, or because the dominant parties fragment. Historical examples such as the early rise of Labour after the Liberal split show that party realignment usually requires major ideological shifts or significant internal divisions in the dominant parties; such outcomes are exceptional rather than typical. The Liberal Democrats'

long-term trajectory therefore reflects broader structural changes in British politics rather than the effects of individual leaders or momentary strategies.

The survival strategies of the Liberal Democrats can be understood as responses to these institutional constraints. In a majoritarian system, third parties often concentrate on niche constituencies or positional gaps left by the two main parties. This approach can produce short-term electoral gains, but it also makes third parties highly dependent on fluctuations in the two-party competition. When one major party weakens, third parties may attract protest votes; when the major parties realign or consolidate geographically, third-party support tends to be squeezed. These dynamics help explain why third parties in the UK have alternated between modest parliamentary representation and sharp decline.

Entering government presents particular risks for third parties under FPTP. Coalition participation increases the junior partner's exposure to responsibility for policy outcomes, while the dominant partner tends to receive disproportionate credit for successes. Voter attribution of responsibility and the asymmetry of media and institutional influence thus reduce the junior partner's electoral appeal after governing. The Liberal Democrats' substantial losses after the 2010–2015 coalition illustrate how these mechanisms—responsibility attribution, perceived policy compromise, and media framing of performance—can undermine a third party's electoral base.

Electoral recoveries of third parties often reflect broader swings in public sentiment rather than durable strengthening of party capacity. A rebound following extended rule by one major party can be driven by protest voting or temporary dissatisfaction, producing improved seat counts without resolving underlying organizational weaknesses. In this sense, short-term gains may indicate cyclical voter behavior rather than a stable shift in party support.

A persistent challenge for the Liberal Democrats has been the difficulty of maintaining a clear, stable ideological core while also exploiting strategic opportunities. When third parties prioritize short-term electoral positioning over coherent programmatic commitments, they risk alienating both centrist voters and their protest constituencies. Episodes of policy reversal or unmet pledges can therefore produce lasting credibility costs that weaken long-term growth prospects.

Territorial dynamics further constrain third-party success. Where local or regional parties consolidate, third-party electoral space narrows; gains in one subnational area may be offset by losses elsewhere as voters return to better-organized local alternatives. Thus, reliance on residual or geographically dispersed support tends to produce unstable representation rather than durable parliamentary presence.

Overall, the experience of the Liberal Democrats in the UK suggests that, under FPTP, third parties are more likely to function as temporary outlets for voter dissatisfaction or as tactical actors within the two-party competition than to become stable governing alternatives. Their role can contribute to policy pluralism and provide electoral choices for disaffected voters, but institutional incentives—responsibility attribution in government, strategic voting, and territorial consolidation—limit their capacity to transform protest into lasting political capital. This perspective highlights the need to analyze third-party outcomes primarily in terms of structural mechanisms rather than personalized narratives.

Category	Description	Lib Dems Example	Applicable to the TPP Analys
Electoral Performance & Regionalism	Reliance on regional strongholds	Strong in the South and university towns.	Regional bases like Taipei, Hsinchu or Taichung.

Party Cooperation & Coalition Roles	Acting as a pivotal minority in coalitions	Coalition with Conservatives (2010-2015).	Cooperation with Blue-Green camps.
Defection & Talent Acquisition	Attracting figures from other parties	Attracts defectors from Tories like Dominic Grieve.	Does TPP recruit from Blue-Green camps?

Table 1 Common Characteristics of Third Parties

This table review compares the UK Liberal Democrats with the challenges faced by 'third parties' in a system dominated by two major parties, exploring how such parties operate within this framework. Based on the key points in the table, we can derive several important insights from the experience of the Lib Dems.

First, electoral performance shows that despite receiving a relatively high level of voter support, the Lib Dems have struggled to convert this support into parliamentary seats due to the structural issues inherent in the First-Past-the-Post electoral system. For instance, in 2010, the Lib Dems won approximately 23% of the national vote but only secured 57 seats (8.7% of the total 650 seats in the parliament) highlighting the significant representational distortion that even a relatively large third party faces under this system. This indicates that even when third parties manage to attract substantial voter support, the structural limitations of the electoral system make it difficult to effectively expand their influence in parliament. Moreover, the issue of regional voting patterns also plays a significant role. The Lib Dems' support was not evenly distributed across the country, which limited their ability to secure seats in certain regions, even though they garnered a considerable proportion of the national vote. This regional disparity further exacerbated the difficulty of achieving proportional representation under the FPTP system, as votes in certain areas became relatively ineffective under this electoral system.

Secondly, coalition participation reveals how 'third parties' can seize opportunities to participate in government formation, thereby influencing policy. The Lib Dems formed a coalition government with the Conservative Party in 2010, gaining influence, but at a considerable cost. Particularly after failing to fulfill their promise on tuition fees, the party's credibility suffered greatly. This serves as a reminder that entering government can be a double-edged sword for 'third parties': while it may provide short-term political gains, it also risks long-term voter disillusionment if election promises are not kept. Therefore, maintaining policy positions and voter support within a coalition is something that third parties must carefully consider.

In terms of talent acquisition and political positioning, one of the Lib Dems' strategies was to attract political figures from other parties, which helped strengthen their position in specific regions. However, the Lib Dems' policy positioning, particularly their ambiguous stance on key issues such as Brexit, also highlighted the importance for third parties to maintain consistency and clarity on major national issues. The experience of the Lib Dems underscores that 'third parties' need to have clear policy distinctions and avoid overly compromise-driven positions, in order to preserve their political independence and credibility.

In conclusion, from the experience of the UK Liberal Democrats, we can see the challenges and opportunities faced by 'third parties' in a system dominated by two major parties. Electoral performance, coalition strategies, and talent acquisition are key factors in determining whether third parties can succeed. The experience of the Lib Dems demonstrates that, although 'third parties' face numerous difficulties in a two-party-dominated system, they can exert influence with the right strategies. These lessons provide valuable insights for other third parties, especially those operating in similar structural challenges in different countries.

METHODOLOGY

This chapter explains the methodological approach used to analyze the development and challenges of the Taiwan People's Party within Taiwan's political system. Building on the analytical framework established in the literature review, the analysis focuses on three dimensions: electoral performance, party cooperation, and organizational and talent recruitment. The experience of the UK Liberal Democrats is incorporated as a comparative reference to illustrate how third parties respond to institutional constraints under different electoral systems.

To address these research objectives, the study adopts archival research and qualitative content analysis, using media reports as the primary data source. Media coverage is particularly suitable for this study because it captures how party behavior, strategic choices, and institutional interactions are publicly framed over time. Rather than measuring voter attitudes, this approach allows the analysis to trace changes in party positioning, cooperation strategies, and organizational development across multiple electoral cycles.

United Daily News (UDN) and Liberty Times Net (LTN) are selected due to their extensive reporting on electoral politics and party competition. Their differing political orientations also allow the study to compare media framing across sources, reducing reliance on a single narrative and strengthening the analytical foundation.

Research Design

The research design specifies the scope of analysis, article selection criteria, and analytical logic guiding interpretation. Instead of random sampling, the study employs rule-based selection to ensure that all included materials are directly relevant to the analytical framework.

A two-stage keyword strategy is used. In the first stage, thematic keywords—including “local elections,” “central elections,” “by-elections,” “party cooperation,” “talent recruitment,”

and “Taiwan People’s Party”—are applied to identify articles related to the three analytical dimensions. In the second stage, analytical keywords such as “strategy,” “institutional constraints,” “candidate background,” and “party positioning” are used to refine the dataset and exclude articles that only provide descriptive event reporting without substantive discussion of party behavior or institutional dynamics.

Selected articles are categorized into three groups: electoral performance, party cooperation, and organizational and talent recruitment. Each category contains approximately 40 to 50 articles, allowing for balanced comparison across dimensions. This categorization ensures that analysis is conducted consistently across different types of party activity while maintaining focus on institutional behavior rather than isolated events.

Within each category, interpretation is guided by explicit analytical criteria. These include the primary issue emphasized in the article, the attribution of responsibility (whether outcomes are explained through institutional factors, party organization, or individual actors), and the evaluative tone toward the TPP. By applying these criteria systematically, the study moves beyond description to assess how media narratives reflect structural incentives and constraints within Taiwan’s party system.

Research Process

Data were collected from the official websites of UDN and LTN, covering the period from August 1, 2019, to August 30, 2025. Using the predefined keyword strategy, a total of 158 articles from UDN and 118 articles from LTN were identified and included in the dataset. This timeframe captures the founding of the TPP, its participation in multiple electoral cycles, and key phases of organizational development.

The analytical process proceeds in three steps. First, articles are coded according to the three analytical dimensions: electoral performance, party cooperation, and organizational and talent recruitment. Relevant information—such as electoral outcomes, cooperation patterns, candidate backgrounds, and organizational changes—is extracted and organized within each category.

Second, comparative analysis is conducted across election types (local, national, and by-elections), geographic regions (northern, central, and southern Taiwan), and patterns of interaction with major parties (the KMT and DPP). This step identifies recurring patterns and variations, allowing the study to assess whether observed outcomes reflect temporary events or broader institutional dynamics.

Third, the findings are interpreted by linking observed media patterns to structural mechanisms within Taiwan's political system. Differences in framing between UDN and LTN are assessed by comparing issue emphasis, attribution of responsibility, and evaluative tone across similar events. Interpretations place greater weight on patterns that appear consistently across both outlets and over time, reducing the influence of isolated reports.

This qualitative approach prioritizes transparency and analytical consistency rather than statistical generalization. By clearly specifying selection rules, coding criteria, and interpretive steps, the study ensures that conclusions are grounded in systematically collected evidence and that the research process is reproducible.

DATA ANALYSIS

Facing a political landscape where the two major parties—the KMT and the DPP—take turns in power, the Taiwan People’s Party, as a rising third force, is under question. Can it avoid the short-lived fate of past third parties like the People First Party or the New Power Party? This research focuses on whether the TPP can build a stable and institutional role under pressure from both sides, or if it will end up as just a temporary tool during elections.

In the literature review, this study examines the main challenges and political positioning of third parties in two-party systems, using the UK Liberal Democrats as a comparative case to analyze their electoral performance, talent recruitment, and cooperation with major parties. Through these analyses, this study aims to understand what valuable lessons can be learned from the experience of the UK Liberal Democrats. These case analyses provide an important analytical framework for the subsequent research, and have inspired the design of the following three hypotheses:

1. The Taiwan People’s Party is highly dependent on electoral support from specific regions.
2. The Taiwan People’s Party gains political leverage through cooperation with the KMT and DPP.
3. The Taiwan People’s Party expands its political influence by recruiting members from other parties.

The methodology part of this research provided an overall picture of how the news data been selected and analyzed. To continue, this data analysis part will provide three sections, namely: elections, party cooperation, and talent recruitment. In each section, there are essential points. They are local elections, national elections, and by-elections in the elections section. They

are Blue–White and Green–White alliances in the party cooperation section. Likewise, they are party switching and campaign support in the talent recruitment section.

This data analysis will show, regarding all these issues, *United Daily News* and *Liberty Times*, with their different political views, report the TPP in different ways. By comparing the two perspectives, this research hopes to present a more complete picture of the TPP’s development as a third party and the challenges it faces. Here they are.

Table 2 Raw Data Collected

Category	United Daily News -	Liberty Times -
Elections	32pics	39pics
Party Cooperation	56pics	38pics
Talent Recruitment	70pics	41pics

First Section (The Geographical Concentration of Support for the Taiwan People's Party)

Under a single-member district system, the survival of a third party is often constrained by the geographic distribution of its support. The case of the United Kingdom’s Liberal Democrats shows that even with stable nationwide support, a party may struggle to gain parliamentary seats if its votes are not geographically concentrated. Building on this structural observation, this section analyzes the Taiwan People’s Party’s electoral performance across different regions to assess whether, as Hypothesis 1 suggests, it relies disproportionately on support from specific geographic areas.

Case 1- Concentrated Support in Northern Taiwan

In the 2022 local elections, the Taiwan People’s Party displayed clear regional variation in its electoral support, with particularly strong performance in northern Taiwan.¹² In Taipei City,

¹² LTN-Election (25)

the party emerged as the third-largest political force, securing four city council seats and successfully forming a party caucus. This outcome represented an important organizational breakthrough, as it provided the TPP with institutional presence, legislative visibility, and access to municipal-level political resources. Similarly, in Hsinchu City, TPP candidate Gao Hongan won the mayoral election with approximately 45 percent of the vote in a highly competitive three-way race.¹³

Beyond Taipei and Hsinchu, the TPP also secured city council seats in New Taipei City, Taichung City, Hsinchu County and City, Changhua County, Nantou County, Yunlin County, and Hualien County.¹⁴ These results indicate that the party's support was not confined to a single metropolitan center, but rather dispersed across selected urban and semi-urban areas, albeit unevenly.

This pattern suggests that the TPP's relative success in northern Taiwan is closely associated with urban political environments, where voter volatility tends to be higher and partisan loyalties are comparatively weaker. Dense media exposure, higher levels of political information, and a larger pool of non-aligned voters reduce entry barriers for newer parties, allowing the TPP to establish institutional footholds more easily than in regions dominated by long-standing local networks.

In contrast, the TPP was unable to replicate these outcomes in southern Taiwan, particularly in major cities such as Kaohsiung and Tainan, where its overall support remained limited.¹⁵ In the 2022 county and city council elections, the party's total vote share in the south hovered around 4 percent.¹⁶ This uneven regional performance reflects the difficulty third parties face in

¹³ UDN-Election (21)

¹⁴ UDN-Election (22)

¹⁵ LTN-Election (24)

¹⁶ LTN-Election (26)

penetrating areas where party competition is stabilized by entrenched local factions and strong organizational mobilization by the two major parties.

Case 2- Growth in Party-List Votes, Weakness in District Races

Between 2020 and 2024, the TPP experienced a substantial increase in its party-list vote share, rising from 11 percent to 22 percent. In the 2020 legislative election, the party surpassed the 5 percent threshold and entered the Legislative Yuan for the first time with five at-large seats.¹⁷ However, it failed to secure any single-member district seats, indicating that its electoral appeal was concentrated in the proportional representation tier rather than at the constituency level.

By 2024, the TPP further expanded its parliamentary presence, increasing its total seats to eight. Its electoral performance improved notably in northern and central Taiwan, particularly in Hsinchu City and Taoyuan City. This growth may have partially resulted from voter realignment following the decline of the New Power Party, suggesting competitive overlap within the non–blue–green political space.¹⁸

Nevertheless, the party’s limited progress in southern Taiwan, especially in cities such as Kaohsiung and Tainan, highlights a persistent structural constraint. While proportional representation allows voters to support third parties without the risk of vote wastage, single-member district elections incentivize strategic voting and favor candidates backed by established local organizations. As a result, increased national visibility and party-list support do not automatically translate into district-level electoral success. This divergence reflects the structural logic of Taiwan’s mixed electoral system and helps explain the TPP’s continued weakness in constituency races.

¹⁷ LTN-Election (3)

¹⁸ UDN-Election (25)

Case 3- Poor Performance in Local By-Elections

The TPP's performance in local by-elections further underscores its regional and organizational limitations. In the 2020 Kaohsiung mayoral by-election, TPP candidate Wu Yizheng received only 4 percent of the vote, a sharp decline compared with the party's broader electoral performance during the same period.¹⁹ Similarly, in the 2020 Taichung Heping District mayoral by-election, candidate Zhang Ruihong obtained approximately 10 percent of the vote, indicating limited competitiveness in local executive contests.²⁰ In the 2024 Yunlin County Mailiao Township mayoral by-election, TPP candidate Lin Yifeng secured only 5 percent of the vote and placed third.²¹

Taken together, these by-election outcomes suggest persistent organizational weaknesses at the local level. More importantly, they highlight how by-elections—often characterized by low voter turnout and strong factional mobilization—tend to magnify the structural disadvantages faced by third parties. In such contexts, limited local networks and weaker mobilization capacity place the TPP at a particular disadvantage, especially in southern and rural constituencies.

Summary

Taken together, the TPP's electoral performance reveals a pattern of geographically concentrated support. Similar to the experience of the United Kingdom's Liberal Democrats under a single-member district system, the TPP's core electoral base is primarily located in northern and selected central urban areas, while southern regions remain a persistent challenge. These cases demonstrate how uneven geographic distribution operates as a structural constraint

¹⁹ LTN-Election (11)

²⁰ LTN-Election (13)

²¹ UDN-Election (28)

on the TPP's ability to achieve sustained nationwide expansion under Taiwan's current electoral system.




Figure 2 TPP Party Vote Variation Analysis (2020 to 2024)

Second Section (Alliances and Attacks Among the Two Major Parties)

In a two-party political environment, the political survival and influence of a third party largely depend on the structural patterns of cooperation with major parties. The experience of the United Kingdom's Liberal Democrats in coalition governments shows that short-term cooperation can provide political leverage, but in the long run, the absence of institutionalized arrangements may lead to support erosion and constrained growth. Drawing on this comparative insight, this section analyzes the cooperation between the Taiwan People's Party and the major parties to evaluate its structural impact on political support and influence, and to assess the validity of Hypothesis 2.

Case 1- Green-White Alliances

The most salient example of informal green–white interaction preceding the TPP’s formal establishment was Ko Wen-je’s 2014 independent mayoral campaign in Taipei. In that election the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) refrained from fielding a candidate, which effectively allowed Ko to consolidate anti-KMT votes and win a decisive plurality. This episode illustrates an instance of asymmetric cooperation in which a major party’s strategic withdrawal can increase bloc-level competitiveness without creating a formal alliance.

From an analytical perspective, the 2014 case highlights two mechanisms. First, strategic withdrawal by a major party can reduce vote splitting in single-member contests, thereby enabling an independent or third-party candidate to exploit consolidated opposition support. Second, such tactical accommodation does not necessarily produce durable organizational alignment: while it can produce short-term electoral gains, it does not create institutional commitments or routine coordination channels that survive electoral cycles. After the TPP’s formation in 2019, informal coordination with pan-Green actors continued in some local contests, but party leadership generally maintained distance from formal alignment with the DPP in order to preserve centrist flexibility and avoid being subsumed by an established partisan identity.²²

Consequently, stable and institutionalized green–white alliances did not materialize in the Legislative Yuan. Internal differences over strategy—exemplified by competing proposals for coalition building—combined with the absence of formal negotiation mechanisms limited the depth and durability of cooperation. As a result, green–white interactions remained primarily tactical and contingent on short-term electoral calculations rather than constituting a structural realignment.

²² UDN-Party Cooperation (3)

Case 2- Blue-White Alliances

The TPP's strategic orientation has increasingly exhibited tendencies to align tactically with pan-Blue forces, particularly in contexts where anti-DPP coordination could improve electoral prospects. During the 2022 local elections and subsequent contests, reports of informal local-level coordination between the KMT and the TPP circulated in several constituencies.²³ In three-way races, such coordination altered the strategic incentives faced by voters and sometimes produced strategic-voting effects that benefited one opposition candidate over another.

Analytically, these developments can be understood through two linked mechanisms. First, the presence of a sizable third-party actor alters the calculus of opposition coordination: both major parties must weigh the costs of vote division against the risks of conceding local ground. Second, effective inter-party coordination requires credible negotiation protocols and shared metrics for candidate selection; the breakdown of high-level negotiations ahead of the 2024 presidential election exposed the lack of such institutionalized procedures.²⁴ Disagreements over polling methodology, candidate ranking, and the absence of mutual trust turned what might have been coordinated bargaining into tactical brinkmanship, undermining efforts to form a united opposition front and generating voter confusion.

Despite these electoral-level difficulties, cooperation occurred in more circumscribed institutional arenas. Within the Legislative Yuan, the KMT and TPP engaged in procedural coordination—such as vote arrangements in leadership elections—and collaborated on specific legislative initiatives.²⁵ These patterns indicate that while electoral alliance formation remained

²³ UDN-Party Cooperation (9)

²⁴ UDN-Party Cooperation (13)

²⁵ UDN-Party Cooperation (15)

fragile, issue-based or procedural cooperation was feasible where incentives and monitoring mechanisms were clearer and where short-term policy gains aligned the parties' interests.²⁶

Following the 2024 presidential election and subsequent political developments, cooperation between the TPP and KMT intensified on specific campaigns and policy initiatives. This shift suggests a gradual institutionalization of tactical coordination in certain domains, though the depth and stability of such alignment remain contingent on the creation of durable negotiation mechanisms and reciprocal trust.

Summary

Overall, the TPP's cooperation with the two major camps has been characterized by strategic ambiguity and selective coordination. Tactical interactions—such as major-party withdrawal, local-level accommodations, and issue-based legislative cooperation—can increase short-term influence for the TPP. However, without formal negotiation channels, credible commitment devices, and inter-party trust, these accommodations remain episodic. This pattern is consistent with Hypothesis 2: cooperation with major parties can yield political leverage for the TPP, but its effectiveness is fundamentally constrained by weak institutional arrangements and low inter-party trust.

Third Section (Talent Recruitment and Political Influence Expansion)

Talent recruitment is a crucial strategy for third parties seeking to expand political influence under a two-party system. By incorporating politicians from other parties, a third party can strengthen organizational capacity, enhance electoral mobilization, and build cross-faction networks. Comparative experience from the United Kingdom's Liberal Democrats suggests that

²⁶ UDN-Party Cooperation (23)

talent absorption—through both formal party switching and informal cooperation—can allow third parties to accumulate resources and influence despite institutional constraints. Drawing on this insight, this section examines how the Taiwan People’s Party utilizes talent recruitment to expand its political influence and evaluates Hypothesis 3.

Case 1- Party Switching

Party switching constitutes the most prominent mechanism of talent recruitment for the Taiwan People’s Party. Rather than emerging randomly, this pattern reflects a structural feature of third-party development: newly established parties often function as alternative platforms for politicians who face declining prospects, limited advancement opportunities, or factional constraints within established parties. By absorbing such figures, a third party can rapidly acquire electoral experience, administrative capacity, and local networks without long-term organizational cultivation.²⁷

The TPP has exhibited this pattern through the incorporation of politicians from across the party spectrum. Former members of the New Power Party, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Kuomintang (KMT), and People First Party (PFP) have assumed positions ranging from legislative seats to local executive roles.²⁸ These transfers do not merely reflect individual career decisions; collectively, they indicate a recruitment strategy that compensates for the TPP’s limited grassroots infrastructure by importing pre-existing political capital.²⁹

Notably, many of these party switchers share similar structural backgrounds: they previously held elected office, experienced marginalization or stagnation within their original parties, and retained localized name recognition. From an organizational perspective, such

²⁷ LTN-Talent Recruitment (1)

²⁸ UDN-Talent Recruitment (16)

²⁹ UDN-Talent Recruitment (17)

recruitment reduces entry barriers for the TPP in competitive districts and accelerates its capacity for electoral mobilization. However, this reliance on externally sourced elites also produces internal heterogeneity, increasing coordination costs and limiting the development of a cohesive party identity.

Beyond high-profile figures, the TPP has also attracted mid-level and grassroots politicians who bring administrative expertise and factional connections. These cases suggest that party switching operates as a functional substitute for long-term cadre training. While this strategy enhances short-term competitiveness, it also underscores the party's dependence on personal networks rather than institutionalized recruitment channels.

Original Party	Person	Current Position
New Power Party	Huang Kuo-chang	TPP's Party Chairperson
New Power Party	Wu Wei-ta	Changhua County Councilor
Democratic Progressive Party	Chen Chao-chi	Legislator-at-Large
Democratic Progressive Party	Chou Yu-hsiu	Party Secretary-General
Kuomintang	Chen Ching-lung	Taichung City Councilor
Kuomintang	Hsieh Li-kung	Former Secretary-General
Kuomintang	Chen Fu-hai	Kinmen County Magistrate
People First Party	Huang Shan-shan	Legislator-at-Large
People First Party	Lin Kuo-cheng	Legislator-at-Large
People First Party	Chiang Ho-shu	Taichung City Councilor

Table 3 Politicians Who Defected to the Taiwan People's Party

Case 2- Campaign Support

In addition to personnel recruitment, the TPP has employed strategic endorsements and vote coordination as a complementary mechanism for expanding political influence. Unlike formal alliances, these practices rely on signaling rather than institutional commitment, allowing the party to mitigate vote-splitting while preserving organizational autonomy.

Empirical cases demonstrate that such coordination frequently occurs in highly competitive races where three-way competition alters voter incentives.³⁰ By encouraging strategic voting or selectively supporting candidates from other parties, the TPP positions itself as a flexible intermediary capable of influencing electoral outcomes without assuming the risks associated with formal coalition-building.³¹ This strategy is particularly evident in local and by-election contexts, where electoral margins are narrow and organizational presence is limited.

Analytically, this pattern reflects the constraints faced by third parties operating under single-member district and mixed electoral systems. Without sufficient district-level strength, the TPP relies on informal coordination to translate its national visibility into localized electoral relevance. However, because these arrangements lack enforceable agreements or long-term reciprocity, their effectiveness remains contingent and difficult to sustain across electoral cycles.

Summary

Taken together, the TPP's talent recruitment strategy is characterized by two interrelated mechanisms: party switching and informal campaign coordination. Party switching allows the TPP to acquire experienced political elites and local networks, partially offsetting its organizational weaknesses. Meanwhile, strategic endorsements and vote coordination enable the party to exert influence in competitive races without institutionalizing alliances.

These strategies parallel the experience of the UK Liberal Democrats, who similarly relied on elite absorption and tactical cooperation to expand influence under institutional constraints. At the same time, the TPP's dependence on externally sourced talent and informal coordination reveals inherent limitations, including internal heterogeneity and weak organizational

³⁰ UDN-Talent Recruitment (35)

³¹ LTN-Talent Recruitment (29)

consolidation. This analysis supports Hypothesis 3 by demonstrating that talent recruitment enhances the TPP's short-term political influence but does not fully resolve its structural vulnerabilities as a third party.

Third, but Not the Same: Divergent Paths of the UK and Taiwan's Third Parties

As previously discussed, the Taiwan People's Party and the UK's Liberal Democrats share several similarities in their political trajectories—particularly in terms of electoral geography constraints, interactions with dominant parties, and challenges in talent recruitment and influence expansion. These parallels underscore the structural dilemmas commonly faced by third parties across democratic systems.

Yet a closer examination reveals significant divergences in their founding contexts, reliance on charismatic leadership, and internal organizational structures. These differences not only reflect broader institutional contrasts between the UK and Taiwan but also highlight the distinct strategic choices and survival logics of third parties operating under different political cultures and electoral systems. The following comparative analysis will be structured in three sections, each focusing on a key dimension of divergence: party origins and institutional formation, dependence on charismatic leadership, and the relationship between organizational structure and membership base.

First Section (Differences in party founding contexts and institutional origins)

The formation of third parties is strongly conditioned by institutional context and political history. Although both the United Kingdom's Liberal Democrats and the Taiwan People's Party are categorized as third parties, their founding processes and institutional origins differ in ways that produce distinct organizational dynamics. This section compares their founding contexts and

outlines how these differences shape subsequent trajectories in electoral performance, party cooperation, and talent recruitment.

Case 1- The UK Liberal Democrats Formed by the Merger of the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party

The Liberal Democrats emerged from a negotiated merger between the long-established Liberal Party and the breakaway Social Democratic Party (SDP). The SDP's split from Labour in 1981 and subsequent electoral cooperation with the Liberals in the 1980s set the stage for a formal union in 1988.³² This merger entailed the integration of local branches, parliamentary groups, and party infrastructures, producing routinized governance procedures and a degree of organizational continuity. Analytically, a merger-based origin tends to facilitate the transfer of institutional resources—such as established local cadres, fundraising networks, and internal decision-making routines—which can enhance a third party's resilience to electoral shocks and support coherent policy positioning within a first-past-the-post environment.

Case 2- The Taiwan People's Party: Founder-Centered Rapid Formation

By contrast, the TPP was established in 2019 without inheriting an existing party apparatus. Its initial mobilization relied heavily on the public visibility and electoral appeal of a single political founder.³³ This leadership-centered origin enabled rapid voter mobilization and high media salience, but it also produced structural consequences: weaker pre-existing local organizations, greater reliance on recruited elites and party switchers, and elevated sensitivity to shifts in leader popularity or media cycles.³⁴ From an organizational perspective, such founder-

³² 蘇子喬、王業立（2013）。選擇投票制與英國國會選制改革。東吳政治學報，31(2)，71-137。

³³ UDN-Party Cooperation (1)

³⁴ UDN-Party Cooperation (5)

centered formation can accelerate short-term expansion while constraining the development of deep local networks and routinized internal governance.

Summary

The contrast between a merger-derived party and a founder-centered party highlights a key institutional trade-off. Merger-based institutionalization tends to support organizational depth, continuity in cadre development, and policy consistency; founder-centered rapid formation tends to deliver immediate visibility and flexibility but may leave a party more dependent on external political capital and media-driven mobilization. These differences are analytically relevant for the present study because they help explain variation in the TPP's electoral geography, the tactical rather than institutionalized nature of some cooperative arrangements, and the party's reliance on talent recruitment as a substitute for long-term organizational embedding. In the following chapters, these founding conditions are used as an interpretive lens for assessing the TPP's electoral performance, patterns of inter-party cooperation, and strategies of talent recruitment.

Second Section (The strength of charismatic leadership and party dependence)

Charismatic leadership describes a situation in which a party depends heavily on the personal image, resources, and mobilizing capacity of a single leader. Such leadership can rapidly raise a party's profile and electoral prospects, but it also concentrates authority, weakens collective decision-making, and increases vulnerability during leadership crises. These risks are particularly salient for parties with limited institutional depth. This section examines how leader-centered dynamics affect organizational resilience by comparing the UK Liberal Democrats and the Taiwan People's Party.

Case 1- Short-lived leader-centric effects in an institutionalized party

The Liberal Democrats have experienced episodes of intensified leader focus—for example, the surge in public attention around Nick Clegg in 2010 (“Cleggmania”) and Jo Swinson’s campaign in 2019—but these moments did not produce durable dependence on a single figure. Two mechanisms help explain why. First, established internal rules for leadership selection and accountability channel popular enthusiasm into institutional processes, preventing permanent concentration of authority. Second, distributed organizational capacities—local branches, cadre networks, and collective messaging—allow the party to absorb reputational shocks and recalibrate strategy when a leader’s appeal wanes. The 2010–2015 coalition experience and subsequent electoral losses prompted internal reflection and structural adaptation within the party, leading to a shift toward more policy-centered campaigns and decentralized outreach under later leadership. Thus, leader-driven visibility can produce short-term gains, but institutionalized parties are better able to constrain the long-term risks associated with charismatic appeals.

Case 2- Leader dependence and organizational vulnerability in the TPP

By contrast, the TPP’s early development exhibits stronger leader dependence. The party’s initial mobilization relied substantially on the founder’s public visibility and branding, which facilitated rapid growth but left organizational foundations comparatively shallow.³⁵ In such founder-centered configurations, several structural mechanisms increase vulnerability: (1) decision-making tends to be centralized around the leader, reducing internal deliberation and the formation of routinized procedures; (2) local organization and cadre development are often underdeveloped, making grassroots mobilization contingent on leader-driven networks; and (3) succession and accountability mechanisms remain weak, so controversies involving the leader

³⁵ LTN-Talent Recruitment (33)

more directly translate into party-wide credibility losses.³⁶ Following the 2024 election period and related controversies, the decline in the founder's approval ratings corresponded with observable drops in party support, a pattern consistent with these mechanisms.³⁷ Attempts by other senior figures to expand leadership roles have been constrained by the absence of clear institutionalized succession rules, which in turn limits the party's capacity to recover quickly from leader-specific setbacks.

Summary

Comparing these cases suggests that institutionalization mediates the effects of charismatic leadership. In parties with established internal mechanisms, leader-centered surges tend to be episodic and manageable: rules, distributed capacities, and collective practices reduce long-term dependence on any one individual. In founder-centered parties, rapid visibility and mobilization can come at the cost of organizational depth, making party fortunes more sensitive to changes in leader popularity or controversy. This analysis supports the hypothesis that high leader dependence constrains long-term stability and institutional development, especially for newly formed or weakly institutionalized third parties. The following chapters examine how these leader-centered organizational conditions influence the TPP's electoral geography, cooperative strategies with major parties, and talent-recruitment practices.

Third Section (The gap between organizational structure and membership base)

The relationship between a party's institutional development and the composition of its membership base shapes its capacity for long-term resilience. Mature parties can face difficulties renewing their membership and policy agenda, while newer parties often struggle to translate grassroots enthusiasm into stable organizational mechanisms. This section compares how the

³⁶ LTN-Talent Recruitment (37)

³⁷ UDN- Talent Recruitment (65)

Liberal Democrats and the Taiwan People's Party manage the balance between structure and membership composition and analyzes the consequences for organizational durability.

Case 1- Mature Structure, Aging Membership, and Youth Engagement Challenges

The Liberal Democrats possess a well-developed organizational structure: formal local branches, routinized policy-making procedures, and established internal democratic mechanisms. At the same time, the party shows a demographic skew toward older members (average age reported at 52, with a substantial share aged 65+ and only a small proportion aged 18–24). Analytically, this demographic profile affects the party through several mechanisms. First, an older membership base can slow the adoption of issue priorities favored by younger voters, reducing policy responsiveness on topics such as digital governance or emergent climate strategies. Second, an aging cadre may constrain candidate renewal and the long-term pipeline of local organizers, increasing reliance on incumbent networks. Third, mobilization patterns linked to older membership—stable but less digitally connected—may limit rapid outreach to younger electorates. These dynamics help explain why institutional depth does not automatically ensure generational renewal and why mature parties must adapt organizational practices to remain electorally relevant.

Case 2- Youthful Base but Weak Organizational Infrastructure

By contrast, the TPP reports a relatively younger membership composition (large shares in the 31–40 cohort and a notable proportion under 30).³⁸ This youthful base contributes to the party's appeal on topics framed as technological, pragmatic, or reform-oriented. However, the party's organizational structure remains comparatively shallow: decision-making appears centralized, local branches are underdeveloped, and mechanisms for routine member

³⁸ LTN-Talent Recruitment (39)

participation are limited. From a mechanism perspective, these conditions produce both strengths and constraints. The youthful membership supports flexible messaging and rapid mobilization via digital channels, but weak local infrastructure reduces the party's capacity for sustained grassroots organizing, candidate development, and local-level service provision. Moreover, reliance on a mobilized but less institutionalized base increases vulnerability to turnover and volunteer burnout, making long-term policy depth and stable local representation harder to achieve.

Summary

These contrasting cases illustrate a core institutional trade-off. The Liberal Democrats' organizational depth affords stability and institutional memory but creates challenges for generational renewal and issue responsiveness. The TPP's youthful membership provides adaptability and media-savvy mobilization, yet the party's limited local structures and centralized decision-making constrain long-term consolidation. Understanding these mechanisms—how membership demographics interact with organizational capacities—helps explain differences in electoral performance, the character of inter-party cooperation, and reliance on external talent recruitment. The following chapters apply this interpretive lens to analyze the TPP's geographic electoral patterns, cooperative strategies, and talent acquisition practices.

CONCLUSION

This study examined the survival conditions and structural challenges faced by third parties operating within two-party-dominated political systems through a comparative analysis of the Taiwan People's Party and the United Kingdom's Liberal Democrats. By applying a unified analytical framework—electoral performance, party cooperation, and organizational and talent structures—the research assessed how institutional arrangements shape both the opportunities available to third parties and the constraints limiting their long-term development. The findings provide empirical support for the proposed hypotheses and offer broader implications for understanding third-party dynamics in democratic systems.

Verification of Research Findings

First, the analysis confirms that the Taiwan People's Party relies heavily on geographically concentrated electoral support. Similar to the UK Liberal Democrats under the First-Past-the-Post system, the TPP demonstrates a pattern of regional asymmetry, achieving stronger performance in northern and selected central urban areas while facing persistent difficulty expanding into southern regions. This uneven distribution reflects the combined effects of electoral institutions and entrenched local political networks, indicating that regional concentration constitutes a structural constraint on nationwide expansion rather than a temporary electoral fluctuation.

Second, the findings show that the TPP has been able to generate political leverage through selective cooperation with major parties, particularly within the legislature. Issue-based collaboration and procedural coordination have enabled the party to exert influence beyond its numerical strength. However, the absence of institutionalized coordination mechanisms has

limited the stability and predictability of such cooperation, especially at the presidential level, where ad hoc negotiations have proven fragile and difficult to sustain.

Third, the study finds that talent recruitment has played an important role in enhancing the TPP's organizational capacity and electoral competitiveness. By incorporating politicians from other parties, the TPP has accessed administrative experience, local networks, and campaign resources that would otherwise be costly to cultivate independently. At the same time, this strategy highlights the party's reliance on external political capital, underscoring the need for stronger internal mechanisms of organizational consolidation and long-term talent cultivation.

Comparative Implications

Beyond hypothesis testing, the comparative analysis highlights key differences between the Taiwan People's Party and the UK Liberal Democrats. The Liberal Democrats' formation through party merger and their relatively higher degree of institutionalization have allowed them to maintain organizational continuity despite electoral setbacks and leadership changes. In contrast, the TPP's rapid emergence as a newly established party has been closely associated with a leadership-centered organizational structure, resulting in greater organizational centralization and increased vulnerability to fluctuations in leadership authority and public support.

This contrast illustrates a broader trade-off faced by third parties. More institutionalized parties benefit from organizational stability and continuity but may struggle with adaptability and responsiveness to emerging political demands. Conversely, newer parties may display greater flexibility and mobilization capacity while lacking the institutional depth necessary for long-term sustainability. These patterns suggest that institutional development, rather than short-term electoral performance alone, is a critical determinant of third-party survival.

Implications and Possible Developments

Recent organizational developments within the Taiwan People's Party suggest an ongoing period of structural adjustment. Changes in leadership configuration and the distribution of authority have introduced additional organizational complexity, potentially affecting internal coordination, policy positioning, and electoral strategy. Rather than indicating immediate fragmentation, these developments reflect the challenges faced by rapidly growing third parties as they transition from personalized leadership structures toward more institutionalized forms of organization.

At the local level, the possibility of future participation by senior party elites in executive-level contests would represent an important test of the TPP's ability to translate national visibility into sustainable local organizational strength. Under conditions of fragmented opposition coordination, such contests may also highlight the risks of vote splitting within non-Green political camps, a challenge consistent with patterns observed in previous elections.

At the national level, the continued dominance of Taiwan's two-party system constrains the prospects of third parties in presidential elections. Consistent with the comparative experience of the UK Liberal Democrats, this suggests that third-party influence under existing institutional arrangements is more likely to be achieved through coalition bargaining, legislative negotiation, or strategic alignment rather than through outright electoral victory. In this context, leadership transitions and alliance strategies will remain central to shaping the TPP's access to policymaking influence.

Overall, these possible developments should not be interpreted as deterministic forecasts, but rather as analytically grounded projections derived from observed patterns in electoral institutions, organizational structures, and inter-party interactions. The extent to which the

Taiwan People's Party can reduce organizational uncertainty, strengthen institutional coherence, and clarify its strategic positioning will remain critical to its future political trajectory.

APPENDIX-UDN

Table of the Database Established for Data Analysis of UDN 's news

158 pieces		
Ref. No.	Data Published	Tittle
UDN-Election (1)	2019/8/7	不分區提滿34席 柯領軍「征戰天下」不蹈時力覆轍…以戰養戰 否則打擊就完了 柯意志進立院…提名人選不排除雙重黨籍
UDN-Election (2)	2019/8/19	台灣民眾黨的立委選舉挑戰
UDN-Election (3)	2019/10/28	學者：小黨愈多 有利藍綠
UDN-Election (4)	2019/11/26	幫柯文哲保溫 柯粉發起廢票運動 蔡壁如：將強化「柯文哲等於民眾黨」意象 催政黨票 不鼓勵投廢票 但也會想知道投柯的無效票有多少？
UDN-Election (5)	2020/1/2	2020立委選舉圖表一覽／國會席次綠再過半 民眾黨竄起成第三大黨
UDN-Election (6)	2020/1/12	藍綠平手 不分區各拿13席 蔡壁如擠進門檻 吳敦義、黃國昌落榜
UDN-Election (7)	2020/1/12	第三勢力 民眾黨、時力突破5% 柯文哲：先解決2022 再來討論2024
UDN-Election (8)	2020/1/16	綠分裂投票 民眾黨定位更關鍵
UDN-Election (9)	2020/5/24	地方選舉第一戰 民眾黨吞敗
UDN-Election (10)	2020/8/13	高市長補選倒數 藍打貪腐 綠衝選票 白拚空戰 吳益政：近日握手 感受民眾溫度
UDN-Election (11)	2020/8/16	柯防線失守 測2024底氣受挫
UDN-Election (12)	2020/8/17	高雄市長補選 無主場優勢？ 藍白選區得票都輸綠

UDN-Election (13)	2020/8/17	民眾黨：輸選舉 贏在為市民發聲
UDN-Election (14)	2021/11/5	民眾黨四公投民調 黨員支持度高
UDN-Election (15)	2021/11/21	民意並未潰敗 誰是公投輸家？
UDN-Election (16)	2022/1/15	拚九合一 各黨提名席次成形 綠26席 白8席 新黨1區1席 時力拚組黨團
UDN-Election (17)	2022/7/7	柯下令參戰 竹市、基隆三腳督 民眾黨鎖定高虹安選竹市 邱臣遠選基隆
UDN-Election (18)	2022/11/2	白坐一望二？ 綠喊制裁柯黃 藍拚願景
UDN-Election (19)	2022/11/20	激戰區搖擺族 決勝關鍵
UDN-Election (20)	2022/11/26	催票vs. 固票 議員候選人都喊搶救 民調封關耳語滿天 老將怕分票、新秀拚出線 選前集體焦慮
UDN-Election (21)	2022/11/27	棄保發酵 高虹安 最年輕竹市長 反擊「綠色恐怖」成全國焦點 為民眾黨搶下灘頭堡
UDN-Election (22)	2022/11/28	第三勢力 民眾黨攻進中彰投 時力台中1席
UDN-Election (23)	2023/11/14	2024大選 本報最新民調 呈現分裂投票 支持柯者 僅 數挺民眾黨 政黨票 藍綠平分秋色 白增幅大
UDN-Election (24)	2024/1/14	綠558萬票 藍466萬票 白368萬票 賴清德小贏 賴得票未過半 國會三黨不過半 民進黨雙少數 第一時間反應 拜登：不支持台灣獨立
UDN-Election (25)	2024/1/14	白不分區8席 時力從立院消失
UDN-Election (26)	2024/1/14	突圍藍綠 民眾黨成第三大黨 第3勢力板塊成形 逾2成6得票率 成柯4年後再戰底氣

UDN-Election (27)	2024/1/14	白分走藍票 綠守住宜蘭立委 黃瑋婷、陳琬惠 喊話陳俊宇：要讓建設起飛
UDN-Election (28)	2024/4/14	麥寮鄉長補選民眾黨仍居第三 是基本盤如此或 柯文哲魅力不再？
UDN-Election (29)	2024/4/18	麥寮鄉長補選啟示錄 預言2026、2028柯文哲與 民眾黨命運
UDN-Election (30)	2024/4/23	從國會表現失去主體性到麥寮吞敗 看民眾黨 2026地方選舉隱憂
UDN-Election (31)	2025/8/14	參選嘉市長 張啓楷鬆口表態
UDN-Election (32)	2025/8/22	白營點名角逐縣市長 彰化公投催票 張啓楷： 成為最好人選
UDN-Party Cooperation (1)	2019/8/6	柯才是綠假裝無視的大尾敵人…
UDN-Party Cooperation (2)	2020/1/13	與民進黨合作？競爭？柯P：不關鍵少數是重 點
UDN-Party Cooperation (3)	2020/1/14	2022選舉 柯：民眾黨要遍地開花 思考推派人 選參選新竹市長 蔡壁如拋「在野大聯盟」尋求 各黨派合作
UDN-Party Cooperation (4)	2020/6/13	蚵仔煎與藍白合作
UDN-Party Cooperation (5)	2020/10/17	拉藍打綠？柯與民進黨很保溫
UDN-Party Cooperation (6)	2021/2/25	學者vs. 大砲 藍白合還有續集？
UDN-Party Cooperation (7)	2021/2/26	藍白合雙贏？重心別只為票源

UDN-Party Cooperation (8)	2021/3/9	「綠白合作」的虛虛實實
UDN-Party Cooperation (9)	2021/4/25	高市長選舉 民眾黨不排除政黨合作 昨成立高市黨部 柯強調中道屬性 藍持開放態度 綠不排斥
UDN-Party Cooperation (10)	2021/5/4	2022北市選戰 柯駁斥「藍白合」 民眾黨不要求黃珊珊入黨 國民黨：沒考慮跟白合作 民進黨：會推最強人選
UDN-Party Cooperation (11)	2021/9/16	拚2024 柯：會尋求郭趙侯支持 若郭台銘民調勝 柯會支持 趙少康：2024柯是關鍵角色
UDN-Party Cooperation (12)	2022/2/15	連勝文：大家一起反對法西斯鬥爭 藍白合？ 柯：藍內部先搞定再來
UDN-Party Cooperation (13)	2022/7/10	柯文哲南下輔選 謝龍介喊在野大聯盟 柯：不同黨也可見面聊天 在野若未有效整合 黃偉哲仍會當選
UDN-Party Cooperation (14)	2022/10/12	破藍白合傳言 林耕仁、侯友宜今合體 盧秀燕牽手高虹安 林向黨中央抗議遭冷處理 國民黨：中市府已澄清
UDN-Party Cooperation (15)	2022/11/10	高虹安密會楊文科 另類藍白合？ 宣明智牽線 高插著點滴針頭見楊 林耕仁尊重 沈慧虹疑利益交換
UDN-Party Cooperation (16)	2022/11/27	柯文哲：第3勢力在壯大 民眾黨打下竹市灘頭堡 學者：2024藍白難合
UDN-Party Cooperation (17)	2022/11/29	藍白未合，選民先行？
UDN-Party Cooperation (18)	2023/1/10	王鴻薇提黨外合作 2024民調納柯、郭「勝選方程式是推最強候選人」 藍稱團結非綠陣營 柯：半年後再回答
UDN-Party Cooperation (19)	2023/1/26	柯改口藍白合作可考量 合併不可能
UDN-Party Cooperation (20)	2023/3/4	南投補選 2024藍白合試金石 朱立倫盼「非綠一起努力」 柯文哲稱維持中立

UDN-Party Cooperation (21)	2023/3/13	藍白合 朱：部分地區可考量 柯文哲肯定連勝文格局 民眾黨：理念相同願合作
UDN-Party Cooperation (22)	2023/5/2	柯文哲高喊「聯合政府」，在向誰示好？
UDN-Party Cooperation (23)	2023/5/21	柯猛轟蔡 承諾當選組聯合政府
UDN-Party Cooperation (24)	2023/10/11	藍白磋商 互提方案 柯：先3場辯論 再比民調
UDN-Party Cooperation (25)	2023/10/13	藍白合必定要策略聯盟
UDN-Party Cooperation (26)	2023/10/14	各懷鬼胎無助藍白合
UDN-Party Cooperation (27)	2023/10/14	會談前先喊 柯：我正、藍副、郭進來 會大贏
UDN-Party Cooperation (28)	2023/10/16	比民調比初選 不如偏好投票制
UDN-Party Cooperation (29)	2023/10/16	柯：藍營只想展現地方實力 批初選「很難執行」 國民黨有其他方案 我們再來談
UDN-Party Cooperation (30)	2023/10/17	認知不同 藍白仍互探底線
UDN-Party Cooperation (31)	2023/10/18	柯文哲先答下一題：當正的，怎麼組政府？
UDN-Party Cooperation (32)	2023/10/21	柯談合作：藍是主力 柯見過朱侯 不會「整碗捧走」 侯籲柯速談折衷辦法
UDN-Party Cooperation (33)	2023/10/26	藍白合柯當正 藍軍恐投不下去
UDN-Party Cooperation (34)	2023/11/2	柯：誰正誰副都接受 但有前提 民眾黨：不會「郭柯配」 侯盼政黨協商新方法 藍白共同往前推進
UDN-Party Cooperation (35)	2023/11/4	藍白不合 問題始終在人

UDN-Party Cooperation (36)	2023/11/4	柯：全民調誤差內 贏了我也讓 朱說統計誤差沒意義 要調查團隊、政黨實力 籲柯別再走回原點
UDN-Party Cooperation (37)	2023/11/9	柯拋民調 壓垮藍白合最後一根稻草？
UDN-Party Cooperation (38)	2023/11/14	2024大選 本報最新民調 呈現分裂投票 支持柯者 僅 數挺民眾黨 政黨票 藍綠平分秋色 白增幅大
UDN-Party Cooperation (39)	2023/11/16	藍白6共識 民調決勝 三方專家檢視民調 周六公布結果 柯：歷史一刻 侯3波民主改革
UDN-Party Cooperation (40)	2023/11/19	爭議一 抽樣誤差範圍相持不下 專家：柯應願賭服輸 藍主張正負3% 白拒讓6個百分點
UDN-Party Cooperation (41)	2023/11/20	柯誓師 外界解讀「選正的 沒侯柯配」
UDN-Party Cooperation (42)	2023/11/24	藍白郭會談不歡而散 柯競辦稱今11時登記 藍11時中常會公布副手 侯11:45登記
UDN-Party Cooperation (43)	2023/11/26	柯泡沫化是藍白未合之得？
UDN-Party Cooperation (44)	2023/11/27	柯：不放棄藍白「和」 被譏家裡蹲 柯說台灣可去的地方很多
UDN-Party Cooperation (45)	2023/12/7	藍白和 小雞合體造勢、掛看板 藍洪佳君同框 蔡壁如、陳世軒 白李有宜找洪孟楷、游淑慧一起掃街
UDN-Party Cooperation (46)	2023/12/9	柯文哲的「深綠告白」，在自剖白皮綠骨？
UDN-Party Cooperation (47)	2024/1/8	拒藍倡議聯合政府，柯文哲還盼綠白合？
UDN-Party Cooperation (48)	2024/1/10	竹縣兩選區 確定藍白合
UDN-Party Cooperation (49)	2024/1/12	侯：必推藍白聯合政府 柯營：用人唯才

UDN-Party Cooperation (50)	2024/1/15	《2024大選變局》柯文哲助賴清德登基，國會將出現綠白合？
UDN-Party Cooperation (51)	2024/3/20	進擊的柯P／柯文哲會蔡英文引發民眾黨路線之爭 急發黨員信穩基層
UDN-Party Cooperation (52)	2024/11/9	2026藍白合變數多 藍營評估合不合有三大關鍵
UDN-Party Cooperation (53)	2024/11/27	藍：政策導向 藍白合作將更緊密 綠營盼小草回頭
UDN-Party Cooperation (54)	2025/7/13	盧秀燕、黃國昌 台中同台反罷 盧：賴總統應停止罷免去救災 黃：台中的事就是民眾黨的事
UDN-Party Cooperation (55)	2025/7/28	盧秀燕謝白營和小草 「續並肩前行」大罷免失敗 藍白更緊密 徐巧芯「公投案湧泉以報」 葉元之：執政黨鴨霸 在野要團結
UDN-Party Cooperation (56)	2025/8/17	黃國昌戰新北 藍：藍白合仍有關卡 終究是藍讓白？ 民意要在野合作 選戰競合還有得談
UDN- Talent Recruitment (1)	2019/8/1	柯營：郭選柯不選 郭不選柯才選 力拚十席區域和不分區立委 稱台灣民眾黨屬柔性政黨 黨網會讓外界「大吃一驚」
UDN- Talent Recruitment (2)	2019/8/1	藍不意外 希望不是台銘黨
UDN- Talent Recruitment (3)	2019/8/2	組政黨 是原子彈或氫彈？
UDN- Talent Recruitment (4)	2019/8/2	柯文哲不是蔣渭水：一個等待填空的黨
UDN- Talent Recruitment (5)	2019/8/2	1郭柯合 2柯參選 3柯不選衝政黨票 2024伺機而動 柯文哲3劇本 萬事俱備只等郭
UDN- Talent Recruitment (6)	2019/8/4	大位難取 精神要贏 柯文哲與郭台銘的分合
UDN- Talent Recruitment (7)	2019/8/7	柯文哲的第三勢力須突破嘴砲印象
UDN- Talent Recruitment (8)	2019/8/7	不當藍綠側翼 四缺的黨怎突圍

UDN- Talent Recruitment (9)	2019/8/15	台灣民眾黨能撐多久？
UDN- Talent Recruitment (10)	2019/8/28	郭或柯選難判斷 綠軍估 郭柯合藍綠票都吃
UDN- Talent Recruitment (11)	2019/10/10	郭柯挖藍綠牆角 選情變數多
UDN- Talent Recruitment (12)	2019/10/24	台灣民眾黨 只剩空氣票？
UDN- Talent Recruitment (13)	2019/10/27	第三勢力競合 時力：要從民眾黨撈票
UDN- Talent Recruitment (14)	2019/10/28	搶政黨票 民進黨和小綠畫清界線 時力、民眾黨搶票 不分區名單形象牌優先 最後關頭可能再打告急牌
UDN- Talent Recruitment (15)	2019/12/21	小黨成不了第三勢力，原因在甘扮側翼
UDN- Talent Recruitment (16)	2020/1/25	綠白合作？ 陳信瑜入柯小內閣
UDN- Talent Recruitment (17)	2020/3/4	柯整軍布局 藍軍林有志當顧問外界解讀挖藍營牆角 北市府顧問藍綠並列 發言體系也增人 網羅民眾黨林珍羽、主播陳智菡
UDN- Talent Recruitment (18)	2020/7/5	2022備戰 綠白鎖定年輕族群
UDN- Talent Recruitment (19)	2020/8/16	「罷韓不等於挺邁」給各政黨的啟示
UDN- Talent Recruitment (20)	2021/2/22	又傳藍被民眾黨挖角 胡文琦任顧問 「可能」違黨紀
UDN- Talent Recruitment (21)	2021/8/27	韓國瑜心腹 加入民眾黨 拐韓粉票？柯：我要拐全台灣票
UDN- Talent Recruitment (22)	2021/12/9	藍綠將擋覆議案 柯酸為社會公益？
UDN- Talent Recruitment (23)	2021/12/18	聚焦兩好 柯文哲轟藍綠搞雙標
UDN- Talent Recruitment (24)	2022/2/21	金主牽線 妻子力挺 柯挖泛藍攻大位

UDN- Talent Recruitment (25)	2022/3/8	無緣會見龐培歐 柯：出價比不過民進黨
UDN- Talent Recruitment (26)	2022/5/29	小黨搶攻北台 5縣市年底混戰
UDN- Talent Recruitment (27)	2022/7/13	竹市長三腳督 藍白：不怕棄保 綠爭取認同
UDN- Talent Recruitment (28)	2022/7/21	民眾黨推原民政見 搶藍鐵票意味濃
UDN- Talent Recruitment (29)	2022/9/12	白挖年輕票 綠北、竹選情吃緊 黃珊珊趨勢看漲 高虹安成竹科「吸票機」 藍：蔣萬安穩定領先
UDN- Talent Recruitment (30)	2022/10/9	一人政黨 自評個性「適合當行政院長」
UDN- Talent Recruitment (31)	2022/10/22	竹市藍綠白 棄保、中間選票是關鍵
UDN- Talent Recruitment (32)	2022/10/25	棄保戰打得火熱 就怕邊緣化
UDN- Talent Recruitment (33)	2022/11/6	棄保不能爭權，攻防也別成綠色黨國幫凶
UDN- Talent Recruitment (34)	2022/11/10	藍白棄保纏鬥 防綠坐收漁翁之利
UDN- Talent Recruitment (35)	2022/11/18	挖牆角？柯文哲花蓮首站挺藍議長
UDN- Talent Recruitment (36)	2022/11/27	藍綠圍攻 民眾黨還有段路要走
UDN- Talent Recruitment (37)	2022/12/5	第三勢力 何去何從
UDN- Talent Recruitment (38)	2023/1/2	柯文哲批 綠沒中心思想
UDN- Talent Recruitment (39)	2023/1/26	淡水賞櫻 沿途紛聞「總統好」 柯說可選總統 侯盼北部千萬人共好
UDN- Talent Recruitment (40)	2023/1/27	性、出身中南部、來自企業或財經界 柯提2024副手3條件 不是黃珊珊

UDN- Talent Recruitment (41)	2023/2/6	柯文哲應該以哪個宋楚瑜為借鑑？
UDN- Talent Recruitment (42)	2023/4/3	柯文哲：若當總統 到立院備詢 競選口號想好了 自認支持度還會成長 不分區立委「八席是低標」
UDN- Talent Recruitment (43)	2023/4/9	訪美層級不高／遭已讀不回 部分僑胞拒接待 民眾黨憂：柯起手式 恐不夠力
UDN- Talent Recruitment (44)	2023/10/3	2024立委戰／柯文哲放話每區提一位立委 前幕僚指2022年教訓不遠
UDN- Talent Recruitment (45)	2023/10/10	柯文哲喊內閣制入憲 終結獨裁總統
UDN- Talent Recruitment (46)	2023/10/17	足夠民意基礎 增加總統正當性 兩輪投票制 終結「民選皇帝」
UDN- Talent Recruitment (47)	2023/11/25	白攻不分區 藍綠想維持現狀
UDN- Talent Recruitment (48)	2023/11/27	平等、正義、永續 抓住新世代的心 年輕選票再度成大選關鍵
UDN- Talent Recruitment (49)	2023/11/27	藍白搶青年票 柯開講 侯主打「戰爭與和平」
UDN- Talent Recruitment (50)	2023/11/28	2024大選 本報最新民調 完全執政47%不樂見區域 不分區立委 藍擴大領先
UDN- Talent Recruitment (51)	2023/11/30	看看新民調，「讓六趴」的心魔可放下了
UDN- Talent Recruitment (52)	2023/12/2	學者評副手：藍綠加分 白有風險
UDN- Talent Recruitment (53)	2023/12/21	柯P蹭遍歷史人物，哪個人設能政黨輪替？

UDN- Talent Recruitment (54)	2023/12/29	藍白搶韓粉 趙少康：分清正牌冒牌 侯友宜：柯應多尊重韓國瑜的選擇 柯辦：誰真誰假不是趙說了算
UDN- Talent Recruitment (55)	2023/12/30	自我推銷 賴：不炒地不炒房 柯：我不紅出身綠 侯：我沒有藍綠白
UDN- Talent Recruitment (56)	2024/1/4	《選戰筆記》 柯想藍綠通吃 侯不讓賴得利
UDN- Talent Recruitment (57)	2024/1/7	批藍綠動員 柯：這場選舉 新政治對決舊勢力
UDN- Talent Recruitment (58)	2024/1/14	網路爭霸 柯強勢威脅綠天下 有聲量未必是好事 操作不慎易翻車 政黨需警惕
UDN- Talent Recruitment (59)	2024/1/15	學者分析小草 還不算柯鐵票
UDN- Talent Recruitment (60)	2024/4/6	柯文哲稱九二共識非兩岸唯一解 恐領民眾黨走向深水區
UDN- Talent Recruitment (61)	2024/8/4	柯文哲：不做小藍 也不是小綠 黨代表大會 批綠對改革自我閹割 柯問黃國昌如何提升網路流量
UDN- Talent Recruitment (62)	2024/8/5	民眾黨五歲的成績單，柯文哲滿意嗎？
UDN- Talent Recruitment (63)	2024/11/7	柯文哲的代理黨主席案 曝露一人政黨脆弱體質
UDN- Talent Recruitment (64)	2024/11/18	柯文哲人設一垮恐鬆動小草支持 藍想爭取盤整把握3大事
UDN- Talent Recruitment (65)	2024/11/21	空氣票vs. 組織票 民眾黨接班人續演黃國昌、蔡壁如之爭
UDN- Talent Recruitment (66)	2024/12/7	民眾黨代表選後派系如何變化？2028年恐面臨大消退潮
UDN- Talent Recruitment (67)	2024/12/27	柯P白色旋風 10年南柯一夢 棄醫從政想改變政治文化 上任市長誓辦5弊案 卸任新5弊案纏身

UDN- Talent Recruitment (68)	2024/12/28	白營救亡圖存 須甩一人政黨
UDN- Talent Recruitment (69)	2025/2/15	黃國昌上任民眾黨主席內憂外患 壯世代、兩年 條款待解
UDN- Talent Recruitment (70)	2025/7/27	合力挺過罷免 藍白雙北2026各有布局 藍營： 會關注民眾黨動向 要先過訴訟難關 白營：不 影響提名

APPENDIX- LTN

Table of the Database Established for Data Analysis of LTN 's news

118 pieces		
Ref. No.	Data Published	Tittle
LTN-Election (1)	2019/12/13	民眾黨區域立委選後布局 柯：2022市議員就有基本盤
LTN-Election (2)	2019/12/23	民眾黨 政黨票要拚15%
LTN-Election (3)	2020/1/2	民眾黨首戰 區域抱蛋 不分區5席
LTN-Election (4)	2020/1/11	柯文哲：民眾黨將是不關鍵少數 在立院扮演示範作用、影子內閣
LTN-Election (5)	2020/1/12	民眾黨進軍國會奪5席 準立委蔡壁如放話：目標第1大黨
LTN-Election (6)	2020/3/20	民眾黨問政表現墊底 柯文哲：民調看看就好
LTN-Election (7)	2020/6/26	參選下屆台中市長？北市副市長蔡炳坤：民眾黨2022不會缺席
LTN-Election (8)	2020/7/9	和平區長補選3人登記 張瑞紘「棄藍投白」捲土重來
LTN-Election (9)	2020/7/25	柯文哲民調吊車尾 台灣民眾黨黨員大會報名也冷
LTN-Election (10)	2020/8/3	搶封關前公布民調 民眾黨稱吳益政逼近李眉蓁
LTN-Election (11)	2020/8/15	高雄補選》流失超過10萬票 民眾黨試水溫得票大失血

LTN-Election (12)	2020/8/16	民眾黨補選得票墊底 侯友宜隔空打氣：柯市長加油
LTN-Election (13)	2020/8/22	台中和平區長補選民眾黨慘敗 柯文哲：本來就艱困選區
LTN-Election (14)	2020/8/22	柯文哲光環盡失？台灣民眾黨2020選舉全員落馬
LTN-Election (15)	2020/9/10	我就爛？高雄補選慘敗被酸爆 柯文哲：我們就4%黨
LTN-Election (16)	2020/12/23	藍營民調：所有政黨支持度下降 4成5中立選民成最大黨
LTN-Election (17)	2021/3/31	大選後40歲以下民眾政黨支持度 民進黨民調：綠提升藍墊底
LTN-Election (18)	2021/10/6	台灣民意基金會民調：對政黨「感情溫度」這黨最熱
LTN-Election (19)	2021/10/26	民調超車國民黨 民眾黨：不敢自滿於一時數字
LTN-Election (20)	2022/2/22	台灣民意基金會調查：民進黨支持度領先 民眾黨居次超前國民黨
LTN-Election (21)	2022/3/7	2024與誰搭檔選總統？柯文哲：搞不好是被人搭檔
LTN-Election (22)	2022/8/11	斷言北市三腳督不會棄保 前議長：25%中間選民成決戰關鍵
LTN-Election (23)	2022/9/16	台灣民意基金會調查：逾4成民眾認同民進黨 國民黨支持度低於民眾黨
LTN-Election (24)	2022/11/26	首插旗失敗！民眾黨台南市議員6人參選「全軍覆沒」
LTN-Election (25)	2022/11/26	民眾黨躍為台北市第三大黨！獲4席議員 將可成立黨團

LTN-Election (26)	2022/11/27	4%黨？民眾黨全國議員政黨得票率4% 網：中選會認證
LTN-Election (27)	2022/11/29	社論》解讀選民所發出的訊息
LTN-Election (28)	2023/1/17	2024總統大選民調 最新民調：賴34%、侯31.4%、柯22.3%
LTN-Election (29)	2023/5/8	直言柯文哲民調「穩居第三」 王世堅揶揄：白藍合真的很「白爛」
LTN-Election (30)	2023/6/15	台灣民意基金會民調：民眾黨崛起三強鼎立 藍綠各流失300萬選民
LTN-Election (31)	2023/9/10	70歲以上支持度只有2%？柯文哲：選舉決戰勝敗在客廳
LTN-Election (32)	2023/12/14	三立民調：賴蕭配領先侯趙配近6% 不分區立委藍綠僅差3.8%
LTN-Election (33)	2024/1/14	柯預告4年後再戰 不辭黨主席
LTN-Election (34)	2024/1/14	胡佛學者：民眾黨非成熟政黨 4年後見真章
LTN-Election (35)	2024/1/17	柯落選怪被多數民調打壓、投票率低 網轟：到底是誰沒穿褲子
LTN-Election (36)	2024/1/18	立院龍頭戰民眾黨輸了？羅旺哲：從關鍵少數變「空氣」
LTN-Election (37)	2024/8/26	美麗島民調：69.1%對柯文哲不信任 民眾黨反感度達65.3%
LTN-Election (38)	2024/12/7	民眾黨支持度剩5.7% 吳靜怡諷：連自家問題都解決不了
LTN-Election (39)	2025/7/26	大罷免首輪結果出爐 24件藍委+新竹市長高虹安罷免案全部不通過

LTN-Party Cooperation (1)	2019/12/11	郭台銘、侯友宜是2024對手？ 柯文哲：兄弟登山各自努力
LTN-Party Cooperation (2)	2020/6/24	藍白合破局 民眾黨：藍綠之外更好的選擇
LTN-Party Cooperation (3)	2020/7/5	藍白合？ 盧秀燕、柯文哲同台
LTN-Party Cooperation (4)	2020/12/2	與朱立倫同台釀藍白合作？ 柯文哲：想太多
LTN-Party Cooperation (5)	2020/12/2	酸跟柯P合作是「白爛」白藍合 王世堅：國民黨小心被夾去配
LTN-Party Cooperation (6)	2021/2/24	藍白有無合作可能性？ 柯文哲：Take it easy ～
LTN-Party Cooperation (7)	2021/3/14	「藍白合」有契機？ 柯文哲：講得有道理我就跟你合作
LTN-Party Cooperation (8)	2021/10/31	民眾黨苗栗黨部成立 國民黨議長：期許兩黨合作
LTN-Party Cooperation (9)	2021/11/22	談2024言之過早！ 鄭文燦：柯文哲與民進黨悖離是事實
LTN-Party Cooperation (10)	2021/12/28	民眾黨江和樹挺顏寬恆 柯文哲：個人立場
LTN-Party Cooperation (11)	2022/1/4	柯媽為顏寬恆站台？ 民眾黨中市黨部：黨中央未指示支持誰
LTN-Party Cooperation (12)	2022/2/13	2024「侯柯配」？ 侯友宜：把握當下好好做事
LTN-Party Cooperation	2022/3/25	搭檔郭董2024參選總統？ 柯文哲乾笑「呵呵」：到時再講啦

(13)		
LTN-Party Cooperation (14)	2022/3/26	與國民黨盧秀燕合作？民眾黨主席柯文哲：跟任何人都能合作
LTN-Party Cooperation (15)	2022/9/20	民眾黨否認台南藍白合 謝龍介：拭目以待
LTN-Party Cooperation (16)	2022/10/2	爭取各黨相挺 柯文哲：基進黨若願支持 我也沒意見
LTN-Party Cooperation (17)	2023/1/18	柯文哲表明2024無「藍白合」 自嘲「難消化」
LTN-Party Cooperation (18)	2023/4/1	高雄野餐被問是否考慮「藍白合」 柯文哲：DNA差很多
LTN-Party Cooperation (19)	2023/5/2	「藍白合」恐破局？柯文哲坦言「不太想聽」
LTN-Party Cooperation (20)	2023/5/8	柯文哲稱「藍白合」是密室政治 王世堅嗆：8年前綠白合才讓你當選
LTN-Party Cooperation (21)	2023/10/9	斷柯後路？侯：民眾不會接受綠白合
LTN-Party Cooperation (22)	2023/10/26	不初選也不堅持民調 柯文哲鬆口願政黨協商 「就我和朱立倫、侯友宜」

LTN-Party Cooperation (23)	2023/11/9	柯文哲稱「民調居冠」侯友宜：加權後有很大 誤差
LTN-Party Cooperation (24)	2023/11/12	合作才有聯合內閣 侯友宜：請柯文哲像我一樣 放棄個人立場
LTN-Party Cooperation (25)	2023/11/12	柯文哲談藍白合：不到最後1秒不會放棄
LTN-Party Cooperation (26)	2023/11/19	批民調讓6%是「竹篙鬥菜刀」 侯友宜：讓科 學證據說話
LTN-Party Cooperation (27)	2023/11/24	社論》以常識和常理看藍白合
LTN-Party Cooperation (28)	2023/12/8	自曝內心深綠惹議！柯文哲高喊：台灣不是藍 的、不是綠的、是人民的
LTN-Party Cooperation (29)	2024/1/6	藍倡組聯合政府 吳欣盈：又來吃豆腐了
LTN-Party Cooperation (30)	2024/1/27	藍綠電話接到煩！柯文哲：辦個公開的 不要像 君悅就是來破局
LTN-Party Cooperation (31)	2024/1/29	自由開講》藍白，你為什麼不爭氣？
LTN-Party Cooperation	2024/5/4	《新竹》芎林議員補選藍白合 藍綠對戰

(32)		
LTN-Party Cooperation (33)	2024/8/4	後悔藍白合？ 柯：DNA差太多
LTN-Party Cooperation (34)	2025/6/7	麥玉珍任民眾黨南投縣黨部主委今交接 藍白宣布加強合作
LTN-Party Cooperation (35)	2025/7/5	力挺國民黨反罷免 黃國昌：民眾黨不會置身事外
LTN-Party Cooperation (36)	2025/7/22	黃國昌現身花蓮挺傅崐萁 兩人相約罷免後合推823核三延役公投
LTN-Party Cooperation (37)	2025/8/4	新竹縣藍白合 拚823大罷免大失敗
LTN-Party Cooperation (38)	2025/8/14	黃國昌、朱立倫同台比加油 談2026縣市長選舉「藍白合」這麼說
LTN-Talent Recruitment (1)	2019/9/27	挖黃珊珊當副市長// 柯宋關係惡化「回不去了」
LTN-Talent Recruitment (2)	2019/10/27	柯文哲連挖親民黨大將 王世堅轟：把宋楚瑜吃乾抹淨
LTN-Talent Recruitment (3)	2019/10/23	李旻蔚脫黨參選、李余典違紀助選 面臨民進黨除名
LTN-Talent Recruitment (4)	2019/12/4	不是消滅藍綠 柯文哲：「超越藍綠」是要和諧生存

LTN-Talent Recruitment (5)	2019/12/19	自由廣場》憑甚麼當第三大黨？
LTN-Talent Recruitment (6)	2019/12/27	柯文哲喊出民眾黨要成為第一大黨 主導台灣未來政治發展
LTN-Talent Recruitment (7)	2020/6/1	謝立功模式 藍議員：柯會持續挖牆腳
LTN-Talent Recruitment (8)	2020/7/18	挖藍軍牆角？民眾黨立委宜蘭成立服務處 找韓家軍李偉華當主任
LTN-Talent Recruitment (9)	2020/8/17	自由開講》給台灣民眾黨柯文哲主席的五大建議
LTN-Talent Recruitment (10)	2020/8/27	自由開講》時代力量與白色力量的「新政治」假象
LTN-Talent Recruitment (11)	2021/1/10	柯文哲：民眾黨非柯粉俱樂部 不會曇花一現
LTN-Talent Recruitment (12)	2021/8/6	民眾黨慶2週年 柯文哲：「台灣」不是政黨綁架人民的代詞
LTN-Talent Recruitment (13)	2021/11/11	自由開講》柯P被貼「中共同路人」標籤 主因民眾黨網曖昧、黨政人士多泛藍身份
LTN-Talent Recruitment (14)	2021/11/27	棄民進黨入民眾黨 花蓮市前市代傅國淵宣布參選縣議員
LTN-Talent Recruitment (15)	2022/5/1	民眾黨成立客委會搶票？ 柯文哲：爭取450萬人支持

LTN-Talent Recruitment (16)	2022/5/30	加入民眾黨選台北市長？黃珊珊：我重感情、喜歡親民黨
LTN-Talent Recruitment (17)	2022/7/4	盼宋楚瑜助選黃珊珊？柯文哲：當然最好
LTN-Talent Recruitment (18)	2022/7/23	傳找宋楚瑜合體挺黃珊珊搶藍選票 柯文哲未否認：誰放出來的消息？
LTN-Talent Recruitment (19)	2022/7/27	郭台銘柯文哲2024將合作？高虹安指出關鍵時間點
LTN-Talent Recruitment (20)	2022/10/16	柯文哲操作「棄陳保黃」？陳時中嗆：意圖使人不當選
LTN-Talent Recruitment (21)	2022/11/1	蔡壁如：討厭民進黨是共識、更須進一步「下架民進黨」
LTN-Talent Recruitment (22)	2022/12/1	民眾黨主席改選僅柯文哲登記成「1人政黨」？柯回應了
LTN-Talent Recruitment (23)	2022/12/8	民眾黨主席只有他參選 柯文哲政見發表：3方向成為執政黨
LTN-Talent Recruitment (24)	2023/2/16	2024與郭台銘合作？柯文哲這樣回應
LTN-Talent Recruitment	2023/7/17	自由開講》別讓「藍綠一樣爛」使你輕易的投下不歸路

(25)		
LTN-Talent Recruitment (26)	2023/7/31	「投白投右」標語下架 民眾黨發言人林子宇： 小編用字不精準
LTN-Talent Recruitment (27)	2023/8/4	郭柯合有機會？ 柯文哲坦言：不是不可能但很難
LTN-Talent Recruitment (28)	2023/8/12	近期沒與郭聯繫 柯重申：我參選到底
LTN-Talent Recruitment (29)	2023/12/26	「挺郭」謝典林表態！總統改挺侯康配 不分區 投民眾黨
LTN-Talent Recruitment (30)	2024/1/4	吳欣盈高雄掃街 喊話棄藍綠保台灣
LTN-Talent Recruitment (31)	2024/1/8	操作「棄侯保柯」？柯文哲錄影推薦國民黨羅 廷璋
LTN-Talent Recruitment (32)	2024/1/13	喊話下次一定可以執政 柯文哲：已向世界證明 台灣不是只有藍綠
LTN-Talent Recruitment (33)	2024/1/17	高中校園現「小草證」？李忠憲：民眾黨很懂 操控年輕人
LTN-Talent Recruitment (34)	2024/1/21	「天然獨」世代竟深信柯文哲 中研院吳叡人這 樣看

LTN-Talent Recruitment (35)	2024/9/16	思想坦克》台灣政黨第三勢力會滅亡嗎？
LTN-Talent Recruitment (36)	2024/12/26	柯文哲涉貪遭訴 外媒：台灣「第三勢力」添變數
LTN-Talent Recruitment (37)	2025/1/3	名家分享～小笠原欣幸》台灣12月民調 民眾黨支持度10%觸底
LTN-Talent Recruitment (38)	2025/2/16	啟動2026選戰布局 黃國昌：找最強方案、推最強人選
LTN-Talent Recruitment (39)	2025/3/4	北社評論》從台聯再思台灣「第三勢力」的特殊性
LTN-Talent Recruitment (40)	2025/4/13	民眾黨前進台南 黃國昌持「至少我們還有良心」上台
LTN-Talent Recruitment (41)	2025/6/2	吳韋達加入民眾黨 2026彰化市長之爭添變數

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