

**Youth Perception of Political Participation:
A Comparative Survey Study of Indonesia and Taiwan**

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Submitted to the Faculty of
Department of International Affairs in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Bachelor of Arts in International Affairs

Wenzao Ursuline University of Languages

2026

WENZAO URSULINE UNIVERSITY OF LANGUAGES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL

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2026

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Wenzao Ursuline University of Languages, 2026

Abstract

Youth is a vital agent that has only grown and developed throughout recent years, with youth-led movements impacting the definitions of political and social discourse. Digital activism and growing participation in demonstrations show how youth are now challenging the public perception of apathetic and disengaged youth. Existing institutional barriers within non-Western contexts may marginalize youth from formal decision-making spaces, leading to a rise to informal channels and digital platforms as their medium of expression. Building accessibility from institutional exclusion raises the academic interest of how youth perception of political participation may be alike or differ between two democratic governances, namely Indonesia and Taiwan. A quantitative survey using a close-ended Likert-scale questionnaire resulted in 592 valid responses from youth all across Indonesia and Taiwan. The survey seeks to measure how youth perceived their knowledge, awareness, and influencing factors of their political participation. The findings showed youth in Indonesia were influenced by demographic variables unlike youth in Taiwan and whereas they align in expressing a range of distrust to the government and judiciary, Taiwanese youth reported lower active democratic behavior and alignment to motivations for political participation. Thus, suggesting targeted communication through campaign or education and transparency to be evaluated in governments of both countries to gain trust from their youth and nurse a long-standing healthy democracy.

Keywords: Youth Political Participation, Institutional Trust, Non-Western Context, Comparative Study

青年對政治參與的看法：印尼與台灣的比較調查研究

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文藝外語大學，2026 年

摘要

青年近年來已成為社會中不斷成長的重要力量。由青年主導的各類運動，不僅重新形塑政治與社會論述的內涵，也挑戰了社會對青年冷漠與政治疏離的既有印象。數位行動主義與示威參與的增加，反映青年正在挑戰社會對其冷漠與政治疏離的既有認知。然而，在非西方社會中，制度性障礙仍使青年多被排除於正式決策機制之外，促使他們轉而透過非正式管道與數位平台尋求表達與參與的空間。

在這樣的脈絡下，本研究關注印尼與台灣兩個民主政體中，青年對政治參與的認知與態度之異同。研究以封閉式李克特量表問卷進行量化調查，共獲得來自兩地 592 份有效樣本，旨在探討青年對自身政治參與的知識、意識以及影響因素之看法。

結果顯示，印尼青年的政治參與受到人口統計變項顯著影響，而台灣青年則相對較少受此影響。兩地青年皆普遍表現出對政府與司法機關的信任不足，但台灣青年在積極民主行為與政治參與動機的一致性上相對較低。研究據此建議，兩國政府可透過有針對性的溝通策略，如教育與公共宣導，並提升政治透明度，以重建青年對制度的信任，促進長期而健全的民主發展。

關鍵詞： 青年政治參與、制度信任、非西方背景、比較研究

Preface

Aspiring to assess youth today, this study stemmed from my fascination towards the relevance of youth in societal change as assessed by journals and video essays. In admiration of mobilizing communities and changing the course of history, I was inspired to explore further how today's institutional system may influence youth perception towards their capabilities. The process of literature review and data collection from youths in Taiwan and Indonesia had allowed me to earnestly appreciate scholars all over the world as well as the importance of policy frameworks, encouraging me to assess the state of youth and government today.

In gratitude to Associate Professor Daniel Lin, my professor, for guiding the construct of this paper through constructive criticism and consultations. His role within this paper has allowed it to be conceptually sound and methodologically aligned, allowing this study to be clear and properly structured.

I hold the deepest gratitude to those I hold dear and has given me encouragement throughout this process. Their presence had allowed me to gain a foothold in this tumultuous journey and enlightened me with unforgettable values. In guidance of my university, ChatGPT had contributed in the making of this paper's structure.

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION.....	1
Background.....	1
Research Motivation	2
Research Purpose	2
Research Questions	2
Limits.....	3
Delimits	3
LITERATURE REVIEW	4
Social Capital and Political Participation	4
Political Participation	4
Social Capital Theory	7
Youth Political Participation.....	12
Youth in Indonesia and Taiwan	16
Indonesian and Taiwanese Youth's Traits.....	16
Applicability of Social Capital Theory	19
Research Methodology.....	23
Significance of Youth.....	23
Methods In Related Studies	25
Quantitative Survey as the Methodological Approach.....	26
METHODOLOGY	27
Introduction.....	27
Research Design.....	27
Sources of Data	28
Research Instrument and Data Collection	29
Tools for Data Analysis.....	31
Ethical Considerations.....	32
Limitations of Methodology	32
Summary.....	33
DATA ANALYSIS	34
Data Collection Profile	34
Analysis of Indonesian Youth Perception on Political Participation	36

Factor Analysis of Indonesian Youth Perception on Political Participation	37
Indonesian Youth Opinion on Political Participation	43
Analysis of Taiwanese Youth Perception on Political Participation	50
Factor Analysis of Taiwanese Youth Perception on Political Participation.	50
Taiwanese Youth Opinion on Political Participation	55
Evaluating Institutional Trust and Political Awareness Across Taiwanese and Indonesian Youth	59
Analysis of Indonesian and Taiwanese Youth Perception on Political Participation	63
Multi-Group Factor Analysis of Indonesian and Taiwanese Youth Perception on Political Participation	63
Summary of Major Findings.....	71
CONCLUSION	73
Discussion.....	73
Research Question 1: How do youth in Taiwan and Indonesia perceive political participation today?	74
Research Question 2: How do institutional trust and political awareness influence youth political engagement choices?	75
Research Question 3: How do differing democratic institutional structures form youth political perception and participation in Taiwan and Indonesia?	76
Suggestion.....	77
APPENDIX.....	78
BIBLIOGRAPHY	82

List of Figures

Figure 1. Percentages of Indonesian and Taiwanese Youth Perception to low2	61
Figure 2. Percentages of Indonesian and Taiwanese Youth Perception to low1	62

List of Tables

Table 1. Demographic Profile of Youth Respondents	35
Table 2. Summary of Factor Analysis Results of aa1-aa7 from the Indonesian Youth	37
Table 3. Summary of Factor Analysis Results of bb1-bb6 from the Indonesian Youth	39
Table 4. Summary of Factor Analysis low1-low7 Results from the Indonesian Youth	40
Table 5. Summary of Factor Analysis cc1-cc5 Results from the Indonesian Youth ..	42
Table 6. Mean Comparison of FAC1 (Politically Optimistic Youth) Across Demographic Groups	43
Table 7. Mean Comparison of FAC2 (Trust in Government) Across Demographic Groups	44
Table 8. Mean Comparison of FAC3 (Politically Empowered Youth) Across Demographic Groups	45
Table 9. Mean Comparison of FAC4 (Cognitively Detached Youth) Across Demographic Groups	46
Table 10. Mean Comparison of FAC5 (Disillusioned Youth) Across Demographic Groups	47
Table 11. Mean Comparison of FAC6 (Risk-Averse Youth) Across Demographic Groups	47
Table 12. Mean Comparison of FAC7 (Externally Motivated Youth Participation) Across Demographic Groups	48
Table 13. Summary of Factor Analysis aa1-aa7 Results of Taiwanese Youth Perception towards Political Participation.....	50
Table 14. Summary of Factor Analysis Results of bb1-bb6 from the Taiwanese Youth	52
Table 15. Summary of Factor Analysis low1-low7 Results of Taiwanese Youth Perception towards Political Participation.....	53
Table 16. Summary of Factor Analysis cc1-cc5 Results of Taiwanese Youth Perception towards Political Participation.....	54
Table 17. Mean Comparison of FAC8 (Civically Engaged Youth) Across Demographic Groups	55

Table 18. Mean Comparison of FAC9 (Critically Aware Youth) Across Demographic Groups	56
Table 19. Mean Comparison of FAC10 (Politically Empowered Youth) Across Demographic Groups	56
Table 20. Mean Comparison of FAC11 (Politically Detached Youth) Across Demographic Groups	57
Table 21. Mean Comparison of FAC12 (Structurally Excluded Youth) Across Demographic Groups	57
Table 22. Mean Comparison of FAC13 (Externally Motivated Youth Participation) Across Demographic Groups	58
Table 23. Frequencies and Percentages of Indonesian and Taiwanese Youth's Perception to Institutional Trust.....	60
Table 24. Frequencies and Percentages of Indonesian and Taiwanese Youth's Perception to Political Awareness.....	62
Table 25. Summary of Multi-Group Factor Analysis aa1-aa7 of Taiwanese and Indonesian Youth Perception to Political Participation	64
Table 26. Summary of Multi-Group Factor Analysis Results of bb1-bb6 from the Indonesian and Taiwanese Youth	65
Table 27. Summary of Multi-Group Factor Analysis low1-low7 of Taiwanese and Indonesian Youth Perception to Political Participation	66
Table 28. Summary of Multi-Group Factor Analysis cc1-cc5 of Taiwanese and Indonesian Youth Perception to Political Participation	67
Table 29. Mean Summary of FAC14-FAC20 across National Identity.....	68

INTRODUCTION

Background

Youth political engagement increasingly challenges the perception of apathetic and disengaged youth. Youth-led movements, such as climate change strikes, pro-democracy protests, and grassroots advocacy, demonstrate the active role youth take in forming political and social discourse. Rather than declining, youth activism has evolved as proven through the surge of digital activism, growing participation in demonstrations, and increased attention to issues like climate change and social justice.

However, institutional barriers and socio-economic pressures often marginalize youth from formal decision-making processes, further emphasizing the notion that they lack political agency. Limited institutional access and uneven democratic structures impact youth perception, efficacy, and participation behavior, particularly in non-Western democracies such as Indonesia and Taiwan.

Indonesia and Taiwan are selected as comparative cases because their contrasting levels of institutional openness allow examination of how democratic structures shape youth political perception, political efficacy, and participation. In this study, youth political participation is understood through three interrelated dimensions: youth perception of politics, political efficacy as belief in influence, and participation behavior through both formal and informal channels.

Recognition from institutions plays a key role to its legitimacy and impact, resulting in the effectiveness and continuity of youth activism. Grounded in social capital theory, this study examines how bonding, bridging, linking, and online networks impact youth political perception, efficacy, and participation across different

institutional and democratic contexts. This study seeks to contribute to the growing literature on youth engagement beyond Western contexts.

Research Motivation

Identifying the factors influencing youth across different democratic institutional frameworks allows discussions regarding the role of youth in social change to deepen and become more definite. Understanding youth perceptions of political participation today is necessary to building a democratic framework that supports civic empowerment. This highlights the importance of understanding how institutional frameworks and digital environments influence how youth political perception and participation forms.

Research Purpose

This study examines how youth in Indonesia and Taiwan perceive political participation, focusing on institutional trust, political awareness, and participation barriers across differing democratic systems.

Research Questions

Question 1: How do youth in Taiwan and Indonesia perceive political participation today?

Question 2: How do institutional trust and political awareness influence youth political engagement choices?

Question 3: How do differing democratic institutional structures form youth political perception and participation in Taiwan and Indonesia?

Contribution

This study provides comparative empirical evidence on youth political participation in two non-Western contexts. Examining how institutional structures and social capital shape youth further extends existing youth participation research beyond Western-centric frameworks.

Limits

First, the limited time frame restricted data collection to a total of 605 participants in survey over two months. Second, this study is focused solely on youth within the age range of 18-30 where findings are not generalizable beyond this demographic.

Delimits

This study is confined to the political contexts of Indonesia and Taiwan, focusing exclusively on youth with Taiwanese or Indonesian identity. It does not cover youth experiences outside these regions. Given logistical and language constraints, the study may not fully capture the diversity within each country's youth population and there may be limitations in the coverage of local-language literature in both contexts.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Social Capital and Political Participation

Political Participation

Political participation lies at the core of the democratic system. It encompasses the wide range of activities individuals partake within society, from expressing their political preferences and influencing policy decisions to directly contributing how governance systems function. Scholars have long debated the constitution of political participation, with conventional forms involving voting, campaigning, party membership, and engaging in electoral processes. More recent discussions urge to expand the boundaries of political participation to include unconventional or non-institutionalized forms such as protests, online activism, petitioning, and civic volunteering.

In particular, online activism has been a rising conduct of political participation in the modern landscape. With the rapid increase in use of online networking in social media platforms, youth have turned to digital activism as their means of organizing, mobilizing, and advocating for political change. This is evident in how social media is used to amplify protests, mobilize public opinions, and challenge policies. These digital forms of engagement challenge the traditional understandings of political action and broadens the parameters of participation beyond the physical and into the digital sphere. Within this study, political participation refers to observable actions where individuals attempt to influence political processes or outcomes, including both formal activities such as voting and party involvement, as well as informal and digital forms such as protests, online activism, and civic engagement.

Political participation is influenced by a complex interaction of several individual, social, and structural determinants. One of which scholars have often discussed as group identity and consciousness. According to Miller et al. in 1981, individuals with a strong political or social identity, especially in the perception that their group is marginalized, are more likely to engage politically to challenge the status quo.¹ This emphasizes how group consciousness mobilizes collective action through identity-based factors. Among youth, group identity and collective consciousness are frequently identified as important influencing factors of political participation.

Religious belief systems can also influence political behavior. In Indonesia, religious affiliations has historically been capable of motivating and constraining political activity depending on various factors such as doctrinal teachings, organizational involvement, and the degree to which the political and religious values align. With how closely religion can influence an individual's political choices, religious institutions then serve not only as moral guides but as doctrines for civic engagement. Countries where religious affiliations is rooted in governance often experience this more intensely, with religious doctrines involved in political party membership and the normalization of institutionalized religious activities. Religious affiliation represents another context by which youth political participation exists, especially in societies where religion and politics are closely intertwined.

Education is consistently identified as a key enabling factor of youth political participation. Playing the role of shaping an individual with the ability to understand political processes and essentially teaching them with the skills to navigate through

¹ Miller, Arthur H., Patricia Gurin, Gerald Gurin, and Oksana Malanchuk. "Group Consciousness and Political Participation." *American Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 3 (1981): 494-511. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2110816>. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2110816>.

society, Mayer's work in 2011 and Persson's more recent work in 2015 both find that higher educational attainment leads to higher political engagement.² However, there is contextual variability as the level and quality of education differs across different contexts of political systems and cultural contexts, as well as institutional access and socio-economic background. Youth political participation is politically affected as they are still closely positioned to educational institutions and may face disillusionment.

Finally, structural inequalities such as gender and social marginalization can become catalysts of political engagement. Shukla's study on the political participation of Muslim women in 1996 examines how gender and religious identity intersect and influence how they navigate through sociocultural and institutional barriers to political engagement.³ Despite limited representation and formal channels, marginalized groups still participate in politics through community-based or informal networks, further paving the diverse ways political agencies can take form. For young people in particular, political agencies take form in digital spheres where they are able to mobilize as they need and bypass the restrictions of formal participation. Structural marginalization further conditions the way youth access and navigate political participation.

Together, these studies highlight how multifaceted youth political participation is, showcasing both diverse participation modes and a range of social and structural conditioning factors. While literature identifies influencing factors of youth political participation, not as much consensus can be gathered regarding how

² Mayer, Alexander K. "Does Education Increase Political Participation?". *The Journal of Politics* 73, no. 3 (2011): 633-45. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s002238161100034x>.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1017/s002238161100034x>.

³ Shukla, Shashi, and Sashi Shukla. "Political Participation of Muslim Women." *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 1/4 (1996): 1-13. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41855734>.

these factors interact across different institutional contexts. This gap drives the need for an analytical framework capable of integrating networks, trust, and institutional access, which the social capital theory addresses in the following section. This study draws from these insights to conceptualize youth political participation as encompassing both formal and informal forms of participation that were conditioned by social and structural factors within differing democratic contexts.

Social Capital Theory

With the various factors influencing the scene of political participation, the social capital theory offers a structural and relational framework for understanding youth political participation through its emphasis on networks, trust, and institutional access in comparison to individual incentives or psychological traits. Economic models tend to emphasize political economic factors, which often describes the older age groups over youth. Psychological models, on the other hand, focus on individual cognitive and behavioral aspects, making them less suitable for a comparative analysis of youth participation across different democratic systems. Social capital is a particularly fitting theoretical framework as its core dimensions allow us to examine the layers of youth agency, deepening our understanding of the ways youth interact with political participation in the modern age.

Social capital evolves through different interpretations across disciplines. In the 1980s, social capital emerged through Bourdieu's work where the theory was closely linked to power structures and social hierarchies and emphasized on mutual recognition.⁴ In the rise of neoliberalism and rational choice, however, social capital

⁴ Bourdieu, Pierre. "The Forms of Capital." *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education* (1983).

was described by James Coleman as a functional concept with stress on the role of trust, obligation, and expectations.⁵ Lastly, Putnam diverged with his own emphasis on social networks, reciprocity, and mutual benefits as key to civic engagement.⁶ They unitedly frame social capital to be both a resource within power structures as well as a mechanism that enables collective political engagement, which is particularly relevant for understanding youth participation in unequal institutional contexts.

Together, these perspectives frame social capital theory as a relational framework that links network, trust, and collective action. These various interpretations allow for a nuanced understanding of political participation by placing emphasis on how individuals and communities leverage their networks for collective action and engagement. Grounding political behavior in such a structure allows social capital to become a lens in analyzing how political participation influences diverse contexts.

While the theoretical foundations of social capital have evolved throughout the decades, the core dimensions are important to understand its role in political participation. There are three core dimensions: bonding, bridging, and linking. As Claridge outlines in 2018, bonding capital refers to strong connections within similar social groups and often takes the form of close relationships like family and close friends, bridging capital refers to connections across diverse groups in society, and linking capital describes the vertical connections between individuals and institutions operating across formal hierarchies and power gradients.⁷

⁵ Coleman, James S. "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital." *American Journal of Sociology* 94, no. 1 (1988): S95-S120. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2780243>.

⁶ Putnam, Robert. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. 2000. doi:10.1145/358916.361990.

⁷ Claridge, Tristan. "Functions of Social Capital." (2018).

These dimensions can be mapped onto different forms of youth political participation in both formal and informal settings. Bonding social capital helps explain youth networks within close-knit groups, often taking form in localized action, for example, student organizations and peer circles. Bridging social capital connects youth across different social groups, including those divided by social class, ethnicities, or ideological lines and can be seen through interactions across different universities or different communities in the same university. Lastly, linking social capital plays a part in the bigger picture of youth's access to institutions or authorities, evident through the instances a youth has contact with the government, civic mentors, student council, and other forms of institutional authority. Linking social capital is often crucial for access to decision-makers, as will be explored further in the case of Taiwanese and Indonesian youth. Better understanding how these layers of social capital intersect provides tools to analyze youth networks and institutional interactions, allowing us to better explain the mechanisms that either build or inhibit youth political participation across varying different sociopolitical contexts.

These dimensions also help in explaining the way commonly cited influencing factors of political participation operate among youth. Beginning with group identity and collective consciousness, as discussed in regards to marginalized youth, are forms of bonding social capital as shared identity forms trust and facilitates collective action. Religious affiliations, then, functions similarly as bonding social capital with their shared faith in a community. As an organization, on the other hand, it resembles linking capital when it maintains formal ties to political institutions or parties. Educational environments in the form of universities and civic programs often takes the form of bridging capital as it connects youth across social, ideological, and institutional boundaries. So, viewed from a structural point of view, marginalization

emphasizes the existing gaps in linking social capital whereas limited access to institutions restrains youth and redirects them to alternative forms of participation, namely informal or community-based networks. This differentiation is necessary for this study as it allows youth participation to be analyzed by the quality and direction of social connections that enables or restrains political engagement instead of only activity types.

The notion of social capital works through these core dimensions with elements of trust, reciprocity, civic norms, and networks. These elements function as mechanisms for social capital to then become an agent of change and participation within the system. Trust, whether in institutions or individuals, encourages political engagement by nurturing confidence in the functioning system and reduces fear of participation. Reciprocity -the expectation of mutual support- strengthens collective action by ensuring that political participation benefits both the individuals and the broader community. Civic norms -the shared sense of fairness and duty- build a sense of responsibility within the people to participate in democratic affairs. Lastly, social networks provide a channel for political engagement as individuals in student organizations, religious groups, or activist circles gain easier access to political information, mobilization efforts, and collective decision-making. These functional aspects of social capital provide a framework for analyzing how youth perceptions of political participation is shaped in this study's analysis.

Within social capital, the shared understanding among individuals varies greatly and result in significantly different outcomes. When a social group has a weak foundation (limited shared knowledge, loose social norms, only few informal rules and expectations), the potential for social action is limited. This can be described as the low social capital context. Lake and Paxton had concluded in theory that high

social capital would lead to increased political participation.⁸ This is due to the understanding that high social capital would increase the capacity for individuals to take political action and thus become politically engaged. For youth, then, low social capital takes form as limited access to political information, weak institutional connections, and reduced confidence in political efficacy.

As these traditional forms and functions of social capital continue to influence the shape of political participation, they have also taken a new form of expression in the digital age. In 2013, Oser, Hooghe & Marien identified a distinct group of citizens who prioritize online participation, illustrating that digital spaces can stand alone in the political sphere instead of extending from offline activism.⁹ Interactions occurring in digital spaces through shared content, discussion, and collaboration contributes to the formation of digital social capital, which is grounded in the same foundation of trust, norms, and networks. This form of online social capital helps to explain the rise of digital activism in youth where participation is facilitated through networked trust, shared norms, and rapid mobilization instead of institutional access. Digital engagement is shaped by algorithms, which can reinforce echo chambers while simultaneously catalyzing rapid mobilization for political efforts. This dual effect is particularly relevant to youth, as they are more likely to encounter the algorithm-driven content that both validates their beliefs and encourages networked mobilization. Indonesia's 2019 *#ReformasiDikorupsi* and Taiwan's 2014 *Sunflower*

⁸ Ronald La Due, Lake, and Robert Huckfeldt. "Social Capital, Social Networks, and Political Participation." *Political Psychology* 19, no. 3 (1998): 567-84. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792178>; Paxton, Pamela. "Is Social Capital Declining in the United States? A Multiple Indicator Assessment." *American Journal of Sociology* 105, no. 1 (1999): 88-127. <https://doi.org/10.1086/210268>. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/210268>.

⁹ Oser, Jennifer, Marc Hooghe, and Sofie Marien. "Is Online Participation Distinct from Offline Participation? A Latent Class Analysis of Participation Types and Their Stratification." *Political Research Quarterly* 66, no. 1 (2013): 91-101. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23563591>.

Movement is evidence to how social media plays a pivotal role in the modern age of collective action, enabling individuals to coordinate their efforts and amplify their voice.¹⁰ Digital social capital should be understood not as a separate form of participation, but as an extension of networking through bonding, bridging, and linking capital within an algorithm-mediated medium.

In recent years, social media has been the channel for marginalized communities to voice their concerns, gain recognition, and raise awareness. The digital sphere allows for social capital to strengthen and become more engaged while providing the capacity to challenge modern political contexts. This study operationalizes social capital through bonding, bridging, linking, and online capital to analyze youth perceptions, political efficacy, and participation behaviors across different institutional contexts in Indonesia and Taiwan. This literature contributes to the framing of the survey design this study conducts by isolating items based on the form of interaction it takes.

Youth Political Participation

Youth political participation should be understood as a present political force rather than a future potential. Despite being underrepresented in formal political spaces, youth engagement today drives the form of democratic norms, political trust, and patterns of participation that persists over time. Existing literature suggests that youth political participation is influenced by both participation forms and determinants. Scholars therefore drew a distinction between the mediums through which youth participate and the social and structural factors that influence their

¹⁰ Matteo Cernison, "Models of Online-Related Activism," in *Social Media Activism*, Water as a Common Good (Amsterdam University Press, 2019).

engagement. Youth perception of such political participation refers to how young individuals interpret, evaluate, and understand political processes, institutions, and opportunities for engagement, including whether they perceive participation as meaningful, accessible, and legitimate.

Despite their importance, youth encounter several barriers in engaging with political systems today. These include a sense of political alienation, declining trust in institutions, and lack of accessible space for civic engagement. These symptoms in youth often stem from a combination of educational gaps, socio-economic disadvantage, and disconnection from formal political culture. As digital natives, however, youth are more adept in operating in the online socio-political landscape, though it further distances them from conventional and formal models of political participation. This understanding drives the need to empower new forms of participation and reframes the concept of democratic participation. While digital platforms lower participation costs and expand access, they do not fully compensate for the initial exclusion from formal political decision-making.

Youth political participation is molded by several encouraging and discouraging factors. First, education plays a key role in shaping political behavior. As Theis argues, civic education plays as the tool equipping young individuals with the necessary knowledge and skills for meaningful contribution in political processes.¹¹ Educational exposure influences how individuals perceive democratic institutions and their role within them. It has also been linked to youth confidence in engaging with political systems. This insight informed how political knowledge and

¹¹ Theis Joachim, "Performance, Responsibility and Political Decision-Making: Child and Youth Participation in Southeast Asia, East Asia and the Pacific," *Children, Youth and Environments* 17, no. 1 (2007), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7721/chilyoutenvi.17.1.0001>.

education-related items should be included in the questionnaire to assess how awareness conditions youth participation.

Secondly, socio-economic status greatly determines one's position in political participation. Youth with lower socio-economic backgrounds often have limited access to political information and fewer opportunities to build networks beyond their immediate communities. Such conditions make it difficult to stay politically informed or critically engage with the fast-paced narrative of modern politics. It is also important to highlight that economic insecurity places more pressure on youth to prioritize employment over civic involvement. Beyond information access, socio-economic status influences the ability of youth to build bridging and linking social capital which directly affects their opportunities. These ideas portray the expectation that youth perceive education and socio-economic status as relevant determinants to their political participation. Informing how political knowledge, trust, and perceived efficacy has a hand in structuring youth participation, the survey design of this study included items concerning such factors.

Furthermore, youth's perceived lack of influence inevitably leads them to feel discouraged to engage with formal political institutions. Political efficacy refers to an individual's belief in their capacity to understand and influence political processes, either through personal action (internal efficacy) or responsiveness of institutions (external efficacy), and has been linked to patterns of political engagement.¹² Such perceived inefficacy often stems from the distrust towards leaders and policies, where witnessing unaccountable leadership or failed reforms lead to skepticism and reluctance to formal politics. In the context of Southeast Asia and the Pacific, Theis

¹² Dana R. Fisher, "Youth Political Participation: Bridging Activism and Electoral Politics," *Annual Review of Sociology* 38 (2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23254589>.

argues that youth are often seen as passive participants instead of active agents of social change and political discourse.¹³ This perception of passive youths has been socially reinforced and constructed over time, rather than being a natural outcome.

Youth political inefficacy is not a natural condition but an outcome that is socially constructed from institutional exclusion and limited representation. The marginalization of youth hinders democratic renewal that occurs by the aid of social change and innovation, making it necessary to deeply analyze and acknowledge youth action in the present. Based on these findings regarding efficacy, these determinants are included as survey items to examine how youth perception in Taiwan and Indonesia differ regarding their political efficacy.

Youth continue to participate in politics, though increasingly in new forms that blur the line between formal and informal political engagement. Traditional political participation includes voting, party membership, and involvement in formal activities by the government. Informal politics take the form of community-based protests and demonstrations, along with other community-organized activities. In 2013, Oser describes these digitally active youth as ‘hybrid activists’, which are individuals engaging both online and offline, reflecting how globalization and social media reshaped mediums of political participation.¹⁴ These shifts have led to new unconventional forms such as online petitions, digital protests through the use of hashtags and online campaigns, and digital political communities. These hybrid forms

¹³ Theis Joachim, "Performance, Responsibility and Political Decision-Making: Child and Youth Participation in Southeast Asia, East Asia and the Pacific," *Children, Youth and Environments* 17, no. 1 (2007), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7721/chilyoutenvi.17.1.0001>.

¹⁴ Jennifer Oser, Marc Hooghe, and Sofie Marien, "Is Online Participation Distinct from Offline Participation? A Latent Class Analysis of Participation Types and Their Stratification," *Political Research Quarterly* 66, no. 1 (2013), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23563591>.

highlight how youth participation increasingly operates outside institutionalized political channels.

Overall, youth political participation is influenced by a combination of participation forms as well as social and structural conditions. Existing literature demonstrates how youth remain politically engaged though in increasingly informal and digitally mediated forms which are conditioned by factors such as education, socio-economic background, institutional access, and societal perceptions of youth agency. These patterns evoke the need of an analytical framework that can explain how participation operates and is structured across different political contexts, as explained in the following section. By examining youth participation through a social capital lens, this study analyzes how trust, networks, and institutional access interact to form participation patterns across different democratic contexts in Indonesia and Taiwan. In this study, youth perception influences how political systems are interpreted, political efficacy reflects belief in the ability to influence those systems, and political participation represents how those beliefs are expressed within institutional and social contexts.

Youth in Indonesia and Taiwan

Indonesian and Taiwanese Youth's Traits

This study defines youth as individuals aged 18 to 30, based on international and contextual considerations. UN's 15-24 age range is less unsuitable, as 15-year-old youths are still developing the capacity to engage with political discourse and the 1979 UN Convention on the *Rights of the Child* defines individuals under 18 as

children, making them unsuitable for studies on political affiliation.¹⁵ Since young adulthood spans beyond the age of 24 and while individuals above 30 are generally regarded as adults, the natural conclusion is to extend the age range of youth up to that point, resulting in the age range of 18 to 30 years old.

This age group is particularly tailored for the discussion of youth political participation, ensuring that those above 18 can function politically and those above 30 are capable of creating their own platform whereas youth often require institutional support to develop political efficacy and engagement. This is important because an adult's political identity and action is often influenced by youth experiences, including civic education and institutional exposure.

Indonesia and Taiwan are of interest with their contrast from historical roots to development of democracy. While Indonesia's youth are active in informal channels of political participation while being marginalized in formal forms, Taiwan offers more open civic frameworks, though youth participation remains difficult to sustain. Despite these differences, youth in both countries are highly engaged online, using digital platforms to discuss and respond to global and local issues. Oftentimes, global and local issues gain rising concern and become the topic of discussions through online media exposure. Thus, despite systemic differences, youth in both countries share similar virtual forms of participation.

Youth in both countries continue to face persistent challenges. First and foremost, youth tend to face political exclusion and marginalization in formal political context. Second, youth today face disillusionment and institutional distrust. Third,

¹⁵ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), "Definition of Youth," <https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/youth/fact-sheets/youth-definition.pdf>.

economically struggling youth are limited in terms of access and awareness. Fourth, weak civic education and limited formal platforms discourage youth engagement.

Taiwan transitioned from martial law (lifted in 1987) to a multi-party democracy, making way to a renewed civic environment.¹⁶ Taiwanese citizens recognized the value of activism as their earned and defended rights, especially for younger generations. Civic education and platforms underwent some changes as they became institutionalized, for example, universities providing platforms (student associations, campus protests, and critical discourse). Youth played the primary role of several movements in Taiwan, namely the Wild Lily Movement in 1990 and the Sunflower Movement in 2014.¹⁷ The significant increase in political awareness, discussion, and action from youth stands as evidence of their capability of mobilizing mass participation, whether through digital platforms or offline means.

Indonesia's history shows youth had been pivotal in critical events in a history where youth were pivotal in mobilizing societal change. In the *Reformasi 1998*, for instance, the efforts of youth majorly contributed in pivoting the nation to democratization by mobilizing mass protests that eventually led to the fall of President Suharto.¹⁸ However, the Indonesian political system remains hierarchal and dominated by elites from military, political families, and business powerhouses.¹⁹ As a result, the excluded youths often engage through informal channels such as digital

¹⁶ Ann Heylen, "From Local to National History: Forces in the institutionalisation of a Taiwanese historiography," *China Perspectives*, no. 37 (2001), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24050963>.

¹⁷ Yunjeong Joo, "Same Despair but Different Hope: Youth Activism in East Asia and Contentious Politics," *Development and Society* 47, no. 3 (2018), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26506192>.

¹⁸ Leonard C. Sebastian, Jonathan Chen, and Emirza Adi Syailendra, *YOUTH AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT*, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (2014), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05897.7>.

¹⁹ Marcus Mietzner, *The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance*, East-West Center (Muthiah Alagappa, 2006), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06524>.

activism and mass protests while facing challenges of marginalization in formal channels, lack of institutional support, political distrust, and fluctuating socio-economic pressure.

Thus, the characteristics of youth in both nations serves a foundational understanding of their political behavior and how it has evolved. Understanding these existing traits is not enough, a deliberate conceptual framework is able to reflect the informal, digital, and institutionally-challenged forms of participation youth has exhibited. In doing so, efforts can be tailored to suit the youth-specific experiences. With the following passage integrating a conceptual framework onto the youth population, a deeper understanding of youth political participation in Taiwan and Indonesia can be presented.

Applicability of Social Capital Theory

Youth political behavior today can be distinctly marked with hybrid activism, declining institutional trust, and strong reliance on peer or community networks. These characteristics call for a theoretical framework accounting both for structure and agency. Social capital theory, with its emphasis on trust, networks, and norms, offers the conceptual instruments to unpack these dynamics. The three core dimensions of social capital form the basis of understanding youth political participation, with recent extensions exploring the role of online capital.

These connections operate through bonding (within-group ties), bridging (between-group ties), and linking (institutional ties). Bonding capital often takes the form of interactions with friends and student organizations, bridging capital as inter-school and cross-interest groups, while linking capital involves engagement with formal institutions like the government bodies and NGOs. Recent academic works are

expanding this framework into the digital realm, with Faucher introducing ‘online capital’ as the accumulation of social interactions that are able to be leveraged for political action, and quantified through metrics of online engagement indicators like hashtags, reposts, followers, etc.²⁰

Bonding & Bridging: Informal Youth Spaces

With social media mobilizing youth to engage politically and organize activities, school-based or community-based organizations often expand their networks and reach through online means, further enhancing their political participation effectively—a dynamic explored by Cernison in 2019. Bonding social capital within youth promotes values of trust, identity, and agency. This is particularly evident in the youth-led narrative of facing various pressures and holding governments accountable for unfulfilled promises. The shared sense of generational pressure and frustration connects them to their peers even across societal groups, resulting in strengthened collective identity and agency. Online social capital plays a role in political learning and early activism by exposing youth to civic discourse, peer-led education, and activist narratives. However, risks of misinformation are simultaneously able to distort political understanding, especially to inexperienced youth.

Linking Capital: Institutions, NGOs, and Trust

Southeast and East Asian societies have a prominent tendency to applying vertical hierarchies in their governance and culture. Particularly, today’s youth

²⁰Oser, Hooghe, and Marien, "Is Online Participation Distinct from Offline Participation? A Latent Class Analysis of Participation Types and Their Stratification."

perception towards government institutions may dwindle overtime with lessening trust and decreasing engagement in civic service. Witnessing failed policies and false promises, youth begin to view the institution as distrustful and corrupt, further alienating themselves from the national governance and formal political engagement. This is observed how youth are often viewed as passive, reflecting a lack of linking capital which further distances youth from political integration.²¹ Without institutional channels to participate and lack of mediators in between youth and the government, political integration takes even more steps to achieve, hindering youth from being seen and heard in the adult-centric narrative of politics.

Online Capital: A Digital Generation of Activists

Digital trust networks on various social media platforms can now substitute the traditional social capital, especially acknowledging the current online world. Through community-based platform, individuals are able to organize mass movements while reaching an even wider audience through the digital sphere. Youth in Taiwan and Indonesia rely more heavily on online capital than linking capital, seeing that online mediums achieve the necessary reach while linking capital is made difficult. Digital student movements in Taiwan and hashtag campaigns by Indonesian youth reflect how online forums are able to carry political discourse.

Within this framework, bonding and bridging capital influences internal efficacy through peer learning and a shared sense of civic identity while linking capital empowers external efficacy by nurturing institutional recognition. In this way,

²¹ Joachim, "Performance, Responsibility and Political Decision-Making: Child and Youth Participation in Southeast Asia, East Asia and the Pacific."

online capital intersects with these dimensions and enables political empowerment through online networked mobilization.

Comparative Reflection, Justification, and Gap.

While youth in both Taiwan and Indonesia interact with informal and digital networks, their access to institutionalized linking capital diverges. Taiwan's relatively open civic landscape allows stronger engagement with NGOs and school-based organizations. In contrast, Indonesian youth more often operate through informal peer networks and online spaces due to existing institutional barriers. These differences reflect the broader political history of democratic governance and institutional infrastructure, emphasizing the importance of context-specific analysis.

Grounded in social capital theory, this study conceptualizes youth political participation as the outcome of interactions under social and institutional contexts. Social capital is operationalized through four dimensions: bonding, bridging, linking, and online social capital. These dimension shape how youth interpret political system and influence their belief in their capacity to impact political outcomes. Youth perception and political efficacy mediate the relationship between social capital and political participation which is expressed through formal, informal, and digital forms of engagement. Institutional context influences how these forms operate, as differing levels institutional openness in Taiwan and Indonesia results in differences in availability and effectiveness of linking social capital and participation opportunities. Through this framework, the study analyzes how social networks, trust, and institutional access jointly influence youth political participation across contrasting democratic systems.

This study addresses a notable gap in existing literature which primarily focuses on adult participation, Western context, or formal political behavior. By comparing and contrasting youth perception on political participation in two non-Western democracies —Indonesia and Taiwan—this thesis contributes to a more inclusive understanding of civic engagement. It further aims to understand how institutional and cultural contexts shape engagement differently, with Indonesia and Taiwan providing a deep context of digital connection and politically diverse youth.

Hence, integrating these theoretical aspects into the conceptual framework provides us with a more layered understanding of how youth political participation in Taiwan and Indonesia is influenced by social networks and institutional trust, while simultaneously facing challenges in formal decision-making. Operationalizing these aspects allows us to measure the impact online capital, bonding, bridging towards youth political participation and form the foundation of this study's methodological design and data analysis.

Research Methodology

Significance of Youth

Youth, defined in this study as individuals between 18 and 30, has experienced a digital age of rapid technological advancement and global interconnection under contrasting democratic and institutional contexts and occupy a critical position within their respective countries. Indonesia and Taiwan are selected as comparative cases due to their contrasting democratic institutional structures as it allows us to examine how varying levels of institutional openness influences how youth access linking social capital and participation opportunities. Both nations rely on their youth to

continue their legacy, yet youth continue to face increasing economic pressure from inflation and the competitive job market.

However, they differ in form and result due to differences in political history and institutional frameworks. In Indonesia, a post-authoritarian democracy, youth face the challenge of limited channels in formal political engagement and encounter structural barriers of underrepresentation, lack of trust to political institutions, and socioeconomic instability. Taiwanese youth, on the other hand, experiences politics under a democratic environment of which civil society were led by youth activism which has influenced the shape of public discourse and policy.

Youth remain as a pivotal part to sustaining a healthy democratic development and long-term national stability. Yet, youth in both countries are still burdened by increasing economic pressures from high unemployment, wage stagnation, and the rising cost of living. Recently, data has shown that the youth unemployment in Indonesia has risen to its highest percentage in February of 2025 at 16,16%.²² Taiwan's Ministry of Labor has also reported youth aged 15-29 has an unemployment rate of 11.42% in 2024.²³ Sharing socioeconomic challenges, youth become a relevant study population of comparative political research with their differences in institutional access and political freedom.

Youth are particularly vulnerable as a marginalized population despite their characteristics being important indicators of future political behavior and patterns. Contrasting from the Western contexts, this study aims to center on youth of Asia-Pacific region to fill the critical gap and contribute to a more localized and deeper

²² "Unemployment Rate by Province, 2025," BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2025, accessed May 10, 2025, <https://www.bps.go.id/en/statistics-table/2/NTQzIzI=/unemployment-rate--august-2023.html>.

²³ Ministry of Labor 勞動部勞動力發展署 (Workforce Development Agency, Taiwan), 投資青年就業方案第二期核定本 [Second Phase of the Youth Employment Investment Program], (勞動部勞動力發展署 (Workforce Development Agency, Ministry of Labor, Taiwan), 2023).

understanding of how different institutional environments shape political engagement and society.

Methods In Related Studies

Youth studies have majorly been conducted within Western contexts but has recently experienced a surge of non-Western perspectives. These studies incorporated both quantitative and qualitative methods, often resulting in a mixed-methods study. Quantitative studies under the topic of youth political participation often used surveys to examine relationships between variables while qualitative studies often utilized interviews and case study analysis. For instance, both Fisher along with Kahne and Middaugh utilized surveys and interviews to gather comprehensive data on youth behavior.²⁴ This methodology gave an edge to the two studies by allowing both a wider and deeper scope of understanding and data to analyze, however face limitations of self-selection bias and reliance on self-reported data which may not be the most accurate.

A particularly focused methodology is qualitative methods. Oftentimes, authors use interviews as data sources to be analyzed. Mindzie, for example, conducted in-depth interviews directly with youth, then facilitating focus group discussions, and analyzed specific instances of youth political engagement to identify variables of focus.²⁵ With a focus on qualitative methods, the study resulted in identifying legal and institutional barriers, socioeconomic barriers, and security

²⁴ Fisher, "Youth Political Participation: Bridging Activism and Electoral Politics."; Joseph Kahne and Ellen Middaugh, "Digital media shapes youth participation in politics," *The Phi Delta Kappan* 94, no. 3 (2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41763677>.

²⁵ Mireille Affa'A Mindzie, *Challenges to Political Participation*, International Peace Institute (2015), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09525.5>.

concerns as key points regarding the youth engagement with formal politics in the Sahel region.

Quantitative Survey as the Methodological Approach

Taking consideration of the findings and limitations identified in existing bodies of literature, a quantitative survey design is adopted to allow systematic comparison to the patterns of youth political perception, efficacy, and participation across two national contexts. This allows statistical comparison between Indonesia and Taiwan as it showcases the complex youth experience embedded in different democratic governances and institutional frameworks. By conducting quantitative survey of ideally 350 respondents from each country, it allows meaningful data to be analyzed.

This design aligns with the research purpose objectives of capturing measurable patterns and direct answers. The quantitative process allows the researcher to identify nuanced trends in institutional trust, political awareness, participation motivation, and barriers. The results of the survey were computed with SPSS where trends are statistically tested in terms of validity and relevance. This allows the researcher to explore how youth interpret political participation in their own terms, what barriers and motivations influence their behaviors, and how engagement takes form in various forms (digital, informal, and formal channels).

The exploratory nature of this research design aims for this study to go further than surface level. Using numeric breadth, the study aims to mitigate the gaps found in previous bodies of literature that may not have comparative breadth. Hence, this study gains not only the quantification of youth perception as data but understand the similarities or differences of youth experiences across countries.

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Continuing the building blocks presented in the literature review, this chapter aims to outline the specific approach chosen to analyze youth perceptions of political participation in Taiwan and Indonesia. Previous studies have emphasized the value of quantitative design which are able to capture both the wide scope and the breadth of youth political behavior. This aids in the choice of a quantitative survey research design which can comprehensively measure the perception of youth in Indonesia and Taiwan, identifying patterns and correlations between the two.

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the methodological framework that guides the data collection and analysis process. It begins with a description of the overall research design and the relevance it has to the study's purpose which is to identify trends in youth political participation and exploring the contextual factors shaping patterns in both democratic governances. This chapter continues with a detailed discussion of the following: research design, sources of data, the research instruments used, data collection procedures, and the techniques used to analyze both the quantitative and qualitative data. Ethical considerations related to respondent consent, anonymity, and data protection are also addressed in the latter part of this chapter.

Research Design

This study uses a quantitative survey research design to analyze youth perception of political behavior. This chosen research design is suitable with the research purposes, allowing the researcher to identify patterns through its main use of structured Likert-scale items within the survey. Its numeric characteristic allows the

researcher to measure and identify trends that may uncover objective insights across the diverse sample of youths all over the countries. Quantitative survey design was selected for this study to compare the collected data with perceptual mapping using a large sample size.

With structured surveys as the main tool, this quantitative survey design is descriptive with the aim of representing comprehensive information regarding the youth perception of political participation in Indonesia and Taiwan. This descriptive design is able to effectively answer the research questions of this thesis through the data provided by the surveys. The first question regarding youth perceptions towards political participation is answered in the first and second segment of the survey which questions the self-perceived political awareness and efficacy of youth respondents, whereas the second question regarding how external (institutional trust) and internal (accessibility) factors impact youth are addressed through the third and fourth segment measuring the barriers and motivations of political participation. The last in question of navigating political participation for youth in contrasting democratic environments is then answered after a merged analysis of the collected responses of youth from both Indonesia and Taiwan. In doing so, the descriptive design aids in providing insight for better care and structure of youth political participation.

Sources of Data

The data for this study was drawn from participants located in Indonesia and Taiwan. The study population consisted of youth aged 18 to 30 in Taiwan and Indonesia, with no exception of any region within, representing a demographic that is both politically significant and underrepresented in institutional discourse. Youth aged 18-30 are selected because they represent the stage at which political attitudes and

participation patterns are actively forming while being eligible for formal political engagement. Respondents for the survey was selected through random sampling methods to ensure diversity and relevance in representing the demographic distribution of youth by age, gender, education, occupation, geographical area, and upbringing.

The target of sample size is 350 respondents for each country by which this number is determined to provide a high level of confidence in data analysis. Though it may lack to generalize the entire population of Indonesia or Taiwan, the research results are helpful and necessary to draw analyzations of youth perception. Data collection was conducted through online survey via Google Forms to ease accessibility for youth who are mainly facilitated through digital means.

Research Instrument and Data Collection

The primary tool used for data collection was a survey questionnaire which had been designed to collect measurable data from Indonesian and Taiwanese youth. The questionnaire consists of 32 questions in total and were distributed through online survey forum via Google Forms. The main questions were divided into four segments, titled as follows: Political Awareness and Perceived Efficacy, Attitudes Towards Political Participation, Barriers to Participation, and Motivations to Participate. The last and fifth segment is the Demographic Information. These survey items are designed based on the conceptual framework where social capital operationalized through bonding, bridging, linking, and online dimensions, political efficacy measured as perceived influence, and political participation captured through formal, informal, and digital activities.

The researcher coded the categorical variables for regression through factor analysis, though the data gathered and compiled into Microsoft Excel were then computed into SPSS Software (Version 31). The results were scaled in reference to the pilot test's codebook with meaningful interval for age and numeric form to the rest of the questions using Likert scale.

The first two segments made use of the Likert scale of Strongly Agree (1) to Strongly Disagree (5), while the third segment made use of a checklist between Yes (1) or No (0) to identify what they perceive as barriers to participating politically. The fourth segment uses a Likert scale of Very Important (5) to Not Important (1) to identify the relevance of several variables. The fifth and last segment identifies the background information of the respondent through multiple choices.

In effort of validity and reliability, the questionnaire was evaluated through a pilot test to the targeted population. Questions were tested by the researcher first, ensuring that it was both relevant and understandable for respondents by having monitored trials of the same respondents testing and retesting the survey several times to ensure consistency.

The data collection was conducted through two online surveys distributed to several digital platforms, both social media and community networks included, to ensure maximum reach and diversity within the sample. Online survey is employed due to their accessibility, cost-efficiency, and alignment with youth communication behavior, particularly in digitally-mediated forms of political engagement. Respondents were aged 18-30 and native locals. Each respondent had received information of the survey's purpose, the research involved, data confidentiality, and informed consent before they completed the survey. These measures were taken to

emphasize that the collected data is able to provide representative insights to youth perception in political participation.

Tools for Data Analysis

The data analysis tool used for the results of the quantitative survey is statistical software SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences). The selection of SPSS was due to its capabilities in processing and analyzing quantitative data, providing various statistical functions to answer research questions. Excel had also been used to conduct simple data analyzation and visualization to aid in the interpretation of the data findings. Comparative statistical analysis is conducted to examine whether youth perception, efficacy, and participation differ significantly between Indonesia and Taiwan.

The data analysis method made use of several functions to answer the research questions. Regression analysis is employed to assess whether social capital dimensions and institutional trust significantly predict youth political participation outcomes. Then, factor analysis simplified collected data helps researchers to understand relationships between variables by identifying the dimensions of social capital embedded within the survey items, allowing empirical validation of bonding, bridging, linking, and online social capital as theorized within the literature. Factor analysis was used to identify the latent patterns of youth political perception beyond individual survey items which allows comparison across national contexts using standardized perception structures.

After the computed factors were analyzed through ANOVA and independent t-test to further compare them with the demographic items to address the research questions regarding youth perception of political participation. ANOVA and

independent t-tests were selected as the appropriate measures to identify mean differences across demographics, namely Indonesia and Taiwan in this study. Reliability tests were used in SPSS to indicate acceptable internal consistency across constructs, supporting the validity of the measurement instruments used in this study.

Ethical Considerations

Within the process of data collection, all respondents have been informed of their right to withdraw at any time. Placing focus on voluntary emphasis, the respondents of the survey were given a clear description of the study's purpose and procedures in the introduction segment of the questionnaire. In doing so, the researcher made sure of each respondent's confidentiality and data protection which were strictly taken care of and securely stored. Data collected was only been used for research purposes.

Limitations of Methodology

Researching the perception of youth in Taiwan and Indonesia, several methodological concerns were considered. First and foremost, it is difficult to generalize the small 350 size to the 72 million of youth in Indonesia where the results of the demographic leans more onto Java's citizens which may lead to bias. Second, respondents might not have given the most genuine and truthful answer, instead giving answers they perceived as desirable by the researcher nor faced fatigue in answering unfamiliar topics. With the nature of sensitive topics regarding political matters, the respondents are likely to have modified their genuine answers which impacts the accuracy of the collected data. Another potential error is disingenuous

results due to less focus and interest by respondents who had originally participated in the survey by attraction of the prize money.

In effort of addressing these limitations, the survey design included neutrally written questions in the survey along with Likert scale questions to deepen the nuance of their answers. Hence, methodological limitations, such as the structured Likert scale and carefully worded questions to reduce any inherent social bias, were minimized through these efforts to capture meaningful data that are both reliable and more accurate.

Summary

This chapter has outlined how the diversity of youth engagement and perception in political participation requires careful planning by the researcher to minimize the risks of methodological limitations and align with the research purpose of this study through a structured quantitative survey design. Using random sampling was determined to ensure results were drawn from the diverse demographic background of youth in both countries. The application of SPSS and thematic analysis also provides a structured approach to data interpretation.

Overall, the chosen methods align closely with the research purposes while progressing in a logical conduct from data collection to analysis. The quantitative phase identifies the general trends and correlations between youth of two contrasting democratic governance. Ethical considerations have also been included throughout the research process to protect the integrity of the study and the rights of its participants.

DATA ANALYSIS

This chapter aims to examine how Indonesian and Taiwanese youth perceive political participation by presenting the empirical findings of the study, analyzing how social capital, youth perception, and political efficacy. The analysis is structured according to the following research questions: (1) How youth in Taiwan and Indonesia perceive political participation today, (2) How institutional trust and political awareness influence youth political engagement choices, (3) How differing democratic institutional structures form youth political perception and participation in Taiwan and Indonesia. Then, it was guided by the conceptual framework earlier outlined.

Data Collection Profile

With a valid total of 365 Indonesian respondents and 227 Taiwanese respondents to the online survey distributed through various platforms, including Line, Instagram, Tiktok, X, Facebook, Dcard forum, and Threads. Data were securely stored in Google Forms, and participant confidentiality was carefully protected. Overall, the Indonesian survey had revealed the majority of respondents to be women in their early 20s either studying for or with a bachelor's degree and residing in Java with urban upbringing. The Taiwanese survey similarly revealed a majority of women in their early 20s in their bachelor's degree, though geographic residence were fairly distributed throughout the nation, and in urban environment. While the sample size slightly differs between Indonesia and Taiwan, both groups remain sufficiently represented to allow meaningful comparative analysis of participation patterns across institutional contexts.

Table 1. Demographic Profile of Youth Respondents

		Indonesian		Taiwanese	
		Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
age	18-20 years	100	26.5%	27	11.9%
	21-25 years	222	58.9%	113	49.8%
	26-30 years	55	14.6%	87	38.3%
gen	Male	70	18.6%	84	37%
	Female	299	79.3%	140	61.7%
	Prefer not to say	8	2.1%	3	1.3%
edu	No formal education	0	0%	1	0.4%
	High school	52	13.8%	9	4%
	Vocational high school	20	5.3%	20	8.8%
	Bachelor's degree	293	77.7%	160	70.5%
	Master's degree	12	3.2%	37	16.3%
job	Student	240	63.7%	104	45.8%
	Employed (Public)	81	21.5%	94	41.4%
	Employed (Private)	11	2.9%	19	8.4%
	Self-employed	18	4.8%	9	4%
	Unemployed	27	7.2%	1	0.4%
resid	Urban	284	75.3%	175	77.1%
	Rural	93	24.7%	52	22.9%

Expanding on the demographic information of the data collected for the Indonesian survey capturing youth attitudes and presented in Table 1, the sample is concentrated within the early-20s age range which reflects the life stage where individuals are transitioning into formal political eligibility while still being in educational or early employment institutions. This is relevant to the study's focus on emerging political efficacy and participation patterns. An overwhelming majority of the respondents were female (79.3%) with a tiny margin of respondents who preferred not to say (2.1%).

Regarding their education, 77.7% were pursuing or holding a bachelor's degree while 19.1% were (vocational) high school graduates and 3.2% were master graduates. With 63.7% being university students, the result of this survey reflects the population of educated youths. There is a relatively high proportion of respondents with tertiary education which suggests that greater exposure to civic knowledge and institutional interaction influences the level of political efficacy and participation

within their political behavior. While there are respondents from all over the country, 78% of the respondents are located in Java while 11.7% were from Sumatra, 5.6% were from Bali and Nusa Tenggara, with the rest scattered from Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Maluku and Papua. In terms of their environment, 75.3% were of urban upbringing while 24.7% were from rural villages

Following onto the Taiwanese respondents, 49.8% of the sample were aged 21-25 years old with 38.3% being 26-30 years old which is a higher turnout of the latter group. Similarly, a majority of the respondents were female (61.7%) with a small margin of those who preferred not to say (1.3%). In regards to their education, 70.5% are of bachelor's degree while 16.3% were of master's degree, reflecting the sample of educated youths.

The sample reflected 45.8% of university students and a slightly less 41.4% of workers in the private sector, indicating the relevance of youth in societal roles. The respondents showed 12 regions of residence, most prominently being in Kaohsiung (21.6%), New Taipei (19.4%), Taichung (16.3%), Taipei (15.9%), Taoyuan (12.3%), and Tainan (9.3%). A majority of the Taiwanese respondents reflects urban environmental upbringing, scoring 77.1% of the sample.

Analysis of Indonesian Youth Perception on Political Participation

Conducting the data collection resulted in 378 Indonesian responses and 227 Taiwanese responses of their youth perception to political participation. The data analysis went through SPSS and involved factor analysis to cohesively group the attitudinal values with the factor scores as subject for further examination. Exploratory factor analysis was conducted to identify the dimensions underlying

youth political perception and variables of trust, which is in line to the conceptual framework derived from social capital theory.

Factor Analysis of Indonesian Youth Perception on Political Participation

With a sample size of 378 Indonesian responses, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was .728 which exceeds the acceptable threshold for factor analysis. Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was statistically significant ($p < .001$) which indicates sufficient correlations among variables. These results confirm the data are suitable for exploratory factor analysis.

Table 2. Summary of Factor Analysis Results of aa1-aa7 from the Indonesian Youth

Factors	Code	Questions	Factor loadings
1. Politically Optimistic Youth	<i>political interest</i>	aa1 I am interested in political issues in my country.	.754
	<i>political knowledge</i>	aa2 I am knowledgeable about how the political system in my country works.	.709
	<i>information seeking</i>	aa3 I actively seek political information from media sources (e.g., news websites, TV, social media).	.761
	<i>perceived political efficacy</i>	aa4 I believe that my participation in political activities can influence political decisions.	.625
	<i>government trust</i>	aa5 I trust that government institutions act in the best interest of young people.	.473
2. Trust in Government	<i>government trust</i>	aa5 I trust that government institutions act in the best interest of young people.	.661
	<i>transparency trust</i>	aa6 I trust that the election process in my country is transparent.	.763
	<i>judiciary trust</i>	aa7 I trust that the judiciary is impartial to all.	.759

Note: Values with factor loadings less than 0.4 were suppressed.

The first factor consists of five items with factor loadings above .40, reflecting a combination of political interest (aa1), political knowledge (aa2), information-seeking behavior (aa3), perceived political efficacy (aa4), and moderate institutional trust (aa5). Together, these items indicate a pattern where respondents who are cognitively engaged with politics also expresses confidence in their ability to influence political outcomes and maintains a generally positive attitude to political

institutions. Instead of representing trust alone, this factor portrays a broader attitudinal profile which is characterized by engagement, perceived agency, and optimism towards political participation. This factor is labeled Politically Optimistic Youth and reflects bonding social capital where political confidence is sustained through peer networks and shared information-seeking instead of reliance on formal institutions.

The second factor comprises three items with strong positive loadings and are all related to institutional trust: trust in government acting in youth's interests (aa5), trust in electoral transparency (aa6), and trust in judicial impartiality (aa7). Unlike the first factor, this dimension captures how confidence is present only in formal political institutions rather than individual engagement or efficacy. These items being clustered suggests that institutional trust operates as a distinct construct within the Indonesian youth sample which justifies the label as Trust in Government.

The cross-loading of aa5 across both factors suggests that trust in government is partially rooted within the behavior of political optimism while functioning still as an independent institutional attitude, reflecting the interconnected nature of efficacy and trust in youth political perceptions. These factors demonstrate how Indonesian youth political attitudes are structured around both engagement-oriented optimism as well as institution-focused trust, providing empirical foundation to examine how these dimensions relate to political participation in later analyses.

The second section of the survey yielded a single-factor solution. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .785 and the Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was statistically significant ($p < .001$), indicating that the items were sufficiently correlated for exploratory factor analysis.

Table 3. Summary of Factor Analysis Results of bb1-bb6 from the Indonesian Youth

Factors	Code	Questions	Factor loadings
<i>3. Politically Empowered Youth</i>	voting is effective	bb1 Voting in elections is an effective way to bring political change.	.630
	future voter	bb2 In the future, I see myself participating in elections as a voter.	.693
	youth in demonstration	bb3 Demonstrating is an effective way for young people to influence politics.	.653
	political conversations	bb4 Discussing politics with others (offline or online) is important for political awareness.	.656
	social media is effective	bb5 Social media is an effective platform for youth political engagement.	.697
	organizational participation	bb6 I believe participating in political parties or youth councils is a meaningful way to influence policies.	.567

This factor comprises six items with positive factor loadings above .40, capturing respondents' evaluations of the effectiveness of multiple mediums in political participation. These include formal participation such as voting (bb1, bb2) and organizational involvement (bb6), as well as informal and digital forms such as demonstrations (bb3), political discussion (bb4), and social media engagement (bb5). This factor represents the perceived capacity respondents have to engage across diverse political channels. Conceptually, this dimension differs from internal political efficacy which focuses on confidence in personal influence, as it emphasizes the perceived effectiveness and legitimacy of participation. It differs from political participation as well because the items are largely measuring anticipated engagement and evaluative beliefs rather than observed action. Set together, this factor reflects a form of political empowerment through participation channels as youth perceive available political channels as meaningful and view themselves as capable of acting within them. Labeled as Politically Empowered Youth, this factor reflects the combination of bonding and online social capital as youth perceive multiple channels of political participation as effective mediums to influence politics. In this study, political empowerment is treated as both an attitudinal and motivational construct

which bridges political efficacy and participation rather than a direct measure of political behavior.

For the third segment addressing barriers to participation, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy resulted in .557, indicating marginal adequacy for factor analysis. Although this value falls below the commonly recommended threshold of .60, Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was statistically significant ($p < .001$), suggesting sufficient inter-item correlations to proceed with exploratory analysis. Results from this segment, then, should be interpreted with caution.

Table 4. Summary of Factor Analysis low1-low7 Results from the Indonesian Youth

Factors	Code	Questions	Factor loadings
4. <i>Cognitively Detached Youth</i>	<i>lack of knowledge</i>	low1 I do not have enough knowledge about politics	.528
	<i>time constraints</i>	low3 I am too busy with work, studies, or personal life.	.538
	<i>perceived irrelevance of politics</i>	low4 Politics is not relevant to my daily life.	.723
	<i>political inefficacy</i>	low5 I feel that my voice will not make a difference	.473
5. <i>Disillusioned Youth</i>	<i>lack of trust</i>	low2 I do not trust political leaders or institutions.	.662
	<i>political inefficacy</i>	low5 I feel that my voice will not make a difference	.595
	<i>time constraints</i>	low3 I am too busy with work, studies, or personal life.	-.442
6. <i>Risk-Averse Youth</i>	<i>fear of consequence</i>	low7 I fear negative consequences for political involvement.	.807

Table 4 presented how the fourth factor holds four items with positive factor loadings above 0.4: lack of political knowledge (low1, .528), time constraints (low3, .538), perceived irrelevance of politics (low4, .723), and political inefficacy (low5, .473). Together, these items reflect a form of cognitive disengagement, where youth perceive politics as distant, difficult to access, or unrelated to their daily lives.

This behavior reflects youth who may lack political literacy and perceives politics as irrelevant or inaccessible which leads to their name as Cognitively Detached Youth.

The fifth factor comprises of three items, two of which has positive loadings and one has a negative loading. Two of the positive loadings are distrust in political leaders and institutions (low2, .662) perceived political inefficacy (low5, .595). One item with negative loading is time constraints (low3, -.442). This pattern suggests that disengagement among youth is not primarily driven by the lack of time but skepticism and loss of confidence in political institutions. Such respondents may be cognitively aware of politics yet refrain from engagement due to disillusionment, which supports the label of Disillusioned Youth. This factor reflects weak linking social capital, where limited trust and perceived inefficacy indicate weak connections between youth and formal political institutions.

Several items loaded onto more than one factor reflects the multidimensional nature of barriers to youth political participation. Instead of representing measurement error, this overlap suggests that perceptions of inefficacy and disengagement may manifest through different psychological pathways, such as cognitive detachment or political disillusionment.

The sixth factor consists of a single item addressing the fear of negative consequences for political involvement (low7, .807). While single-item factors limit internal reliability, this result highlights a distinction in the Indonesian context where political participation may be perceived as socially risky. This factor is retained for its substantive relevance while being interpreted cautiously and is named Risk-Averse Youth.

For the fourth and last segment addressing Motivations to Participate, the result of Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .809 and the Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was highly significant ($p < .001$). With the KMO being highly sufficient as well, this segment is fairly valid and relevant for factor analysis. The result is presented in Table 5.

Table 5. Summary of Factor Analysis cc1-cc5 Results from the Indonesian Youth

Factors	Code	Questions	Factor loadings
7. <i>Externally Motivated Youth Participation</i>	<i>education motivation</i>	cc1 Receiving political education would motivate me to participate.	.739
	<i>peer motivation</i>	cc2 Seeing my peers participate in political activities would encourage me to engage.	.777
	<i>government initiative motivation</i>	cc3 Clearer government initiatives for youth political involvement would encourage me to participate.	.819
	<i>transparency motivation</i>	cc4 More transparency in political institutions would make me more willing to engage.	.752
	<i>digital opportunity motivation</i>	cc5 More opportunities for digital political participation (e.g., online petitions, forums) would encourage me to be more active.	.786

Table 5 presents the seventh factor which consists of five items with strongly positive factor loadings: motivation from education (cc1, .739), peers (cc2, .777), government initiatives (cc3, .819), transparency (cc4, .752), and digital opportunities (cc5, .786). This behavior reflects youth who want to participate but require enabling factors like education, peer models, transparency, and accessible digital channels. In other words, this factor represents youth whose participation is conditional to institutional transparency, social encouragement, and accessible civic platforms. This factor captures conditional motivation instead of political interest, emphasizing the role of external institutional, social, and informational enablers in influencing youth participation. Hence, the name as Externally Motivated Youth Participation.

Finally, after 31 questions were classified into 7 factors, the factor scores of each factor could be examined simultaneously as it was generated using the regression method within the statistical software which allows standardized comparison across factors. To enhance interpretability, weighted composite scores were calculated by summing the standardized item scores multiplied by their respective factor loadings and normalizing the results to a 1-5 scale, allowing comparison of respondent tendencies across factors while preserving relative item contribution. This method allows the researcher to standardize the respondents' attitudes across different factors within the basis of a clearly quantifiable measure of Indonesian youth perceptions towards political participation.

Indonesian Youth Opinion on Political Participation

Using One-way ANOVA and T-test, the researcher seeks to answer Research Question 1: What is youth perception of political participation today in Indonesia and in Taiwan? Through this method, the researcher explores the Indonesian youth perceptions towards political participation and how certain key demographic factors may shape youth perception. All six factors (FAC1 to FAC6) underwent mean comparison across the six demographic variables (age, gender, education, job, geographical location, and residential upbringing). By approaching the factors through demographic variables, possible intrinsic relationships can be uncovered which provides a deeper understanding to the youth perceptions towards political participation and how it may differ with certain attributes of the population.

Table 6. Mean Comparison of FAC1 (Politically Optimistic Youth) Across Demographic Groups

Demographic Variables	Statistical Test	F/t-value	p-value	Pair means with Significant Difference
Age	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 375) = 0.987$	0.374	None.

Gender	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 375) = 1.566$	0.210	None.
Education	One-way ANOVA	$F(4, 373) = 0.965$	0.427	None.
Job	One-way ANOVA	$F(4, 373) = 1.341$	0.254	None.
Geographical Location	One-way ANOVA	$F(5, 372) = 1.190$	0.314	None.
Residential Upbringing	Independent T-Test	$t(376) = -0.316$	0.752	None.

Table 6 shows the statistical finding of comparing the mean of FAC1 scores across the six demographic items, where no statistically significant mean differences found between age, education, job, geographical location, and residential upbringing with FAC1. These findings indicate that politically optimistic attitudes among Indonesian youth are relatively consistent across demographic groups which indicates consistency in reported political interest, awareness, and efficacy. This suggests that the Indonesian youth political culture values personal interest even in the absence of strong institutional differences.

Table 7. Mean Comparison of FAC2 (Trust in Government) Across Demographic Groups

Demographic Variables	Statistical Test	F/t-value	p-value	Pair means with Significant Difference
Age	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 375) = 0.136$	0.873	None.
Gender	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 375) = 0.275$	0.760	None.
Education	One-way ANOVA	$F(4, 373) = 0.736$	0.568	None.
Job	One-way ANOVA	$F(4, 373) = 1.452$	0.216	None.
Geographical Location	One-way ANOVA	$F(5, 372) = 0.885$	0.491	None.
Residential Upbringing	Independent T-Test	$t(376) = 1.467$	0.141	None.

No statistically significant mean differences were found across any demographic variables for FAC2 in Table 7, which suggests trust in government among Indonesian youth is broadly uniform across age, gender, education,

occupation, region, and residential upbringing. This reflects a shared stance towards political institutions, indicating that trust in government is not determined by demographic background which results to a shared sense of institutional skepticism.

Table 8. Mean Comparison of FAC3 (Politically Empowered Youth) Across Demographic Groups

Demographic Variables	Statistical Test	F/t-value	p-value	Pair means with Significant Difference
Age	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 375) = 0.597$	0.553	None.
Gender	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 375) = 4.663$	0.010	“Male” (-0.324) : “Female” (0.076)
Education	One-way ANOVA	$F(4, 373) = 0.673$	0.611	None.
Job	One-way ANOVA	$F(4, 373) = 0.846$	0.497	None.
Geographical Location	One-way ANOVA	$F(5, 372) = 1.449$	0.206	None.
Residential Upbringing	Independent T-Test	$t(376) = 0.251$	0.802	None.

Table 8 presents the statistical finding from the comparison of FAC3 across the demographic variables. A significant difference was found for gender ($F(2, 375) = 4.663$, $p = 0.010$), with female youth scored higher (0.076) than male youths (-0.324). Similarly with the previous factor, all the other demographic variables scored without any statistical significance. This concluded that there are no statistically significant mean differences found between age, education, job, geographical location, and residential upbringing with FAC3. This factor reflects institutionally mediated empowerment where participation is perceived as legitimate and effective within formal channels. It’s important to note that although they are comprised of the same items and result in the same factor name, this factor does not represent the same capital structure as Indonesia.

Such finding suggested that female youth tended to report higher belief regarding their political participation which aligns with recent studies suggesting

women may engage more actively in communicative and network-based political participation, particularly in digital and informal spaces. This conclusion may also indicate how political discourse differ between gender in Indonesia, reflecting deeper that female youth perceive greater political agency and space to participate in Indonesia differs between gender.

Table 9. Mean Comparison of FAC4 (Cognitively Detached Youth) Across Demographic Groups

Demographic Variables	Statistical Test	F/t-value	p-value	Pair means with Significant Difference
Age	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 375) = 2.655$	0.072	None.
Gender	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 375) = 0.630$	0.185	None.
Education	One-way ANOVA	$F(4, 373) = 0.481$	0.750	None.
Job	One-way ANOVA	$F(4, 373) = 1.983$	0.103	None.
Geographical Location	One-way ANOVA	$F(5, 372) = 2.792$	0.017	“Sumatra” (-0.312) : “Bali dan Nusa Tenggara” (0.657)
Residential Upbringing	Independent T-Test	$t(376) = 2.877$	0.004	“Urban” (0.083) : “Rural” (-0.256)

Table 9 presents the statistical finding from the comparison of FAC4 across the demographic variables. Two significant differences were found. One of which is between geographical locations ($F(5, 372)$, $p = 0.017$) where youth respondents located in Sumatra scored lower (-0.132) than those in Bali and Nusa Tenggara (0.657). Another difference was found in residential upbringing ($t(376) = 2.877$, $p = 0.004$) with youths growing in urban aeras scoring higher (0.083) than those in rural areas (-0.256). Meanwhile, age, gender, education, and job have no statistically significant difference within its groups in regards to FAC4.

These findings suggested that youth in Bali and Nusa Tenggara scored significantly higher on cognitive detachment than those in Sumatra, indicating stronger perceptions of political irrelevance, limited efficacy, and disengagement.

Similarly, youth raised in urban areas exhibited higher levels of cognitive detachment than those from rural backgrounds. This pattern may reflect an overload of information or political fatigue where politics competes with economic and lifestyle priorities, particularly how political disengagement may be more influenced by contextual exposure than individual demographic traits.

Table 10. Mean Comparison of FAC5 (Disillusioned Youth) Across Demographic Groups

Demographic Variables	Statistical Test	F/t-value	p-value	Pair means with Significant Difference
Age	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 375) = 1.369$	0.256	None.
Gender	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 375) = 0.630$	0.533	None.
Education	One-way ANOVA	$F(4, 373) = 2.505$	0.042	None.
Job	One-way ANOVA	$F(4, 373) = 0.273$	0.895	None.
Geographical Location	One-way ANOVA	$F(5, 372) = 0.756$	0.582	None.
Residential Upbringing	Independent T-Test	$t(376) = -0.832$	0.406	None.

Table 10 presents how FAC5 scored in mean comparison with all the demographic variables, with a statistically significant difference detected across educational levels ($F(4, 373, p = 0.042)$). However, post-hoc comparisons did not identify specific group pairs driving this difference which suggests a diffused relationship between education and political disillusionment rather than polarization between discrete educational groups. This result indicates that educational background interacts with political participation in a complex and non-linear way that differs from clear structured form.

Table 11. Mean Comparison of FAC6 (Risk-Averse Youth) Across Demographic Groups

Demographic Variables	Statistical Test	F/t-value	p-value	Pair means with Significant Difference
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Age	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 375) = 1.861$	0.157	None.
Gender	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 375) = 3.262$	0.039	“Male” (-0.272) : “Female” (0.064)
Education	One-way ANOVA	$F(4, 373) = 0.126$	0.973	None.
Job	One-way ANOVA	$F(4, 373) = 0.613$	0.654	None.
Geographical Location	One-way ANOVA	$F(5, 372) = 0.618$	0.686	None.
Residential Upbringing	Independent T-Test	$t(376) = -1.256$	0.210	None.

Table 11 shows how FAC6 yields against the demographic variables in mean comparison. Only one statistically significant difference was found, which was in gender ($F(2, 375) = 3.262$, $p = 0.039$). Female youth scored higher (0.064) than their male counterpart (-0.272) in FAC6. Age, education, job, geographical location, and residential upbringing scored no statistically significant difference.

In FAC6 concerning risk-averse youth, gender is the only one scoring a significant difference where male youth score much lower which indicated that they are not as scared to the consequence of political participation as female youth are. This report can indicate a need to raise trust and a sense of security between youth and the democratic system, particularly to female youth. This finding aligns with literature suggesting women face higher perceived social and personal risks in political participation, particularly in contexts where political expression has risks. In other words, there is a gendered perception of political risk in Indonesia where female youth exhibit greater concern over the potential consequences in participation.

Table 12. Mean Comparison of FAC7 (Externally Motivated Youth Participation) Across Demographic Groups

Demographic Variables	Statistical Test	F/t-value	p-value	Pair means with Significant Difference
Age	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 375) = 3.727$	0.025	“18-20” (0.102) : “26-30” (-0.330)
Gender	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 375) = 5.885$	0.003	“Male” (-0.308) : “Female” (0.087)

Education	One-way ANOVA	$F(4, 373) = 0.452$	0.771	None.
Job	One-way ANOVA	$F(4, 373) = 1,338$	0.255	None.
Geographical Location	One-way ANOVA	$F(5, 372) = 0.803$	0.548	None.
Residential Upbringing	Independent T-Test	$t(376) = -0.664$	0.507	None.

Table 12 presents the mean comparison of FAC7 across the six demographic values with two statistically significant differences found, which were age ($F(2, 375) = 3.727$, $p = 0.025$) and gender ($F(2, 375) = 5.885$, $p = 0.003$). Concerning age, 18–20-year-old youths had scored higher (0.102) than the older 26–30-year-old youths (-0.330) whereas in gender, male youths scored lower (-0.308) than female youths (0.087). Meanwhile, education, job, geographical location, and residential upbringing had no statistically significant difference against FAC7.

These two found differences reported that younger youth who are between 18- and 20-years old report the need external motivation to politically participate in comparison to their older counterpart. Male youth are also reported to be less externally motivated in comparison to female youths. Such findings suggest that specified effort in increasing accessibility and opportunities for youth to engage politically in a public platform may aid in this reported gap. This pattern suggests Indonesian youth participation as highly conditional, relying on external validation, institutional signs, and social encouragement.

Overall, these findings revealed Indonesian youth perceptions of political participation vary selectively across demographic variables. Gender became the most consistent differentiating factor, particularly in political empowerment, risk aversion, and external motivation. Age differences suggest younger youth rely more heavily on institutional and social encouragements, whereas older youth who exhibit greater self-driven orientations. Regional and residential differences highlight the role of local

police environments in shaping cognitive detachment. Together, these results indicate that youth political perceptions in Indonesia are influenced less by structural demographics such as education or occupation and more by gendered experiences, life stage, and local sociopolitical context.

Analysis of Taiwanese Youth Perception on Political Participation

Factor Analysis of Taiwanese Youth Perception on Political Participation

The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy for the 227 valid Taiwanese responses was .743, and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was highly significant ($p < .001$), indicating that the data were suitable for exploratory factor analysis. The result of the factor analysis can be seen as in summarized in Table 13.

Table 13. Summary of Factor Analysis aa1-aa7 Results of Taiwanese Youth Perception towards Political Participation

Factors	Code	Questions	Factor loadings
8. <i>Civically Engaged Youth</i>	<i>political interest</i>	aa1 I am interested in political issues in my country.	.813
	<i>political knowledge</i>	aa2 I am knowledgeable about how the political system in my country works.	.635
	<i>information seeking</i>	aa3 I actively seek political information from media sources (e.g., news websites, TV, social media).	.729
	<i>perceived political efficacy</i>	aa4 I believe that my participation in political activities can influence political decisions.	.750
	<i>government trust</i>	aa5 I trust that government institutions act in the best interest of young people.	.695
	<i>transparency trust</i>	aa6 I trust that the election process in my country is transparent.	.426
	<i>judiciary trust</i>	aa7 I trust that the judiciary is impartial to all.	.715
9. <i>Critically Aware Youth</i>	<i>political knowledge</i>	aa2 I am knowledgeable about how the political system in my country works.	.588
	<i>government trust</i>	aa5 I trust that government institutions act in the best interest of young people.	-.521
	<i>transparency trust</i>	aa6 I trust that the election process in my country is transparent.	.575
	<i>judiciary trust</i>	aa7 I trust that the judiciary is impartial to all.	-.430

Note: Values with factor loadings less than 0.4 were suppressed.

The eighth factor analysis to the Taiwanese respondents holds seven items within the first segment of the survey and were all of positive factor loadings. Their political awareness was measured by political interest (aa1, .813), political knowledge (aa2, .635), information-seeking behavior (aa3, .729), perceived political efficacy (aa4, .750), as well as trust in government (aa5, .695), transparency (aa6, .426), and judiciary (aa7, .715). This factor captures a form of civic engagement that combines political interest, knowledge, information-seeking behavior, perceived efficacy, and institutional trust. Reflecting strong linking social capital, it grounds youth engagement in institutional trust, procedural confidence, and established democratic norms. It differs as trust exists but participation is not peer-anchored, instead system-anchored. Awareness and confidence in political institutions reflects a form of engagement rooted in Taiwan's open democratic environment, titling the factor as Civically Engaged Youth.

The ninth factor consists of four items with both positive and negative factor loadings. The positive items are political knowledge (aa2, .588) and trust in transparency (aa6, .575). The negative items are trust in government (aa5, -.521) and judiciary (aa7, -.430). With their distrust to the judiciary and government institutions while still remaining knowledgeable and trusting the election process, this reflects critical consciousness where awareness coexists with skepticism to institutional figures. It reflects trained linking social capital where political knowledge coexists with selective institutional distrust which indicates critical engagement, not withdrawal. This suggests that political engagement among Taiwanese youth does not have unconditional trust to their government. This factor is titled as Critically Aware Youth to capture the duality of youth perception and presence of selective trust.

The tenth factor's Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of sampling adequacy resulted in .785 and the Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was highly significant ($p < .001$).

Table 14. Summary of Factor Analysis Results of bb1-bb6 from the Taiwanese Youth

Factors	Code	Questions	Factor loadings
<i>10. Politically Empowered Youth</i>	voting is effective	bb1 Voting in elections is an effective way to bring political change.	.788
	future voter	bb2 In the future, I see myself participating in elections as a voter.	.749
	youth in demonstration	bb3 Demonstrating is an effective way for young people to influence politics.	.757
	political conversations	bb4 Discussing politics with others (offline or online) is important for political awareness.	.824
	social media is effective	bb5 Social media is an effective platform for youth political engagement.	.812
	organizational participation	bb6 I believe participating in political parties or youth councils is a meaningful way to influence policies.	.829

The tenth factor is identical as the result of the factor analysis on Indonesian youth, granting it with an identical title of Politically Empowered Youth. This factor shows that empowerment is mediated by the institutions where participation is perceived as effective within formal channels. In comparison to those of Indonesian youth, the items had consistently high factor loadings: perception of effective voting (bb1, .788), social media (bb5, .812), and organizational participation (bb6, .829), as well as voting in the future (bb2, .749), demonstration as an effective method (bb3, .757), political conversations (bb4, .824). Compared to Indonesian youth, Taiwanese youth exhibit a more cohesive empowered environment where formal, informal, and digital participation is able to coexist in one dimension.

The eleventh and twelfth factor concerns barriers to participation, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy resulted in .574 and the Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was highly significant ($p < .001$). Despite the KMO result being of

marginal sufficiency for factor analysis, the Bartlett's test was highly significant which allows the study to go on as presented in Table 15.

Table 15. Summary of Factor Analysis low1-low7 Results of Taiwanese Youth Perception towards Political Participation

Factors	Code	Questions	Factor loadings
11. Politically Detached Youth	<i>lack of knowledge</i>	low1 I do not have enough knowledge about politics	.433
	<i>lack of trust</i>	low2 I do not trust political leaders or institution:	-.568
	<i>time constraints</i>	low3 I am too busy with work, studies, or personal life.	-.633
	<i>perceived irrelevance of politics</i>	low4 Politics is not relevant to my daily life.	.535
	<i>political inefficacy</i>	low5 I feel that my voice will not make a difference	.506
12. Structurally Excluded Youth	<i>lack of access</i>	low6 There are no accessible opportunities for youth participation.	.723
	<i>fear of consequence</i>	low7 I fear negative consequences for political involvement.	.715

The eleventh factor consists of five items. Positive loadings reflect political disengagement through low knowledge (low1, .433), perceived irrelevance (low4, .535), and political inefficacy (low5, .506), while negative loadings on institutional distrust (low2, -.568) and time constraints (low3, 0.633) suggest that disengagement is not primarily driven by cynicism or lack of time. This factor represents politically detached youth whose disengagement stems from cognitive distance rather than distrust or constraint. Reflecting weak linking social capital, disengagement stems from limited access and perceived risk more than lack of political awareness. Their detachment reflects disengagement without antagonism. Thus, they are named Politically Detached Youth.

With only two items and both of positive factor loadings, the twelfth factor consists lack of access (low6, .723) and fear of negative consequences (low7, .715). Recognizing that no accessible opportunities and fear of negative consequences are

characteristics of structural and psychological barriers which is a systemic limitation youth perceives and restrains youth engagement regardless of their political awareness and interest. This factor is named Structurally Excluded Youth.

The last segment and factor had been proven highly significant through the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of sampling adequacy which resulted in .864 whereas the Bartlett's Test of Sphericity resulted in $p = <.001$.

Table 16. Summary of Factor Analysis cc1-cc5 Results of Taiwanese Youth Perception towards Political Participation

Factors	Code	Questions	Factor loadings
<i>13. Externally Motivated Youth Participation</i>	<i>education motivation</i>	cc1 Receiving political education would motivate me to participate.	.859
	<i>peer motivation</i>	cc2 Seeing my peers participate in political activities would encourage me to engage.	.830
	<i>government initiative motivation</i>	cc3 Clearer government initiatives for youth political involvement would encourage me to participate.	.879
	<i>transparency motivation</i>	cc4 More transparency in political institutions would make me more willing to engage.	.835
	<i>digital opportunity motivation</i>	cc5 More opportunities for digital political participation (e.g., online petitions, forums) would encourage me to be more active.	.862

Table 16 showcased how the thirteenth factor holds the same five items as the seventh factor in the Indonesian factor analysis with strongly positive factor loadings: motivation from education (cc1, .859), peers (cc2, .830), government initiatives (cc3, .879), transparency (cc4, .835) and opportunities for digital participation (cc5, .862). This factor represents youth whose political participation is conditional upon external factors which reflects existing engagement that is restrained by structural and motivational conditions. This leads to their name as Externally Motivated Youth Participation.

Lastly, after 31 questions were classified into 7 factors, the factors were narrowed down to a smaller range and standardized. This allows for consistent

comparison of factor scores across respondents and facilitates subsequent mean comparison analyses.

Taiwanese Youth Opinion on Political Participation

Using One-way ANOVA and Independent Samples T-tests, this section addresses Research Question 1 by examining Taiwanese youth perceptions of political participation. Factor scores derived from exploratory factor analysis were compared across key demographic variables, including age, gender, education, occupation, geographical location, and residential upbringing. This approach allows for identification of demographic patterns shaping youth political perception within Taiwan's distinct democratic and institutional context.

Table 17. Mean Comparison of FAC8 (Civically Engaged Youth) Across Demographic Groups

Demographic Variables	Statistical Test	F/t-value	p-value	Pair means with Significant Difference
Age	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 225) = 0.066$	0.936	None.
Gender	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 225) = 1.510$	0.223	None.
Education	One-way ANOVA	$F(3, 224) = 0.961$	0.412	None.
Job	One-way ANOVA	$F(4, 223) = 0.964$	0.428	None.
Geographical Location	One-way ANOVA	$F(5, 222) = 0.347$	0.884	None.
Residential Upbringing	Independent T-Test	$t(226) = -1.143$	0.254	None.

Table 17 shows the mean comparison of FAC8 across demographic variables. No statistically significant differences were found across age, gender, education, employment status, geographical location, or residential upbringing. This suggests that Taiwanese youth demonstrate relatively consistent perceptions in being civically engaged regardless of demographic background. The absence of significant

differences also suggest youth political perceptions in Taiwan are formed by a shared institutional and civic environment instead of individual demographic factors.

Table 18. Mean Comparison of FAC9 (Critically Aware Youth) Across Demographic Groups

Demographic Variables	Statistical Test	F/t-value	p-value	Pair means with Significant Difference
Age	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 225) = 0.115$	0.891	None.
Gender	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 225) = 1.273$	0.282	None.
Education	One-way ANOVA	$F(3, 224) = 0.190$	0.903	None.
Job	One-way ANOVA	$F(4, 223) = 0.104$	0.981	None.
Geographical Location	One-way ANOVA	$F(5, 222) = 1.859$	0.096	None.
Residential Upbringing	Independent T-Test	$t(226) = 0.199$	0.842	None.

Table 18 shows there is no statistically significant difference in mean comparison of FAC9 found across age, gender, education, employment status, geographical location, or residential upbringing. This suggests that critical political awareness with selective institutional trust is broadly shared among Taiwanese youth across demographic groups, further reinforcing the idea of a homogeneous civic culture among Taiwanese youth.

Table 19. Mean Comparison of FAC10 (Politically Empowered Youth) Across Demographic Groups

Demographic Variables	Statistical Test	F/t-value	p-value	Pair means with Significant Difference
Age	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 225) = 2.395$	0.094	None.
Gender	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 225) = 1.308$	0.273	None.
Education	One-way ANOVA	$F(3, 224) = 0.832$	0.478	None.
Job	One-way ANOVA	$F(4, 223) = 0.412$	0.800	None.
Geographical Location	One-way ANOVA	$F(5, 222) = 0.347$	0.884	None.
Residential Upbringing	Independent T-Test	$t(226) = -1.886$	0.061	None.

Table 19 displays the mean comparison of FAC10 across the demographic variables, where there is no statistically significant difference found across age, gender, education, employment status, geographical location, or residential upbringing. This suggests that beliefs regarding the effectiveness of both formal and informal political participation is uniform among Taiwanese youth as well as how youth perception towards institutions outweigh demographic variables in influencing participation.

Table 20. Mean Comparison of FAC11 (Politically Detached Youth) Across Demographic Groups

Demographic Variables	Statistical Test	F/t-value	p-value	Pair means with Significant Difference
Age	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 225) = 1.619$	0.200	None.
Gender	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 225) = 1.259$	0.286	None.
Education	One-way ANOVA	$F(3, 224) = .434$	0.729	None.
Job	One-way ANOVA	$F(4, 223) = 0.519$	0.722	None.
Geographical Location	One-way ANOVA	$F(5, 222) = 1.550$	0.175	None.
Residential Upbringing	Independent T-Test	$t(226) = 0.105$	0.916	None.

Table 20 shows there is no statistically significant difference in mean comparison of FAC9 found across age, gender, education, employment status, geographical location, or residential upbringing. This suggests that political detachment in Taiwan is a generalized orientation instead of a demographic-specific disengagement. A united democratic context with shared expectations of participation is reflected through this pattern.

Table 21. Mean Comparison of FAC12 (Structurally Excluded Youth) Across Demographic Groups

Demographic Variables	Statistical Test	F/t-value	p-value	Pair means with Significant Difference
Age	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 225) = 0.022$	0.978	None.

Gender	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 225) = 0.256$	0.774	None.
Education	One-way ANOVA	$F(3, 224) = 1.223$	0.302	None.
Job	One-way ANOVA	$F(4, 223) = 0.552$	0.698	None.
Geographical Location	One-way ANOVA	$F(5, 222) = 1.751$	0.124	None.
Residential Upbringing	Independent T-Test	$t(226) = 1.817$	0.071	None.

Table 21 displays the mean comparison of FAC10 across the demographic variables, where there is no statistically significant difference found across age, gender, education, employment status, geographical location, or residential upbringing. This suggests that youth perceptions of structural and institutional barriers are shared across demographic categories, indicating its trait to be systemic which supports the portrayal of Taiwanese youth's united perception of civic environment.

Table 22. Mean Comparison of FAC13 (Externally Motivated Youth Participation) Across Demographic Groups

Demographic Variables	Statistical Test	F/t-value	p-value	Pair means with Significant Difference
Age	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 225) = 0.696$	0.500	None.
Gender	One-way ANOVA	$F(2, 225) = 0.883$	0.415	None.
Education	One-way ANOVA	$F(3, 224) = 0.743$	0.528	None.
Job	One-way ANOVA	$F(4, 223) = 1.797$	0.130	None.
Geographical Location	One-way ANOVA	$F(5, 222) = 0.806$	0.547	None.
Residential Upbringing	Independent T-Test	$t(226) = -1.653$	0.100	None.

Table 22 shows there is no statistically significant difference in mean comparison of FAC9 found across age, gender, education, employment status, geographical location, or residential upbringing. This suggests that the need for external incentives such as education, transparency, and institutional outreach is consistent across Taiwanese youth demographics.

In contrast to the Indonesian youth responses, the absence of variation found in Taiwanese youth suggests that their perception is broadly consistent regardless of education, gender, or location. There are several potential reasons as to why all the factors resulted without statistically significant difference. Firstly, there were either no true relationship or only a weak relationship between the factors and the presented demographic variables. Secondly, the observed data had occurred simply by chance. Thirdly, the dataset is too small to the extent that an existing true effect is not able to be detected. Fourth, the possibility that Taiwanese youth share a more homogenous political culture which leads to minimal perceptual differences across demographic lines.

Compared to Indonesian youth, Taiwanese youth display more differentiated patterns of perception across factors related to institutional trust, civic awareness, and structural access. While Indonesian youth perceptions were largely uniform across demographics, Taiwanese youth exhibited a more distinct stratification, particularly in factors related to civic engagement and structural exclusion. This aligns with Taiwan's institutionalized channels for youth participation and stronger democratic consolidation.

Evaluating Institutional Trust and Political Awareness Across Taiwanese and Indonesian Youth

This section compares the patterns of youth political participation between Indonesia and Taiwan by examining similarities and differences across factor structures and demographic influences. It does so as the comparisons highlight how institutional contexts and levels of democratic consolidation shape youth perception, efficacy, barriers, and motivations for political participation.

To answer Research Question 2: Does institutional trust and political awareness influence their engagement choices, youth perception of the three variables was measured using frequency count and percentages through SPSS. Firstly, institutional trust includes aa5, aa6, aa7, and low2 whereas political awareness includes aa1, aa2, aa3, bb4, and low1.


Table 23. Frequencies and Percentages of Indonesian and Taiwanese Youth's Perception to Institutional Trust

		aa5		aa6		aa7	
		Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Strongly Disagree	Indonesian	67	17.7	90	23.8	126	33.3
	Taiwanese	58	25.4	18	7.9	64	28.1
Disagree	Indonesian	150	39.7	136	36.0	151	39.9
	Taiwanese	52	22.8	17	7.5	58	25.4
Neutral	Indonesian	89	23.5	89	23.5	59	15.6
	Taiwanese	63	27.6	62	27.2	54	23.7
Agree	Indonesian	50	13.2	52	13.8	25	6.6
	Taiwanese	36	15.8	76	33.3	26	11.4
Strongly Agree	Indonesian	22	5.7	11	2.9	17	4.5
	Taiwanese	19	8.3	55	24.1	26	11.4

Table 23 summarizes how Indonesian and Taiwanese youth perceives institutional trust, presenting how the two contrast against one another. Concerning government trust (aa5), most Indonesian youth expressed disagreement with 39.7% whereas Taiwanese youth were fairly spread out with 23.5% expressing neutrality, 17.7% expressing strong disagreement, and 22.8% expressing disagreement. In terms of trust in transparency of the election process (aa6), 36% of Indonesian youth expressed disagreement while 23.5% expressed neutrality and 23.8 expressed disagreement which highly differs from the Taiwanese youth where 33.3% expressed agreement, 27.2% expressed neutrality and 24.1% expressed strong agreement. Judiciary trust (aa7) resulted similarly between the two youths, with 39.9% of Indonesian youth expressing disagreement and 33.3% expressing strong disagreement

while 28.1% of Taiwanese youth expressed strong disagreement while 25.4% expressed disagreement.

Figure 1. Percentages of Indonesian and Taiwanese Youth Perception to low2



Lastly, as presented in

Figure 1, distrust to political leaders or institutions resulted differently as well. Most Indonesian youth, which was 64.6%, agreed whereas 35.4% expressed trust. Taiwanese youth, on the other hand, resulted in an equal split of 50% expressing trust and distrust.

These findings suggest that more Indonesian youth perceives the government and judiciary with stronger distrust, whereas Taiwanese youth demonstrate moderate trust and greater doubt. The polarization found in Indonesian youth perception may signal the urgent need for government accountability and transparency reforms while Taiwan’s relatively neutral response suggests sustained but cautious confidence in its institutions. The two youth completely polarize regarding transparency of election process, with Indonesian youths strongly reporting strong disagreement while most Taiwanese youth expressed agreement and neutrality


Table 24. Frequencies and Percentages of Indonesian and Taiwanese Youth's Perception to Political Awareness

		aa1		aa2		aa3	
		Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Strongly Disagree	Indonesian	0	0	6	1.6	3	0.8
	Taiwanese	7	3.1	10	4.4	9	3.9
Disagree	Indonesian	17	4.5	40	10.6	36	9.5
	Taiwanese	33	14.5	17	7.5	40	17.5
Neutral	Indonesian	52	13.8	83	22.0	81	21.4
	Taiwanese	64	28.1	56	24.6	39	17.1
Agree	Indonesian	200	52.9	203	53.7	166	43.9
	Taiwanese	91	39.9	87	38.2	80	26.3
Strongly Agree	Indonesian	109	28.8	46	12.2	92	24.3
	Taiwanese	33	14.5	58	25.4	60	26.3

Table 24 summarizes the Indonesian and Taiwanese perception regarding political awareness. Concerning self-perceived national interest (aa1), 52.9% of Indonesian youth expressed agreement in being interested while only 39.9% of Taiwanese youth expressed the same agreement with 28.1% expressing neutrality. Both youths, with 53.7% of Indonesian youth and 38.2% of Taiwanese youth, expressed being knowledgeable of their national political issues though 24.6% of Taiwanese youth expressed neutrality and 25.4% expressed strong agreement. 43.9% of Indonesian youth and 26.3% of Taiwanese youth expressed agreement in actively seeking political news, with an equal amount of 26.3% Taiwanese youth also expressing strong agreement. In terms of lack of knowledge as a barrier, 65.9% of Indonesian youth and 69.3% of Taiwanese youth expressed disagreement which is presented in the following

Figure 2.

Figure 2. Percentages of Indonesian and Taiwanese Youth Perception to low1



These results reveal that Indonesian youth are more open in their interest and being active to seeking political information whereas Taiwanese youth are quieter but informed political awareness. Henceforth, it can be interpreted that political participation calls for action from the political leaders, institutions, and government instead of the lack of will from the youth.

Analysis of Indonesian and Taiwanese Youth Perception on Political Participation

Multi-Group Factor Analysis of Indonesian and Taiwanese Youth Perception on Political Participation

Amounting to 605 responses of both Indonesian and Taiwanese respondents, the data followed an identical SPSS process involving factor analysis to test their measurement invariance. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of sampling adequacy test yielded .695 and the Bartlett's Test of Sphericity showed statistical significance ($p < .001$), indicating that the united dataset of Indonesian and Taiwanese youth is sufficient to run factor analysis tests.

Table 25. Summary of Multi-Group Factor Analysis aa1-aa7 of Taiwanese and Indonesian Youth Perception to Political Participation

Factors	Code	Questions	Factor loadings
14. Institutionally- Trusting Youth	<i>national interest</i>	aa1 I am interested in political issues in my country.	.752
	<i>political knowledge</i>	aa2 I am knowledgeable about how the political system in my country works.	.655
	<i>information seeking</i>	aa3 I actively seek political information from media sources (e.g., news websites, TV, social media).	.749
	<i>perceived political efficacy</i>	aa4 I believe that my participation in political activities can influence political decisions.	.674
	<i>government trust</i>	aa5 I trust that government institutions act in the best interest of young people.	.598
	<i>judiciary trust</i>	aa7 I trust that the judiciary is impartial to all.	.525
15. Civically Confident Youth	<i>political interest</i>	aa1 I am interested in political issues in my country.	-.430
	<i>government trust</i>	aa5 I trust that government institutions act in the best interest of young people.	.532
	<i>transparency trust</i>	aa6 I trust that the election process in my country is transparent.	.710
	<i>judiciary trust</i>	aa7 I trust that the judiciary is impartial to all.	.669
16. Politically Disenchanted Youth	<i>political knowledge</i>	aa2 I am knowledgeable about how the political system in my country works.	.553
	<i>perceived political efficacy</i>	aa4 I believe that my participation in political activities can influence political decisions.	-.452
	<i>transparency trust</i>	aa6 I trust that the election process in my country is transparent.	.505

The fourteenth factor consists of six positively loaded items, of which five items are identical to the Active Democratic Youth from the Indonesian youth as political interest (aa1, .752), political knowledge (aa2, .655), information-seeking behavior (aa3, .749), perceived political efficacy (aa4, .674), and trust in government (aa5, .598). The addition of trust in judiciary (aa7, .525) then leads to this factor titled as Institutionally-Trusting Youth.

The fifteenth factor of the merged data consists of four values, three of which had been strongly positive and one of which was negative in its factor loading. There are positive loadings of trust in government (aa5, .745), transparency (aa6, .639), and judiciary (aa7, .825). The one negative loading had been political interest (aa1, .752). These values indicate high trust while maintaining interest which presents political

efficacy and civic optimism, titling it as Civically Confident Youth to reflect the engagement driven through trust and grounded in their belief to institutions.

The sixteenth factor of the merged dataset consists of three values, two with positive factor loadings and one with negative factor loading. The two positive items were political knowledge (aa2, .553) and trust in transparency (aa6, .505), indicating knowledge and trust to their government. With the negative item of perceived political efficacy (aa4, -.452) showing low internal efficacy and demotivation, thus this factor is titled Politically Disenchanted Youth.

Table 26. Summary of Multi-Group Factor Analysis Results of bb1-bb6 from the Indonesian and Taiwanese Youth

Factors	Code	Questions	Factor loadings
<i>17. Politically Empowered Youth</i>	voting is effective	bb1 Voting in elections is an effective way to bring political change.	.686
	future voter	bb2 In the future, I see myself participating in elections as a voter.	.730
	youth in demonstration	bb3 Demonstrating is an effective way for young people to influence politics.	.712
	political conversations	bb4 Discussing politics with others (offline or online) is important for political awareness.	.764
	social media is effective	bb5 Social media is an effective platform for youth political engagement.	.771
	organizational participation	bb6 I believe participating in political parties or youth councils is a meaningful way to influence policies.	.682

The seventeenth factor went through the same two tests of Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of sampling adequacy which resulted in .862 and the Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was highly significant ($p < .001$). Table 26 presents how the seventeenth factor for the merged dataset remains the same as it had been with both the Indonesian and Taiwanese youth respectively, allowing it the same title of Politically Empowered Youth.

The eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth factors is regarding the barriers of political participation and has resulted in .809 for Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of

sampling adequacy while Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was highly significant ($p < .001$), which indicated that the data is sufficient to conduct factor analysis with.

Table 27. Summary of Multi-Group Factor Analysis low1-low7 of Taiwanese and Indonesian Youth Perception to Political Participation

Factors	Code	Questions	Factor loadings
18. Socioeconomically Advantaged Youth	<i>lack of knowledge</i>	low1 I do not have enough knowledge about politics	.548
	<i>lack of trust</i>	low2 I do not trust political leaders or institutions.	-.461
	<i>perceived irrelevance of politics</i>	low4 Politics is not relevant to my daily life.	.622
	<i>political inefficacy</i>	low5 I feel that my voice will not make a difference	.640
19. Underprivileged Youth	<i>lack of trust</i>	low2 I do not trust political leaders or institutions.	.471
	<i>time constraints</i>	low3 I am too busy with work, studies, or personal life.	.425
	<i>lack of access</i>	low6 There are no accessible opportunities for youth participation.	.580
	<i>fear of consequence</i>	low7 I fear negative consequences for political involvement.	.556
20. Time-Constrained Youth	<i>time constraints</i>	low3 I am too busy with work, studies, or personal life.	.717
	<i>fear of consequence</i>	low7 I fear negative consequences for political involvement.	-.596

Table 27 first presents how the eighteenth factor consists of three items with positive loadings and two negative loading, with the positive loadings of “I do not have enough knowledge about politics” (low1, .548), “Politics is not relevant to my daily life” (low3, .622), and “I feel that my voice will not make a difference” (low5, .640). The negative loading had been “I do not trust political leaders or institutions” (low2 -.461). These values and factor loadings describe the acknowledgement of lacking knowledge, trusting political figures, politics as irrelevant and not impactful. Thus, this factor is named Socioeconomically Advantaged Youth.

The nineteenth factor consists of four positive items, which are lack of trust (low2, .471) and access (low6, .580), time constraints (low3, .425), and fear of consequence (low7, .556). These values describe lack of trust to politics, lack of time to participate, lack of accessibility, and present consequence of political participation which sums up to the context of underprivileged citizens. Hence, this factor is titled as Socioeconomically Disadvantaged Youth.

The twentieth factor consists of two values. One has a positive loading, namely time constraints (low3, .425) whereas fear of consequence (low7, -.569) has a negative loading. These items and factor loadings describe the behavior of having no time for politics and no fear of participating, thus naming this factor as Time-Constrained Youth.

Lastly, the twenty-first factor's Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin Measure of sampling adequacy resulted in .847 and the Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was highly significant ($p < .001$), which indicated sufficient data for factor analysis. It had resulted in one factor, as it did in the previous tests for both Indonesian and Taiwanese youth respectively.

Table 28. Summary of Multi-Group Factor Analysis cc1-cc5 of Taiwanese and Indonesian Youth Perception to Political Participation

Factors	Code	Questions	Factor loadings
21. Externally Motivated Youth Participation	<i>education motivation</i>	cc1 Receiving political education would motivate me to participate.	.798
	<i>peer motivation</i>	cc2 Seeing my peers participate in political activities would encourage me to engage.	.799
	<i>government initiative motivation</i>	cc3 Clearer government initiatives for youth political involvement would encourage me to participate.	.843
	<i>transparency motivation</i>	cc4 More transparency in political institutions would make me more willing to engage.	.789
	<i>digital opportunity motivation</i>	cc5 More opportunities for digital political participation (e.g., online petitions, forums) would encourage me to be more active.	.824

With all five items containing positive factor loadings in Table 28, namely motivation from education (cc1, .798), peers (cc2, .799), government initiatives (cc3, .843), transparency (cc4, .789), and opportunities for digital participation (cc5, .824). This factor was named Externally Motivated Youth Participation.

Finally, these factor scores were calculated with each factor's variables multiplied by their respective factor loadings and its sum were then divided by the total of the calculates factor loadings, which produces scores ranging from 1 to 5.

Cross-National Comparison of Youth Political Participation

With a merged dataset of Indonesian and Taiwanese youth, the researcher places effort to answering Research Question 3: How do youth perception of political participation differ in contrasting democratic structures, particularly Taiwan and Indonesia? The researcher utilized independent t-test to identify where Indonesian and Taiwanese youth differ in their factor-based perceptions and orientations towards political participation. Emphasizing on the comparative study of these two-target population, the researcher omits demographic variables in favor of assessing whether or not there are significant differences between youths of contrasting democratic and institutional contexts. The comparison between the two nations is based on factor patterns instead of raw data, with FAC14–FAC21 representing factor structures derived from the merged dataset, allowing direct cross-national comparison based on identical survey items.

Table 29. Mean Summary of FAC14-FAC20 across National Identity

Factors	t-value	p-value	Pair means with Significant Difference
FAC14	t(604) = 1.640	.104	None.
FAC15	t(604) = -11.640	<.001	"Indonesian" (-0.332): "Taiwanese" (0.550)
FAC16	t(604) = -7.702	<.001	"Indonesian" (-0.232): "Taiwanese" (0.384)
FAC17	t(604) = 5.278	<.001	"Indonesian" (0.162): "Taiwanese" (-0.270)

FAC18	$t(604) = -1.483$.139	None.
FAC19	$t(604) = 1.362$.174	None.
FAC20	$t(604) = -6.687$	<.001	“Indonesian” (-0.203): “Taiwanese” (0.337)
FAC21	$t(604) = 2.944$.003	“Indonesian” (0.092): “Taiwanese” (-0.153)

Table 29 presents how FAC14 up to FAC21 scores across Indonesian and Taiwanese youth respondents. Firstly, FAC14 ($t(604) = 1.640$, $p = .104$) found no statistically significant difference regarding Institutionally Trusting Youth. So did FAC18 ($t(604) = -1.483$, $p = .139$) concerning Socioeconomically Advantaged Youth and FAC19 ($t(604) = 1.362$, $p = .174$) concerning Socioeconomically Disadvantaged Youth scored no statistically significant difference.

Secondly, FAC15 ($t(604) = -11.640$, $p < .001$) yields Taiwanese youth (0.550) with a higher score in comparison to Indonesian youth (-0.332) which concerns Civically Confident Youth. This suggests that Taiwanese youth have stronger political confidence even when it does not consistently become active participation. Concerning FAC16 ($t(604) = -7.702$, $p = < .001$) titled Pessimistic about Political Participation, Indonesian youth score lower (-0.232) than their Taiwanese counterpart (0.384). It suggests that political disengagement among Taiwanese youth reflects institutional fatigue and perceived inefficacy instead of political apathy. Statistically significant difference was also found in FAC20 ($t(604) = -6.687$, $p = < .001$), titled Time-Constrained Youth, where Taiwanese youth scored higher (0.337) than Taiwanese youth (-0.203). Such suggests that despite a consolidated democratic system, structural pressures and lifestyle demands are practical barriers to participation for Taiwanese youth.

Thirdly, FAC17 ($t(604) = 5.278$, $p = < .001$) found statistically significant difference concerning Politically Empowered Youth, where Indonesian youth scored higher (0.162) than Taiwanese youth (-0.270) whereas in FAC21 ($t(604) = 2.944$, p

= .003) concerning Externally Motivated Participation, Taiwanese youth (-0.153) scored lower than Indonesian youth (0.092). This suggests Indonesian youth are more likely to perceive political participation as reachable means of influence when mobilized through social or collective mediums. The Indonesian youth is also conditional upon enabling environments that are comprised of peer encouragement, institutional openness, and visible opportunities for engagement.

Concluding to the results of mean comparison of Indonesian and Taiwanese youth respondents across seven factors from the merged dataset, the data showed that Indonesian youth score higher than Taiwanese youth in two factors, namely Politically Empowered Youth (FAC17) and Externally Motivated Youth Participation (FAC21). These findings indicate Indonesian youth reported higher internal efficacy, belief in multiple channels of influence, and a need for external motivations for political participation.

With Socioeconomically Advantaged Youth and Socioeconomically Disadvantaged Youth containing no significant difference between Indonesian and Taiwanese youth, it signified both nations have concerns on the lack of accessibility to participate politically for youth. On the other hand, Taiwanese youth scored higher than Indonesian youth in Civically Confident Youth (FAC15), Pessimistic Youth (FAC16), and Time-Constrained Youth (FAC20). These may indicate how Taiwanese youth reported higher levels of trust in the government while being more demotivated to the turnout of their participation, and reported being more preoccupied than their Indonesian youth.

Overall, Indonesian youth participation is primarily supported by bonding and online social capital which compensates for its weaker institutional trust whereas Taiwanese youth participation is structured through linking social capital which is

indicating strain despite democratic stability. Thus, these differences indicate how Indonesian youth participation is influenced by situational access and social mobilization while Taiwanese youth participation is restrained by perceived sense of institutional responsiveness instead of civic opportunity.

Summary of Major Findings

Within this section, an analysis of findings regarding youth perception of political participation from both Taiwan and Indonesia is presented. These findings reveal the ways demographic factors such as age, gender, education, occupation, geographical location, and residential upbringing are influential to youth perception of both nations, which reveals the distinct yet interconnected patterns in how Indonesian and Taiwanese youth perceive political perception.

Firstly, the matter of demographic influence. Indonesian youth perception varies between gender, age, and socioeconomic setting, which shows that political participation is externally shaped by lived experience and environment. Taiwanese youth perception remained demographically uniform, implying a shared political culture and institutional constituency. The second point is regarding institutional trust, where Indonesian youth exhibit deeper distrust towards government and judiciary whereas Taiwanese youth showed moderate institutional trust yet expressed dissatisfaction with judicial transparency. Third, concerning political awareness, Indonesian youth reported higher interest and information-seeking attitude while Taiwanese youth show balanced yet less expressive awareness. Fourth, the statistically significant differences found between several factors. Indonesian youth scored higher in Politically Empowered Youth and Externally Motivated Youth Participation, indicating eagerness but dependence on the presence of enabling

environment. Taiwanese youth scored higher in Civically Confident, Politically Disenchanted Youth, and Time-Constrained Youth which illustrates their trust in institutions but frustration with competing life priorities. Both groups show no significant difference in socioeconomic factors which further highlights shared barriers to youth accessibility and inclusion.

In summary, Indonesian youth are mobilizable but externally dependent on political orientation while Taiwanese youth demonstrate institutional confidence which is dulled down by disillusionment and pressure of time. These results confirms that youth political participation is contextually and institutionally conditioned.

Implications of the Findings

For democracy, these findings suggest that youth political participation under democratic systems are more influenced by accessibility and credibility of participatory channels than it is on regime type. While both Indonesia and Taiwan operate under democratic framework, youth engagement varies according to perceived efficacy, institutional responsiveness, and social capital arrangements.

In terms of youth policy and civic education, these findings indicate that youth participation initiatives should not stop at providing knowledge and place focus on creating visible, accessible, and responsive channels for engagement. For Indonesian youth, peer-based and community-mobilized programs may be more effective while rebuilding the perceived impact within institutions are more critical for Taiwanese youth.

For future research, this study can be built on through incorporating qualitative methods like interviews or focus groups to further deepen how youth interpret political efficacy and institutional trust. Collecting information regarding youth

repeatedly over an extended period of time to track changes may also clarify whether the observed patterns are determined by life-cycle phases or a broader generational shift.

CONCLUSION

Overall, the cross-national comparison reveals both shared and separated patterns in youth perceptions of political participation between Indonesia and Taiwan when examined at the factor level. While dimensions like institutional trust and socioeconomic positioning showed no statistically significant differences, there were other factors which displayed clear variation across the two nations. Indonesian youth reported higher scores regarding political empowerment and external motivation for participation whereas Taiwanese youth scored higher for factors associated with civic confidence, political disillusionment, and time-related constraints. The implications are further analyzed in the following discussion chapter.

Discussion

This study examined youth perceptions of political participation in Indonesia and Taiwan through a factor-based comparative approach. By identifying the dimensions of engagement, trust, motivation, and constraint, the research aimed to understand how youth political participation is perceived across contrasting democratic contexts. The discussion interprets these findings through political participation literature and social capital theory.

Research Question 1: How do youth in Taiwan and Indonesia perceive political participation today?

Youth perception of political participation in Taiwan and Indonesia reflect the contrasting institutional and cultural contexts, resulting in different meanings to participation. Indonesian youth display conditional engagement where participation occurs when external encouragement, peer mobilization, or visible institutional transparency is present. Political participation then relies on contextual and social enablers rather than internalized political confidence. Gender and age distinctions suggest that younger and female youth are more responsive to these participatory triggers whereas male and older respondents tend to be more disengaged.

Meanwhile, Taiwanese youth reveal a more uniform and institutionally grounded perception, as they are less influenced by demographic background which indicates a shared political culture. However, this shared culture coexists with institutional fatigue where their sense of trust in democratic structures is weakened by disillusionment regarding their political efficacy.

Youth in both democracies view participation as valuable but with conditions. Indonesians perceive it as an instrumental tool for influence which is activated when enabling conditions are present, reflecting lower institutional trust coexisting with the persisting belief of their participation's potential impact and a reliance on bonding social capital.²⁶ Meanwhile, Taiwanese youth perceive it as normatively important but low-impact, holding with an emotional distance that renders it as a symbol that is increasingly limited in action.

²⁶ Putnam, Robert. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. 2000. doi:10.1145/358916.361990.

Research Question 2: How do institutional trust and political awareness influence youth political engagement choices?

Institutional trust and political awareness impacts both Taiwanese and Indonesian youth in contrasting ways. For Indonesian youth, low institutional trust coexists with relatively high internal efficacy which produces political engagement that is driven by self-initiative and peer mobilization rather than institutional dependency. Political awareness is maintained through media consumption and social interaction, enabling participation despite existing skepticism towards formal governance.

Taiwanese youth, on the other hand, exhibit moderate institutional trust but low external efficacy. They perceive the government and electoral processes as somewhat transparent yet contain doubt that their participation will yield tangible outcomes. This combination produces politically aware but cautiously passive engagement from youth, which can be characterized by selective or issue-based involvement rather than routine engagement.

Applying the political efficacy theory, the relationship of institutional trust and political awareness between youth are able to be defined: political awareness enables readiness whereas efficacy determines the whether it matters. In Indonesia, youth's low external efficacy indicates the need for the government to strengthen trust by targeted communication and transparency audits. In Taiwan, youth's moderate internal efficacy and low external efficacy points to institutional reflection on responsiveness. In both cases, awareness reinforces engagement potential and efficacy influences whether it matters while political empowerment influences the form participation takes: communal and grassroots for Indonesian youth and observational and cautious for Taiwanese youth.

Research Question 3: How do differing democratic institutional structures form youth political perception and participation in Taiwan and Indonesia?

The democratic structures of Indonesia and Taiwan condition youth perception to differ in three key points of trust, efficacy, and access. Democratic institutions do not increase participation in a uniform manner, instead reorganizing how participation is expressed.

Indonesia's developing democracy led youth participation through bonding social capital, where peer and community networks compensates the weaker institutional reliability. Engagement then arises from peer trust instead of state trust, which makes political participation collective, situational, and expressive. Taiwan's democratic context reflects political participation influenced by strained linking social capital. With youth's confidence in democratic processes yet frustration in institutional responsiveness, the trust in system remains while perceived inefficacy diminishes the enthusiasm to politically engage. This results in respect for formal institutions without strong emotional investment.

Thus, both Indonesian and Taiwanese youth pertain active citizenship under democracy while differing in the drivers of political participation: Indonesian youth rely on social networks as gateways for participation while Taiwanese youth depend on institutional credibility but struggle with motivational decline. The conceptual pathway proposed within this study demonstrates how varying forms of social capital (bonding, bridging, linking, and online) are able to interact with political efficacy to influence the form of political empowerment under encouraging and engaging institutional environments.

Suggestion

Based on the analysis and findings from this research, there are several practical and theoretical suggestions to be considered. Firstly, the Taiwanese sample size can be expanded to achieve parity with the Indonesian dataset. A larger and more balanced respondent pool would allow better cross-national comparisons and statistical reliability. Future studies should consider conducting mixed-method designs by incorporating interviews or focus groups to capture qualitative nuances explaining these statistical trends concerning institutional trust and efficacy perceptions. Secondly, these findings highlight the necessity for institutional recognition of youth as active political stakeholders. Governments and policymakers should prioritize accessible and transparent communication channels for youth participation, both digitally and local-level initiatives. In Indonesia, the observed polarizations in youth perception suggest a need for standardized civic education and inclusive political engagement that goes over regional and socioeconomic divides. In Taiwan, efforts should focus on sustaining the trust through shared governance with institutional transparency matching the visible responsiveness towards youth concerns. Third, future research could extend this comparative framework to include other Asian or Global South contexts, or focus on a specific marginalized subgroup to expand understanding of social capital, political efficacy, and institutional trust play within democracy.

APPENDIX

Youth Perception of Political Participation: A Comparative Study of Indonesian and Taiwanese Youth

Questionnaire by

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Introduction – Dear Participant,

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this research study titled *Youth Perception of Political Participation: A Comparative Study of Indonesian and Taiwanese Youth*. This questionnaire is designed to explore youth perspectives on political participation, their engagement, and the factors influencing their involvement.

Your responses will remain strictly confidential and anonymous. The data collected will be used solely for academic research purposes. This questionnaire is composed of 32 questions, taking around 10 minutes to complete.

Section 1: Political Awareness and Perceived Efficacy

(Please rate the following statements on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = Strongly Disagree and 5 = Strongly Agree.)

	1	2	3	4	5
1. I am interested in political issues in my country.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
2. I am knowledgeable about how the political system in my country works.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
3. I actively seek political information from media sources (e.g., news websites, TV, social media).	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
4. I believe that my participation in political activities can influence political decisions.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
5. I trust that government institutions act in the best interest of young people.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

6. I trust that the election process in my country is transparent. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

7. I trust that the judiciary is impartial to all. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

Section 2: Attitudes Toward Political Participation

(Please rate the following statements on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = Strongly Disagree and 5 = Strongly Agree.)

	1	2	3	4	5
8. Voting in elections is an effective way to bring political change.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
9. In the future, I see myself participating in elections as a voter.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
10. Demonstrating is an effective way for young people to influence politics.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
11. Discussing politics with others (offline or online) is important for political awareness.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
12. Social media is an effective platform for youth political engagement.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
13. I believe participating in political parties or youth councils is a meaningful way to influence policies.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Section 3: Barriers and Motivations for Participation

Barriers to Participation

(Check all that apply.)

14. ☐ I do not have enough knowledge about politics

15. ☐ I do not trust political leaders or institutions.

16. ☐ I feel that my voice will not make a difference.

17. ☐ I am too busy with work, studies, or personal life.
18. ☐ Politics is not relevant to my daily life.
19. ☐ There are no accessible opportunities for youth participation.
20. ☐ I fear negative consequences for political involvement.

Motivations to Participate

(Please rate the following statements on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = Not Important, 5 = Very Important)

	1	2	3	4	5
21. Receiving political education would motivate me to participate.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
22. Seeing my peers participate in political activities would encourage me to engage.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
23. Clearer government initiatives for youth political involvement would encourage me to participate.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
24. More transparency in political institutions would make me more willing to engage.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
25. More opportunities for digital political participation (e.g., online petitions, forums) would encourage me to be more active.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Section 4: Demographic Information

(Check all that apply.)

26. Age

- ☐ 18-20 years old
- ☐ 21-25 years old
- ☐ 26-30 years old

27. Gender

- ☐ Male
- ☐ Female
- ☐ Other
- ☐ Prefer not to say

28. Educational Level

- ☐ No formal education
- ☐ High school
- ☐ Vocational school
- ☐ Bachelor's degree
- ☐ Postgraduate degree

29. Occupation

- ☐ Student
- ☐ Employed (Private Sector)
- ☐ Employed (Public Sector)
- ☐ Self-Employed
- ☐ Unemployed

30. Geographic Location

- ☐ Taiwan
- ☐ Sumatra
- ☐ Java
- ☐ Kalimantan
- ☐ Sulawesi
- ☐ Bali and Nusa Tenggara
- ☐ Maluku and Papua

31. Urban/Rural Residence

- ☐ Urban (city/metropolitan area)
- ☐ Rural (village/small town)

Thank you for your participation! Have a wonderful day ahead.

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